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Author: 


Powers,  Henry  Huntington 


Title: 


Wealth  and  welfare 


Place: 


Philadelphia 

Date: 

1899 


^t-f-P^O/T--^ 


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cPowers,  Henry  Huntington^  1859-1936. 

Wealth  and  welfare:  a  study  in  subjective 
economics;  the  nature  and  scope  of  economic  inquiry 
cPhiladelphia,  American  academy  of  political  and 
social  science,  18993 

95  p.   (On  cover:  Publications  of  the  American 
academy  of  political  and  social  science,  no,  248) 


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pubwcations  of 
The  American  Academy  of  Poi<iticai,  and  Sociai,  Science. 

No.  248. 


Issued  Fortnightly. 


April  4,  1899. 


Wealth  and  Welfare. 


1^  \ 


BY 


1 


Professor  H.  H.  Powers.    ^ 


A  PAPER  SUBMITTED  TO  THE 
AMERICAN  ACADEMY  OF  POLITICAL  AND  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 


PHILADELPHIA 
AMERICAN  ACADEMY  OF  POUTICAL  AND  SOCIAL  SCIENCE. 

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Gbrmant  :   Mayer  &  MiiUer,  a  Prinz  Louis  Ferdinandstrasse.  Berlin,  N.  W. 

Italy  :  Direzione  del  Giomale  degli  Economisti,  Rome,  via  Monte  Savello,  Palazzo  Orsini. 

Spain  ;  E.  Capdcviile,  9  Plaza  de  Santa  Afia,  Madrid. 


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THE  LIBRARIES 


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WEALTH  AND   WELFARE. 


A  STUDY  IN  SUBJECTIVE  ECONOMICS. 
THE    NATURE    AND    SCOPE    OF   ECONOMIC 

INQUIRY* 


Chapter  L 

INTRODUCTION. 

Economics,  like  all  other  sciences,  is  based  on  premises 
or  assumptions  which  it  does  not  itself  question.  No 
matter  how  far  back  the  investigation  is  carried  this  neces- 
sary dependence  remains.  New  assumptions  may  take  the 
place  of  old  ones,  but  the  science  still  rests  on  data  which 
it  as  such  cannot  vouch  for.  Built  upon  these  premises  a 
more  or  less  elaborate  structure  of  reasoning  and  conclusion 
represents  the  constructive  achievements  of  the  science. 

There  are  two  ways  in  which  the  science  can  progress. 

*  Prefatory  Note.— The  following  pages  were  written  as  an  introduction  to  a 
larger  work,  the  completion  of  which  has  been  delayed  by  other  interests.  As 
I  am  uncertain  when  I  shall  be  able  to  treat  the  subject  on  the  larger  scale  which 
I  contemplate  I  have  followed  the  advice  of  friends  to  offer  this  introduction  lor 
publication.  I  make  no  other  apology  for  it  than  this  explanation  of  its  obviously 
fragmentary  character. 

'  i  .      : '  ■    !      .'-     H.  H.  POWBRS. 
Berlin,  September  /,  1898. 

L325  J 


»   •    •  • 

B     *     i      0  • 

9  »       »   #« 


*       • 


Fiw. 


])il3 

2  Annals  of  the  American  Academy. 

Starting  with  given  premises  we  may  reason  forward  to 
evermore  remote  and  more  detailed  conclusions;  or,  return- 
ing to  our  starting  point,  we  may  work  our  way  backward, 
questioning  our  original  assumptions  and  modifying  them 
as  the  result  of  wider  investigation  or  in  deference  to  dis- 
coveries in  other  sciences  from  which  they  are  derived. 
The  first  process  is  in  a  sense  the  primary  and  normal  one, 
but  the  second  is  a  periodic  necessity. 

Economics  started  with  such  premises  as  were  available. 
Popular  notions  of  uncertain  authority,  conclusions  of  other 
sciences  in  different  stages  of  development,   and  finally, 
laws  of  the  mind  itself  which  impose  themselves  upon  the 
reasoning  process  and  give  no  reason  why,  all  were  united 
in  the  fundamentals  of  the  new  science.     The  revision  of 
these  premises  was  inevitable  and  was  in  part  foreseen,  but 
it  was  necessarily  long  postponed.     The  task  of  drawing 
conclusions   from   the   first  simple   premises  of    political 
economy  busied  economists  for  nearly  a  century.     From 
Adam  Smith  to  John  Stuart  Mill  there  is  little  change  in 
fundamentals  save  the  disappearance  of   Smith's   natural 
theology,  which  necessitated  but  little  change  in  the  science. 
But  all  that  has  changed.     Two  causes  have  contributed 
to  turn  inquiry  toward  the  premises  of  economics.     The 
first  was  the  development  of  other  sciences,  and  particularly 
of  biology.     In  this  field  a  principle  was  discovered  whose 
application  soon  proved  to  be  universal  and  its  importance 
well  nigh  revolutionary.     While  economics  may  boast  of 
having  been  the  real  pioneer  in  this  remarkable  discovery, 
since  it  was  Malthus  who  gave  Darwin  his  clue,  it  cannot 
be  said  that  the  science  has  been  quick  to  make  the  revision 
which  the  discovery  requires.     Something  of  an  introduc- 
tion of  biological  terminology  into  economic  literature  has 
indeed  testified  to  the  consciousness  of  the  problem,  but  as 
yet  there  has  been  no  adequate  or  even  approximate  recog- 
nition of  the  principle  6f  evolution,  the  reciprocal  modifi- 
ability  of  nature  and  hum«an  nature  in  mutual  contact,  as  a 

[326] 


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Wealth  and  Welfare.  3 

premise  of  economics.  Even  at  the  point  of  most  obvious 
contact,  the  doctrine  of  population,  the  radical  change 
required  by  evolution  is  but  partially  appreciated. 

But  the  revision  of  the  premises  of  economics  has  not 
always  been  thus  forced  upon  the  science  from  without  to 
the  disturbance  of  its  complacency.  In  large  part  it  has 
found  its  impulse  within  the  science  itself,  dissatisfied  with 
its  own  conclusions.  Very  often  these  conclusions,  the 
result  of  irrefragable  logic,  have  been  too  much  at  variance 
with  facts  to  justify  acceptance.  Hence  the  inevitable 
question :  Are  there  no  other  postulates  of  the  science,  no 
other  forces  sufficiently  important  to  account  for  these 
divergences  of  fact  from  theory  and  sufficiently  general  to 
permit  of  formulation  into  laws?  Reduced  to  its  last 
analysis,  this  is  the  purpose  of  the  historical  school,  to 
formulate  more  principles,  take  account  of  more  forces  and 
so  produce  a  science  approaching  more  nearly  in  complexity 
to  the  phenomena  which  it  purports  to  interpret. 

More  recently  the  impulse  to  examine  premises  has  mani- 
fested itself  in  another  form,  that  of  a  farther  analysis  of 
premises  already  accepted  with  a  view  to  their  better  com- 
prehension. Impelled  by  a  sense  of  the  unsatisfactoriness 
of  economic  inquiry,  the  inductive  economist  urges  that  the 
old  premises  were  too  few.  To  assume,  for  example,  that 
men  are  actuated  only  by  self-interest  will  not  explain  all 
phenomena.  Another  critic  says  the  premises  are  too 
vague,  too  ambiguous.  What  is  self-interest?  Under 
what  forms  may  it  appear?  These  two  lines  of  inquiry  are 
radically  different  in  method,  but  they  have  a  common 
origin  and  a  common  object.  They  seek  to  find  by  an 
inquiry  into  the  premises  of  the  old  political  economy  an 
explanation  of  phenomena  which  seem  to  contradict  or 
transcend  its  conclusions.  It  is  this  last  process,  this  effort 
to  examine  somewhat  more  thoroughly  certain  premises  of 
economics,  to  which  I  invite  attention  in  the  present 
work. 

[327] 


31"  I 


•  »    •    * 


4  Annals  of  ths  American  Academy. 

If  we  ask  in  what  respect  the  assumptions  of  the  older 
science  were  most  inadequate  the  reply  must  unhesitatingly 
be,  in  the  subjective  or  psychic  factors.     The  excessive 
simplification  of  the  ** economic  man"  was  suggestive  of 
incompleteness  at  the  outset,  but  the  conception  was  in 
reality  far  more  incomplete  than  it  seemed.     The  few  terms 
used  to  represent  the  multitude  of  psychic  phenomena  were 
not  analyzed  or  even  satisfactorily  defined.     As  a  conse- 
quence, reader  and  writer  played  fast  and  loose  with  them, 
confusing  each  other  and  even  confusing  themselves.     This 
neglect  of   subjective   phenomena,    however,  was   not  an 
oversight.      Mill  at  least  distinctly  discountenanced  any 
attempt  to  extend  economic  inquiry  into  this  field.     The 
two  opportunities  to  do  so  occurred  in  connection  with  con- 
sumption, which  is  the  goal  of  economic  effort  and  the 
source   of   economic   incentives,  and  value,  which   is  the 
shadow  that  coming  consumption  casts  before.     Both  these 
avenues  of  approach  he  distinctly  strove  to  close  up,  and 
that  with  a  peremptoriness  which  is  as  significant  as  it  is 
surprising.      Value  he  declares    to    be    merely  ratio   in 
exchange.     The  inevitable  suggestion  that  a  ratio  implies 
some  quality  or  characteristic,  which  is  the  basis  of  com- 
parison he  avoids,  and  in  his  well-known  statement  that 
there  can  be  no  general  rise  in  values  he  by  implication  at 
least  declares  all  inquiry  into  the  nature  of  this  basal  fact 
irrelevant  to  political  economy.     On  the  subject  of  con- 
sumption he  does  not  stop  with  implications. 

*♦  Political  economy,"  he  declares,  *'has  nothing  to  do  with  the 
consumption  of  wealth  further  than  as  the  consideration  of  it  is 
inseparable  from  that  of  production  or  that  of  distribution.  We 
know  not  of  any  laws  of  the  consumption  of  wealth  as  the  subject 
of  a  distinct  science:  they  can  be  no  other  than  the  laws  of  human 
enjoyment." 

The  content  of  this  statement,  which  is  often  re-echoed 
by  Mill's  applauding  disciples,  hardly  seems  to  be  such  as  to 
warrant  its  peremptoriness  and  its  all  but  disdainful  italics. 

[328] 


1:^ 


Wealth  and  Welfare.  5 

Suppose  that  **the  laws  of  the  consumption  of  wealth"  are 
*  *  no  other  than  the  laws  of  human  enjoyment' '  that  is  surely 
not  disparaging  to  their  importance,  nor  is  it  an  obvious 
reason  why  they  are  not  '*the  subject  of  a  science" 
whether  * '  distinct' '  or  not  is  small  matter.  The  implication 
is  strongly  that  in  importance  these  laws  are  second  to  none 
of  those  that  interest  us.  If  they  are  not  known  they  are 
not  therefore  unknowable.  Mill's  well-meant  effort  to  limit 
the  field  of  economic  inquiry  has  but  served  to  point  out 
the  very  direction  where  extension  was  indispensable. 

''Value  is  a  ratio,"  says  Walker.  Yes,  but  a  ratio  with 
reference  to  what?  When  we  say  that  one  thing  is  worth 
twice  as  much  as  another  do  we  mean  that  it  is  twice  as 
large  or  twice  as  hard  or  twice  as  heavy  as  the  other?  Evi- 
dently none  of  these  things.  To  say  that  it  is  twice  the 
other  simply,  which  is  what  the  above  definition  reduces  to, 
is  to  evade  the  question.  Twice  the  other  in  what  respect  ? 
Twice  the  other  in  exchangeability,  say  Mill  and  his  fol- 
lowers ;  twice  the  other  in  command  of  gold.  The  inser- 
tion of  a  third  arbitrary  term  creates  a  diversion.  We  now 
have  two  ratios  instead  of  one  and,  busied  in  comparing  the 
two,  we  forget  that  exchangeability  is  itself  based  upon  this 
same  elusive  characteristic  of  value,  and  we  fancy  we  have 
an  explanation.  Between  initial  curiosity  and  final  ex- 
planation there  are  usually,  on  long  lines  of  investigation, 
one  or  more  way  stations  where  inquiry  is  side-tracked  and 
where  even  thoughtful  minds  will  for  a  time  rest  content  as 
though  they  had  reached  their  destination.  It  is  clear  that 
the  statement,  value  is  a  ratio,  is  both  non-explanatory  and 
incorrect.  I^ike  many  other  things  value  may  be  quanti- 
tively  expressed  and  may  give  occasion  for  comparisons, 
but  these  comparisons  are  not  the  essence  of  the  thing  com- 
pared. As  well  might  we  try  to  explain  weight  by  calling 
attention  to  the  fact  that  some  things  are  heavier  than  others. 

This  deliberate  attempt  to  confine  inquiry  to  the  objec- 
tive phenomena  of  economic  life  was  doomed  to  failure.    Its 

[329] 


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6      Annai^  of  thk  American  Academy. 

unsatisf actor iness  was  too  apparent  The  first  to  break 
away  was  Cairnes,  whose  services  as  the  founder  of  the  sub- 
jective economics  have  not  been  sufficiently  recognized. 
They  are  confined,  illogically  enough,  to  the  explanation  of 
cost.  What  is  cost,  asks  Cairnes;  wages,  profits  and  rent? 
None  of  these;  these  are  rewards.  What  then?  Cost  con- 
sists of  the  sacrifices  which  men  undergo  to  obtain  wealth 
which  are  classified  as  labor,  abstinence  and  risk.  These 
are  the  ultimate,  the  only  true  elements  of  cost.  It  does 
not  seem  to  occur  to  Cairnes  that  in  rejecting  Mill's  analysis 
of  cost  he  has  introduced  an  incongruity  into  an  otherwise 
consistently  objective  scheme.  As  Mill's  conception  of 
wealth  stops  with  the  objective,  so  much  so  that  he  will  not 
even  allow  that  labor  which  does  not  issue  in  objective 
wealth  is  productive,  so  his  analysis  of  cost  is  not  allowed 
to  go  beyond  the  things  which  are  parted  with  as  a  condi- 
tion of  securing  wealth  through  production.  In  a  word, 
the  elements  of  cost  must  be  objective  elements,  and  it  is 
not  easy  to  see  what  other  elements  could  be  found  than 
those  mentioned  by  Mill.  Of  course  such  an  analysis  is 
most  unsatisfactory.  It  never  gets  at  true  cost  at  all,  but 
stops  with  a  consideration  of  the  exchanges  incident  to 
production  in  which  true  or  ultimate  cost  is  more  or  less 
faithfully  reflected.  But  after  all,  is  this  enumeration  of 
the  proximate  objective  counterparts  of  real,  /.  ^.,  subjec- 
tive cost  any  less  satisfactory  or  ultimate  than  the  corre- 
sponding objective  analysis  of  value  or  utility  ?  Evidently 
it  seemed  so  to  Cairnes.  At  any  rate  it  was  only  at  this 
point  that  he  felt  impelled  to  convert  the  elements  of  his 
problem  into  terms  of  psychic  experience.  I  will  venture 
the  suggestion,  however,  that  Cairnes  looked  with  peculiar 
complacency  on  this  part  of  his  work  and  felt  with  regard 
to  it  more  than  with  regard  to  other  parts,  the  wage  fund 
for  instance,  that  he  had  reached  a  finality  that  was  both 
incontestable  and  significant. 
I  need  refer  but  briefly  to  the  work  of  Jevons  and  the 

[330] 


•li 


Wealth  and  Wei^fare.  7 

Austrians.  The  fame  of  their  brilliant  achievements  is  too 
present  with  us  to  call  for  extended  remark.  Thanks  to 
their  investigations,  value  is  seen  to  be,  not  a  ratio  based 
on  an  unanalyzed  characteristic,  but  the  characteristic  itself 
shown  to  depend  upon  the  subjective  state  of  man.  So 
completely  has  this  conception  taken  possession  of  the  eco- 
nomic consciousness  that  it  strikes  us  as  a  startling  an- 
achronism when  some  one  inadvertently  asserts  that  there 
can  not  be  a  general  rise  in  values.  Did  not  the  past  deter 
us  with  its  warning  we  might  be  tempted  in  our  satisfaction 
over  these  achievements  to  venture  the  opinion  that,  ''hap- 
pily, there  is  nothing  in  the  laws  of  value  which  remains 
for  the  present  or  any  future  writer  to  clear  up;  the  theory 
of  the  subject  is  complete. ' '     But  let  us  refrain. 

The  subject  of  value  could  not  be  really  explained  with- 
out an  analysis  of  utility.  The  study  of  utility  involves  a 
study  of  the  enjoyment  of  wealth.  The  utility  of  a  good  is 
one  aspect  of  its  meaning  in  terms  of  subjective  experience. 
Since  value  is  defined  in  terms  of  utility,  to  understand  it 
we  must  understand  utility  and  the  law  which  determines 
its  variations.  It  is  hyperbole  to  call  the  few  principles 
which  this  incidental  study  of  utility  has  disclosed  **a 
theory  of  consumption,"  as  one  writer  has  done;  they  con- 
stitute at  best  but  the  rudiments  of  such  a  theory ;  but  they 
make  such  a  theory  inevitable.  We  do  know  of  **laws  of 
the  consumption  of  wealth"  and  the  validity  and  impor- 
tance of  such  laws  is  admitted.  Their  amplification  and 
fuller  formulation  is  only  a  question  of  time. 

The  economist  looks  out  upon  a  vast  aggregate  of  mys- 
terious but  presumably  purposeful  activity.  What  is  it  all 
for?  Eventually  it  becomes  clear  that  men  are  trying  to 
secure  enjoyment  and  avert  discomfort.  How  do  they  do  it ? 
In  the  main  by  modifying  the  things  that  constitute  their 
environment,  making  useless  elements  serviceable  and 
noxious  elements  harmless;  that  is,  by  producing  wealth. 
Suppose  we  undertake  to  analyze  the  process  and  estimate 

[331] 


M\ 


8 


Annals  op  the  American  Academy. 


1 


1 


its  results.     The  estimates  are  made  piece  by  piece,  in  local 
activities,  each  turning  out  its  peculiar  product.     We  are 
at  a  loss  to  express  our  total.     We  have  sheep  and  oxen, 
wheat  and  corn,  tools  and  furnishings  and  fabrics,  all  with 
their  attractions,  but  so  very  dissimilar.     There  is  the  sug- 
gestion, too,  that  a  different  assortment,  or  one  differently 
proportioned  would  have  been  preferable.     How  are  we  to 
know,  since  there  is  the  utmost  variety  of  opinion  as  to  the 
relative  importance  of  these  various  things?    Furthermore, 
a  man  who  has  sheep  for  his  part  in  the  whole  transaction 
deems  himself  less  well  remunerated  than  one  who  has 
fabrics.     The  question  calls  for  settlement,  but  the  mere 
enumeration  of  goods  throws  no  light  upon  it.     The  bewil- 
dering total  furnishes  no  other  criterion  for  homogeneous 
estimate  at  first  than  a  vague  consciousness  on  our  part 
that  they  are  in  general  more  or  less  attractive  to  ourselves. 
But,  observed  more  closely,  this  general  attractiveness 
seems  to  be  the  common  quality  we  seek.     All  these  goods 
excite  human   desire,  and   that   in  a  measurable  degree. 
Put  an  obstacle  in  the  way  of  obtaining  one  of  these  articles 
and  men  will  overcome  it  and  secure  the  prize.     Increase 
the  obstacle  beyond  a  certain  point  and  they  will  forego  the 
satisfaction  of  its  possession.    The  maximum  obstacle  which 
will  be  overcome  measures  the  maximum  desire  which  it 
excites  and  approximately,  the  satisfaction  which  it  can 
confer.     Here,  then,  we  have  a  common  term,  value.     Will 
not  the  aggregate  value  of   the  articles  included  in  our 
enumeration  tell  us  the  amount  of  success  achieved  in  the 
aggregate  undertaking?     The  value  of  the  sheep  and  the 
fabrics  tells  us  whether  a  different  distribution  of  energy 
would  have  been  preferable  or  not  and  how  much  satisfac- 
tion each  of  the  participants  derived  from  his  participation. 
In  value  we  seem  to  have  finality. 

But  perplexing  facts  soon  disturb  our  conclusion.  Thus, 
a  poor  family  disposes  of  its  pet  lamb  to  an  indifferent 
butcher  and  it  becomes  mutton  on  a  banker's  table.     Its 

[332] 


i 


Wealth  and  Welfare.  9 

loss  caused  the  keenest  suffering  to  the  family,  a  suffering 
out  of  all  proportion  to  the  satisfaction  conferred  upon  the 
butcher  or  banker.  Doubtless  the  poor  family  consented  to 
the  bargain  in  the  expectation  of  securing  a  more  than 
compensating  satisfaction  or  averting  a  still  greater  suffer- 
ing, but  this  is  not  the  point.  We  looked  to  value  to  fur- 
nish us  a  final  criterion  which  should  tell  us  exactly  what 
a  lamb  signifies  in  terms  of  human  welfare  and  it  fails  us. 
The  price  in  this  case  may  have  been  a  subject  of  no  dis- 
pute, but  either  value  bears  no  constant  relation  to  price,  or 
if  it  be  its  constant  subjective  counterpart,  then  something 
else  than  value  and  widely  different  from  it  must  be  the 
real  measure  of  human  satisfaction.  All  attempts  to  esti- 
mate individual  or  national  prosperity  in  terms  of  value  or 
price  can  serve  but  a  relative  and  subsidiary  purpose.  Back 
of  value  lies  the  more  fundamental  fact  of  utility,  of  which 
value  is  a  function,  and  in  which  we  naturally  seek  the 
meaning  of  goods. 

But  the  utility  which  is  the  basis  of  value,  though  much 
more  exactly  corresponding  to  fundamental  interests  than 
anything  we  have  so  far  considered,  is  still  not  quite  a 
finality.  The  lamb  may  have  been  sold  to  avert  a  misfor- 
tune which  did  not  come  or  which  came  just  the  same 
despite  the  sacrifice.  Or  the  proceeds  may  have  been  spent 
for  deceptive  goods  which  proved  unsatisfactory  in  the 
using.  The  utility  upon  which  the  bargain  was  based  and 
values  calculated  was  therefore  out  of  proportion  to  the 
satisfaction  actually  experienced.  Something  of  this  dis- 
parity usually  exists  between  anticipation  and  realization 
and  must  be  considered  in  estimating  the  one  by  the  other. 
The  utility  which  we  reach  as  we  approach  the  subject  from 
the  side  of  value  is  a  prospective  or  estimated  utility  from 
which  we  may  proceed  to  actual  utility,  the  satisfactions  of 
real  experience.     Here  at  last  is  finality. 

But  this  finality  is  the  beginning  rather  than  the  end  of 
our  inquiry.     The  last  stage  reached  in  the  development  of 

[333] 


n 


u  1 


v^j 


% 

:    "Sf 


lO 


Annai^  of  ths  American  Academy. 


a  science  is  not  unfrequently  the  starting  point  in  its  pre- 
sentation. We  have  worked  our  way  back  from  incidentals 
to  fundamentals.  The  study  of  these  fundamentals  is  most 
important  in  itself.  It  is  the  only  thing  that  can  give  us 
any  ultimate  facts  regarding  human  welfare.  Technology 
may  tell  us  how  to  increase  our  flocks,  but  what  does  such 
an  increase  signify?  Other  things  remaining  the  same  it 
means  an  increase  in  satisfactions,  but  other  things  will  not 
remain  the  same,  these  subjective  facts  among  the  rest. 
How  far  will  they  remain  the  same  and  what  laws  govern 
their  variation  ?  And  even  were  they  to  remain  the  same, 
the  meaning  of  flocks  in  general  is  an  enigma  until  they 
are  translated  into  terms  of  these  same  subjective  experi- 
ences. If  we  are  tempted  to  disparage  the  importance  of 
such  knowledge  it  is  only  because  we  have  a  certain  amount 
of  it  which  we  have  derived  from  experience  and  which 
serves  our  ordinarj'-  purposes.  We  have  data  by  which  to 
estimate  subjectively  the  value  of  a  good  dinner.  What 
need  have  we  of  science  for  such  purposes?  Thus  we  trans- 
late into  the  language  of  personal  experiences  the  objective 
wealth  about  us,  how  adequately,  it  will  be  our  purpose 
later  to  inquire.  No  process  is  more  delicate  or  stands 
more  in  need  of  careful  study  than  this  of  transmuting 
wealth  into  happiness. 

I  am  aware  that  any  mention  of  happiness  as  the  goal  of 
economic  activity  will  excite  nervous  apprehension  in  some 
minds.  The  effort  to  be  remorselessly  scientific  has  devel- 
oped a  morbid  sensitiveness  with  regard  to  any  studies 
which  smack  of  meliorism  or  philanthropy.  Thus  Nichol- 
son declares  that  economic  ideals  must  be  strictly  excluded 
from  our  inquiry. 


* '  It  may  perhaps  be  thought  .  .  ,  that  practically  the  greatest 
good  of  the  greatest  number  will  be  admitted  by  everyone  as  the 
economic  ideal.  But  .  .  .  maximum  freedom  is  at  least  as 
attractive  and  may  lay  claim  to  equal  authority.  For  my  own  part, 
I  should  not  care  to  regard  equality  of  distribution,  even  if  it  could 

[334] 


Weai^th  and  Wei«fare. 


II 


be  shown  to  be  both  practicable  and  productive  of  maximum  hap- 
piness, as  the  ultimate  goal  of  human  progress.  Human  energies, 
activities  and  ambitions  are  not  to  be  satisfied  with  a  dull  level  of 
placid  content.  * ' 

Ideals  are  as  inadmissible  for  the  individual  as  for 
society. 

' '  To  spend  a  given  sum  of  money,  so  as  to  produce  the  greatest 
happiness  to  the  spender,  can  not  properly  be  called  economic 
expenditure ;  this  refers  to  value  received  for  value  given  and  not 
to  the  happiness  which  may  follow  on  the  completion  of  the 
bargain. ' ' 

The  search  for  happiness  has  indeed  fallen  into  disrepute 
with  economists  of  this  stamp. 

The  extravagance  of  these  statements  is  due  to  a  very 
simple  confusion  of  ideas.  The  pursuit  of  happiness  is  not 
science,  but  it  may  be  the  subject  of  a  science.  Economic 
inquiry  can  have  no  other  legitimate  ideal  than  to  know 
the  truth,  but  economic  activity  may  and  does  have  an 
ideal  which  economic  inquiry  must  ascertain  as  the  condi- 
tion of  any  explanation  whatever.  The  scientist  must, 
indeed,  refrain  from  mingling  his  idealizations  with  his 
investigations,  must  at  least  know  and  clearly  state  when 
he  is  doing  the  one  and  when  the  other,  else  his  work  will 
be  hopelessly  misleading;  but  this  is  a  very  different  thing 
from  trying  to  study  human  actions  without  paying  any 
attention  to  the  ideals  and  incentives  to  which  these  actions 
owe  their  existence  and  direction.  Such  a  study  may  be 
descriptive,  but  it  can  not  be  explanatory.  The  social 
arrangement  which  is  *  ^productive  of  maximum  happiness'  * 
may  be  one  which  we  "would  not  care"  to  approve — this  is 
small  matter — but  it  is  a  matter  of  the  profoundest  impor- 
tance to  know  whether  such  an  arrangement  regularly  is 
approved  in  human  affairs.  Expenditure  guided  by  con- 
siderations of  happiness  to  the  spender  may  or  may  not  be 
economic,  as  we  will,  but  ts  expenditure  guided  by  such 
considerations?      Such    an   inquiry  may   or  may  not   be 

[335] 


"41 


12 


Annai^  of  thk  American  Academy. 


WEAI.TH  and  WEI^EARE. 


X3 


"j 


1 


included  in  economics — that  is  a  matter  of  definition  and 
convenience— but  it  is  in  any  case  fundamental  to  economic 
inquiry.  The  economist  may  avoid  investigation,  but  he 
can  not  avoid  assumption  in  this  connection.  Some  hypo- 
thesis of  economic  purpose  and  incentive,  simple  or  com- 
plex is  indispensable.  It  must  furnish  the  unit  of  all 
measurements,  the  term  in  which  all  results  are  expressed. 

The  assumption  that  economic  activity  is  determined  by 
considerations  of  happiness  may  of  course  be  challenged. 
Duty,  liberty,  equality,  etc. ,  have  been  urged  as  competing 
considerations.  It  would  be  premature  to  try  to  settle  such 
a  question  in  advance  and  would  anticipate  some  of  the 
more  important  results  of  our  inquiry.  But  in  common 
with  all  economists  I  have  given  the  individual  pursuit  of 
enjoyment  the  first  place  among  economic  incentives  and 
am  persuaded  that  an  inquiry  into  this  subject  would  be 
especially  remunerative.  It  may  be  worth  while  to  give  a 
few  reasons  for  this  working  hypothesis. 

In  addition  to  the  cases  in  which  persons  avowedly  seek 
enjoyment  there  are  certainly  many  others  where  the  in- 
centive is  the  same  under  another  name.  Duty,  liberty, 
equality,  etc.,  are  surreptitiously  urged  as  incentives  on 
the  ground  that  they  affect  happiness.  Witness  the  criti- 
cism just  cited.  A  system  "productive  of  maximum  hap- 
piness" is  rejected  because,  forsooth,  *' human  activities  can 
not  be  satisfied  with  a  dead  level  of  placid  content. ' '  Pass- 
ing the  surprising  statement  that  we  cannot  be  "satisfied" 
with  "content,"  we  have  to  ask  w^hat  it  means  to  be  satis- 
fied. The  satisfaction  referred  to  is  plainly  synonymous 
with  happiness,  at  least  a  species  under  the  genus.  A 
system  which  is  productive  of  maximum  happiness  is  thus 
rejected  because  it  does  not  produce  happiness  of  the  kind 
and  amount  which  some  other  system  promises.  Only  the 
juggling  with  synonyms  makes  such  a  contradiction  in 
terms  possible.  The  socialistic  scheme  of  Babceuf,  which 
attached  the  most  extravagant  importance  to  equality  did 

[336] 


so  on  the  ground  that  ** equality  is  happiness."  In  like 
manner  all  those  social  schemes  which  have  emphasized 
liberty  have  claimed  for  it  a  similar  identity  with  happi- 
ness, the  one  self-justifying  thing.  The  confusion  is  due 
to  an  insistence  upon  different  terms  of  the  same  series. 
We  might  as  well  dispute  about  whether  it  was  more  neces- 
sary to  always  have  enough  to  eat  or  to  always  have 
enough  money  to  buy  our  dinner.  Happiness  is  thus  offset, 
not  against  a  real  alternative,  but  against  a  supposed  con- 
dition of  happiness  which  for  the  moment  is  mistaken  for 
an  end.  Such  attempts  to  deny  that  happiness  is  the 
mainspring  of  voluntary  action  assume  what  they  deny  and 
accomplish  their  own  refutation.  Whether  a  science  of 
industry  or  society  is  possible  without  this  assumption  or 
not,  it  is  certain  that  the  science  we  have  is  based  on 
such  an  assumption.  What  else  do  we  mean  by  the  assump- 
tion made  by  Professor  Nicholson  along  with  the  rest  that 
men  act  from  self-interest? 

But  the  validity  of  a  science  of  enjoyment  does  not 
depend  on  the  universality  of  this  or  any  other  incentive. 
Whether  universal  or  not  it  is  at  least  the  most  common  of 
all  the  springs  of  effort.  It  can  not,  therefore,  be  useless  to 
inquire  what  are  the  laws  of  its  action.  If  this  does  not 
solve  all  problems  it  will  solve  some.  In  some  cases  at  least 
it  will  tell  us  the  meaning  of  wealth  in  terms  of  human 
experience,  where  alone  it  has  meaning. 

Whether,  therefore,  the  science  of  enjoyment  is  to  be 
included  in  economics  or  not  it  is  the  legitimate  and  neces- 
sary outcome  of  economic  investigation.  If  the  earlier 
phases  of  inquiry  seemed  fruitful  quite  apart  from  the  final 
phase  it  was  because  a  certain  amount  of  popular  know- 
ledge stood  ready  to  supplement  the  incomplete  inquiry. 
People  have  always  had  a  certain  notion  of  what  wealth 
was  and  how  to  get  the  good  out  of  it.  The  notion  was 
neither  very  clear  nor  very  uniform,  but  it  was  enough  to 
give  a  meaning  to  objective  calculations.     Why  then  do  we 

[337] 


H 


Annai^  of  the  American  Academy. 


WEAI.TH  and  WEIvFARE. 


15 


need  a  science  of  enjoyment  at  all  ?  For  precisely  the  same 
reason  that  we  need  a  science  of  production,  distribution, 
etc.  On  these  subjects,  too,  there  is  a  considerable  body  of 
popular  knowledge  which  senses  fairly  well  for  practical 
purposes.  But  it  is  deemed  expedient  to  collect,  classify 
and  increase  this  popular  knowledge  so  as  to  make  a  science 
of  it.  Why  not  the  other?  Whether  the  inquiry  be  pur- 
sued for  its  own  sake  or  as  a  guide  to  conduct  and  in  fur- 
therance of  human  interests  the  subject  is  one  of  excep- 
tional interest  and  importance. 

But  it  is  not  alone  as  the  final  term  in  economic  inquiry 
that  the  study  of  enjoyments  has  a  claim  upon  us;  it  is  the 
initial  term  as  well.     Economic  activity  moves,  not  in  a 
line,  but  in  a  circle.     If  wealth  culminates  in  happiness  it 
originates  in  happiness— that  is,  in  desires  born  of  past 
experiences.      Modifications  of  production  such  as  those 
following  changes  in  fashion  are  inexplicable  without  a 
knowledge  of  what  fashion  is  and  what  laws  control  it. 
Distribution  invokes  at  every  step  the  laws  of  enjoyment  to 
explain  its  phenomena.     Economics  is  not  only  incomplete 
without  a  study  of  enjoyment;  it  is  impossible.     The  only 
question  is  whether  the  laws  of  enjoyment  shall  be  consid- 
ered, formulated  and  classified  like  other  laws,  or  be  smug- 
gled in  where  needed  without  recognition  and  with  all  the 
imperfection  of  statement  which  such  a  method  implies. 
As  regards  the  subject  of  enjoyment,  it  is  not  a  question  of 
science  or  no  science,  but  of  good  science  or  bad  science. 
Without  some  science  of  the  subject  we  get  nowhere.     We 
are  hardly  left  in  doubt  as  to  the  conditions  upon  which  a 
radical  improvement  in  economic  science  must  depend. 

If  the  importance  of  this  study  is  duly  recognized  we  can 
be  relatively  indifferent  to  the  name  which  is  applied  to  it 
and  the  order  in  which  it  is  taken  up.  But  these  questions 
are  of  enough  importance  to  deserve  brief  attention.  There 
is  a  good  deal  to  be  said  in  favor  of  extending  the  term 
economics  to  include  this  study.     In  the  first  place,  if  the 

C338] 


study  of  enjoyment  is  not  a  part  of  economics  it  at  least  is 
not  a  part  of  anything  else.  No  other  science  has  taken  it 
up  in  a  way  to  satisfy  the  requirements  of  economics. 
There  are  therefore  no  associations  to  be  overcome  unless  it 
be  with  the  narrower  use  of  the  term  economics.  But  this 
term  displaced  the  older  term,  political  economy,  about  at 
the  time  when  attention  was  being  turned  to  this  study. 
Its  advent  may,  therefore,  appropriately  mark  the  recogni- 
tion of  the  new  department.  To  put  it  in  another  way,  the 
study  of  enjoyment  is  no  part  of  political  economy,  but  it  is 
a  part  of  economics.  The  use  of  these  terms  may  thus 
appropriately  continue  to  distinguish  the  conservative  or 
reactionary  from  the  progressive  writers.  In  the  second 
place,  while  other  scientists  have  done  nothing  with  the 
subject,  economists  have  made  notable  beginnings  at  its 
investigation.  This  has  already  established  a  tentative  or 
provisional  association  in  favor  of  this  designation.  I  am 
not  sure  but  the  thorough  investigation  of  the  subject  will 
lead  us  to  considerations  which  will  suggest  the  traditional 
economic  discussions  but  remotely  if  at  all,  but  even  so,  the 
attachment  here  is  greater  and  the  friction  less  than  else- 
where. 

The  final  and  far  more  important  reason  is  that  the  two 
sets  of  phenomena  are  related  to  each  other  in  a  manner 
that  scarcely  admits  of  separation.  They  form  a  sequence  or 
circle  which  may  be  studied  in  sections,  but  can  be  compre- 
hended only  as  a  whole.  It  is  instructive  to  compare  this 
relation  with  that  which  exists  between  economics  and 
sociology.  As  in  the  case  we  have  been  considering,  many 
of  the  most  considerable  contributions  to  sociology  have 
been  made  by  economists,  and  the  two  sciences  are  inti- 
mately associated  in  academic  connections.  But  all  at- 
tempts to  make  the  one  a  part  of  the  other  have  been 
abandoned.  The  reason  is  that  though  they  treat  largely 
the  same  matter  they  are  logically  independent.  Sociology 
is  the  science  of  grouping  or  association,  and  its  interest  in 

[339] 


i 


i6 


Annals  of  the  American  Academy. 


;•» 


■^ 


I 


all  phenomena  which  it  considers  is  to  find  their  relation  to 
the  size,  tenacity  and  character  of  the  group.  Whether 
association  makes  men  happier  or  not  is  strictly  no  concern 
of  sociology.  Economics,  on  the  other  hand,  is  the  science 
of  enjoyment,  or  if  we  insist  upon  a  narrower  definition,  the 
science  of  the  means  of  enjoyment.  To  one  or  the  other  of 
these  all  definitions  of  economics  reduce.  While,  therefore, 
the  science  of  sociology  diverges  from  economics,  the  science 
of  enjoyment  emerges  from  it.  Clearness  of  thought  has 
everything  to  gain  by  distinguishing  sociology  sharply  from 
economics;  it  can  only  lose  by  implying  a  fundamental  dis- 
tinction between  the  study  of  enjoyments  and  the  study  of 
wealth.  When  an  organic  whole  is  arbitrarily  cut  into  sec- 
tions it  must  be  with  the  clearest  recognition  of  the  fact 
that  the  division  is  only  for  convenience  and  is  without 
prejudice  to  its  organic  character.  Such  a  recognition  can 
not  be  better  assured  in  the  case  before  us  than  by  uniting 
the  two  parts  of  the  study  under  a  single  name. 

More  important  is  the  question  of  the  order  in  which  the 
subjective  and  objective  phases  of  economics  should  be 
taken  up.  For  one,  I  incline  strongly  to  the  opinion  that 
the  subjective  study  should  come  first  as  being  the  more 
fundamental  and  the  logical  antecedent  of  the  other  inquiry. 
The  chapters  which  follow  will  be  the  best  explanation  of 
my  position.  But  it  is  proper  here  to  note  the  reason  why 
this  is  not  the  traditionally  accepted  order.  As  is  well 
known,  it  is  usual  to  begin  with  a  discussion  of  wealth,  its 
production,  etc. ,  after  which  come  discussions  of  distribu- 
tion and  exchange,  followed  in  the  later  work,  by  a  curious 
appendix  la^belled  consumption.  It  is  the  location  of  this 
appendix  which,  more  than  anything  else,  has  left  the  im- 
pression that  the  study  of  enjoyment  should  come  last.  An 
examination  of  this  division  of  economics  throws  light  on 
the  question.  In  it  can  be  found  a  little  of  everything 
except  the  study  of  enjoyments.  The  computation  of  a 
German  statistician  as  to  the  relative  expenditure  of  different 

[340] 


^^^^1 


I 


Wealth  and  Welfare. 


17 


classes  for  rent,  food,  fuel,  etc.,  has  been  eagerly  util- 
ized to  fill  the  aching  void.  In  general  the  department 
reminds  us  of  the  blank  advertisements  sometimes  seen  in 
papers:  "This  Space  is  Reserved  for  "—let  us  say  for 
Walker's  future  Adam  Smith.  The  location  of  consump- 
tion in  economic  treatises  is,  therefore,  to  be  accounted  for 
by  (a)  the  nature  of  its  principal  matter  which  is  as  objec- 
tive as  any  other  and  such  as  can  be  postponed,  (d)  its 
nondescript  character,  unclassified  material  being  usually 
reserved  for  an  appendix,  (c)  its  emptiness,  confessions  of 
ignorance  being  usually  postponed.  Imagine  any  treatise 
in  which  chapters  on  consumption  occur  so  rearranged  as 
to  bring  these  chapters  first,  an  arrangement  which  would 
usually  involve  no  logical  difficulties,  and  what  an  impres- 
sion it  would  make  of  impotence  and  obscurity  at  the 
threshold  of  the  science ! 

I  have  said  that  the  earlier  writers  omitted  all  considera- 
tion of  consumption  as  a  department  of  political  economy. 
But  they  did  not  therefore  treat  the  subjective  problems  less 
fully  than  modem  writers  have  done.  The  treatment  in 
either  case  has  been  scanty  enough.  But  the  point  which 
it  most  concerns  us  to  note  is  the  order  of  treatment  which 
they  followed.  Allusions  to  subjective  phenomena  may  be 
found  scattered  through  their  writings,  but  almost  always 
as  a  preliminary  to  the  discussion  of  objective  problems. 
The  statement  that  men  act  from  self-interest  (that  is,  in 
deference  to  the  laws  of  enjoyment)  is  not  an  appendix  to 
but  a  premise  of  their  inquiries.  Whether  the  recognition 
was  by  vague  implication  or  detailed  statement  this  charac- 
ter of  premise  was  not  and,  indeed,  cannot  be  modified. 

In  undertaking  to  analyze  and  expand  this  premise  we 
have  no  power  to  change  its  logical  relation  to  the  subject 
Granting  that  the  dependence  between  the  two  is  mutual  it 
is  by  no  means  evenly  balanced.  The  discussion  of  objec- 
tive  economics  involves  far  greater  assumptions  in  the  sub- 
jective field  than  that  of  subjective  economics  does  in  the 

[341] 


%*i 


z8 


Annai^  of  the  American  Academy. 


objective.  The  fact  that  in  the  development  of  the  science 
the  logical  order  is  not  the  chronological  order,  is  not 
strange  but  natural.  The  objective  is  more  tangible  than 
its  subjective  antecedent  and  so  earlier  noticed.  But  when 
the  subjective  has  once  been  analyzed,  when  once  we  have 
found  the  source  of  economic  activity,  we  can  most  easily 
trace  the  windings  of  the  stream  by  beginning  at  the  source 
and  following  with  the  current. 


-I 


Chapter  II. 
ECONOMIC  OBJECT  AND  SUBJECT. 

The  most  fundamental  distinction  in  a  science  of  enjoy- 
ments is  that  between  object  and  subject,  or,  speaking 
roughly,  between  wealth  and  uses.  It  will  pay  us  to  exam- 
ine this  distinction  somewhat  carefully.  "Everyone  has  a 
notion,"  says  John  Stuart  Mill,  "sufficiently  correct  for 
ordinary  purposes,  of  what  is  meant  by  wealth."  It  is 
doubtless  true  that  a  man  who  talks  about  this  and  similar 
subjects  with  no  suspicion  of  technicality  is  not  greatly 
misunderstood.  But  one  who  announces  his  intention  of 
treating  such  subjects  from  a  scientific  or  philosophical 
point  of  view  has  no  such  immunity.  Past  discussion  has 
left  a  legacy  of  subtleties  and  ambiguities.  Modem  writers 
cannot  proceed  at  once  to  the  main  task  as  Mill  could  do. 
They  can  at  best  but  abridge  the  inevitable  preliminaries. 

In  many  cases  we  are  at  no  loss  to  tell  whether  an  article 
is  wealth  or  not.  Articles  which  are  useful  and  limited  in 
amount  make  us  no  trouble.  Shoes  are  useful  and  not  over- 
abundant, and  hence  they  are  wealth.  But  such  an  article 
has  antecedents  and  consequents  which  must  also  be  classi- 
fied. One  set  of  antecedents  make  us  no  trouble,  such  as 
leather,  cattle,  land,  etc.,  in  order  of  derivation.  But  back 
of  these,  or  co-operating  with  them,  is  another  antecedent, 
labor,  which  has  been  the  subject  of  much  dispute,  but  is 

[342] 


Wealth  and  WeivFare. 


19 


not  usually  classed  as  wealth.  Following  upon  the  use  of 
the  shoes  is  a  consequent,  satisfaction  or  comfort,  which  it 
is  agreed  not  to  call  wealth.  The  consensus  of  opinion  is 
clear,  and  it  at  first  seems  inexcusable  that  economists 
should  have  departed  from  popular  usage  in  modifying  the 
definition  of  wealth  as  the  aggregate  of  those  non-human 
material  instruments  of  human  satisfaction  which  exist  in 
insufficient  amount  to  satisfy  all  desires.  Shoes  and  their 
scarce  material  antecedents  are  wealth ;  their  human  ante- 
cedents and  their  immaterial  or  psychic  consequents  are 
not.  Why  is  not  this  distinction  satisfactory?  It  seemed 
so  to  Mill. 

It  is  perfectly  possible  to  use  wealth  in  this  sense  in  eco- 
nomic discussion,  as  referring  to  things  usually  intervening 
between  the  human  fact  of  labor  and  the  human  fact  of 
satisfaction,  and  serving  as  vehicles  of  transfer,  but  if  we 
do  this  we  make  it  too  narrow  a  base  for  the  foundation  of  a 
science  of  economics.     Economics  ceases  to  be  the  science 
of  wealth  and  certain  most  important  analogies  are  obscured. 
Many  transactions  which  are  conspicuously  economic  do 
not  have  to  do  with  wealth  as  thus  defined,   involve  no 
material  vehicle  of  the  kind  previously  described.     Labor 
confers  satisfaction  directly  and  the  satisfaction  is  recog- 
nized by  payment,  but  outside  of  the  payment  there  is  no 
wealth  as  here  defined.     The  distinction  proves  embarrass- 
ing.    Mill  found   it  so  and  faced  the  difficulty  consistently. 
Labor  thus  expended  was  unproductive,  and  by  implication 
at  least,  non-economic.     What  other   conclusion  was  pos- 
sible  to  one  who  did   not  recognize  consumption  or  the 
science  of  satisfactions  as  having  place  in  economics?     But 
Mill's  most   unfortunate  and   misleading  consistency  has 
always  been  a  stumbling-block  and  has  usually  been  repu- 
diated.    The  definition  of  wealth  which  was  satisfactory 
enough  in  itself  was  rejected  as  soon  as  any  use  was  made 
of  it.     Moreover,  though  popular  usage  has  never  applied 
the  term  wealth  to  labor,  laborers  and  labor  power,  except  by 

[343] 


•-Si 


"M 


'*t 


■•fi 

'.'ti 


IWTaaBWWT'*rt[Wl!'W»l'ilLT~ V ■rg"' ■»g»"'*."    <w»^  ".'•■¥■■,  ■*■*-- 


f 


20 


Annai^  op  ths  American  Academy. 


WEAI.TH  AND  Welfare. 


21 


'^1 


way  of  metaphor,  it  has  been  less  conservative  in  regard  to 
allied  terms  as  "labor  market,"  "cost  of  labor,"  **  value  of 
labor,"  etc.,  all  of  which  imply  an  essential  identity  be- 
tween labor  and  wealth,  a  complete  interchangeability, 
while  avoiding  the  term  itself.  To  call  a  large  and  impor- 
tant part  of  labor  which  has  its  value  and  its  market  as 
much  as  any  other,  unproductive  and  by  implication  non- 
economic,  has  always  impressed  men  as  carrying  much  too 
far  a  distinction  which  popular  speech  has  never  been 
willing  to  emphasize. 

But  criticism  was  easier  than  improvement.  These 
transactions  must  be  recognized  as  economic  and  yet  it  was 
difficult  to  extend  the  term  wealth  to  include  them.  There 
was  strong  inclination  to  cling  to  the  idea  of  a  material 
vehicle  between  effort  and  satisfaction.  Could  such  a 
vehicle  be  found  in  these  cases  where  Mill  found  only 
unproductive  labor  for  lack  of  it?  Professor  J.  B.  Clark 
has  ventured  a  suggestion  which  is  at  least  original.  The 
material  vehicle  always  exists  though  not  always  visible  to 
the  untrained  mind.  In  this  case  it  calls  for  the  more 
acute  observation  of  the  physicist.  When  we  pay  for 
admission  to  a  concert  we  are  but  buying  material  wealth. 
Does  this  material  wealth  consist  in  the  singers?  No,  but 
in  their  product.  They  are  not  unproductive.  They 
produce  sound  waves  of  an  agreeable  kind  which  are 
material  and  valuable,  are  wealth.  If  we  prefer  a  stere- 
opticon  lecture  to  the  concert  we  purchase  ether  vibrations 
which  please  us.  The  criteria  ot  wealth,  excluding  human 
beings,  are  materiality  and  value.  Tangibility,  durability, 
etc. ,    these  are  matters  of  indifference. 

Such  proportions  as  these  can  never  find  acceptance,  no 
matter  how  sound  they  may  be.  To  include  soimd  waves  and 
ether  vibrations  in  the  categoryof  material  wealth  is  simply 
to  forfeit  the  sympathy  and  interest  of  practical  men.  It  is 
probably  this  consideration  which  has  deterred  men  from 
accepting  the  classification,  for  the  argument  seems  to  have 

[344] 


gone  unchallenged.  I  confess  to  some  surprise  at  this,  for 
the  fallacy  seems  to  me  amazingly  clear.  I  omit  all  con- 
sideration of  the  difficulty  of  making  men  conceive  of  sound 
waves  as  comparable  to  bread  and  meat.  I  merely  ask,  are 
they  economically  comparable?     Let  us  see. 

Going  to  a  concert  I  buy  sound  waves  which  are  wealth 
produced  by  singers  who  are  not.  But  a  canary  also  pro- 
duces sound  waves.  So  when  I  buy  a  canary  I  am  really 
buying  sound  waves  which  are  wealth  produced  by  a  canary 
which  is  not.  If  instead  of  going  to  the  illustrated  lecture 
I  buy  a  picture  for  my  room  (to  use  the  ordinary  misleading 
form  of  statement)  what  I  really  buy  is  a  stream  of  ether 
vibrations  which  please  me.  These  are  wealth,  not  the 
picture.  To  get  a  case  more  perfectly  analogous,  let  us 
compare  transactions  in  which  there  is  no  permanent  and 
complete  transfer,  only  a  temporary  and  conditional  one 
known  as  hire.  Desiring  to  take  a  drive  in  Japan  I  hire 
myself  pulled  by  a  coolie,  in  America  by  a  horse.  The 
coolie  is  not  wealth,  but  only  the  producer  of  certain  inde- 
finable motor  vibrations  which  are  the  object  of  my  desire. 
The  same  must  be  true  of  the  horse  whose  function  is 
identical.  Horses  therefore  are  not  wealth.  Equally  so 
for  shoes,  food,  etc.  They  are  all  merely  producers  of 
vibrations  conducive  to  our  comfort.  In  short,  all  wealth 
reduces  to  vibrations,  this  being  the  form  in  which  all 
matter  acts  upon  the  senses.  We  started  out  to  find  a 
material  entity  for  certain  special  cases  where  a  link  was 
missing.  We  have  found  no  such  entity,  only  a  notion  or 
conception  of  the  way  matter  acts  which  applies  to  all 
cases.  We  have  cumbered  our  reasoning  with  a  perfectly 
irrelevant  conception  borrowed  from  physics,  and  the  pecu- 
liar class  of  phenomena  which  we  were  trying  to  assimilate 
to  the  larger  group  remain  as  incorrigibly  peculiar  as 
before. 

A  more  popular  effort  to  unify  these  phenomena  invests 
human  capacity,  talent,  etc. ,  with  the  attributes  of  wealth. 

[345] 


is 


:i:s  >j;«wf^'- 


22 


Annals  of  the  American  Academy. 


In  hinng  a  coolie,  a  carpenter,  a  physician,  I  plainly  pur- 
chase  something.     Since  the  individuals  are  not   to  be 
counted  as  wealth,  what  can  that  something  be?     In  the 
case  of  the  carpenter  we  can  escape  the  difficulty  by  seizing 
upon  his  material  product,  but  in  the  other  cases  we  find 
nothing  tangible.     But  talent,  skill,  labor  capacity,  these 
are  much  desired  qualities.     Are  these  not  what  we  buy? 
To  so  classify  them  is  to  encounter  a  difficulty  as  great  as 
the  one  we  seek  to  escape.     These  objects  of  desire  are 
attributes,  qualities,  not  separable  from  that  with  which  they 
are  associated    Why  is  the  strength  of  a  man  less  legiti- 
mately  classified  as  wealth  than  the  strength  of  a  horse  or 
a  rope  ?     Each  is  prized  for  the  quality  that  makes  it  useful, 
but  the  only  way  to  get  the  quality  is  to  get  the  thing 
possessing  it.     In  general  we  accept  this  necessary  connec- 
tion of  quality  and  thing  as  a  matter  of  course.  We  desire 
objects  by  reason  of  certain  qualities,   but  we  never  think 
of  dissociating  the  quality  from  the  object  for  economic 
purposes  except  when  the  object  is  a  human  being.     Why 
do  we  do  so  in  this  case? 

The  reason  is  a  very  natural  but  a  very  illogical  one;  it 
is  the  pressure  of  humanitarian  and  social  considerations. 
Scientific  analysis  finds  in  personal  pride  and  social  defer- 
ence a  serious  obstacle  to  its  normal  development.     There 
is  an  intense  and  justifiable  reluctance  to  allow  men  to  be 
assimilated  to  the  brutes  even  for  scientific  purposes.     The 
reason  is  that  the  struggle  of  the  ages  has  been  to  prevent 
his  being  assimilated  to  the  brutes  for  practical  purposes. 
The  memory  of  the  great  struggle,  whose  results  are  none 
too  well  assured,  makes  the  sentinels  watchful  and  suspi- 
cious.    If  comparisons  are  made  between  man  and  brute 
they  are  quick  to  insist  that  the  contrasts  are  more  impor- 
tant than  the  resemblances  and  more  apt  to  be  forgotten 
All  this  is  doubtless  true,  and  for  general  purposes  man's 
kinship  to  the   brutes  must  not   be  made  too  prominent 
The  man  who  should  address  his  wife  as  an  animal  would 

[346] 


Wealth  and  Welfare. 


23 


not  by  any  amount  of  after  caressing  avoid  her  resentment, 
because  for  general  purposes  he  would  be  expected  to  con- 
sider her  in  her  conjugal  rather  than  in  her  biological 
character.  But  how  about  special  purposes  f  Would  he,  as 
a  zoologist,  be  justified  in  insisting  that  women  had  no 
place  in  a  zoological  classification  ?  The  answer  is  plain. 
When  certain  limited  and  well-defined  relations  are  under 
consideration,  classification  should  be  based  exclusively  on 
these  relations.  This  alone  makes  science  possible.  But 
these  special  classifications  should  not,  for  a  moment,  pre- 
judice the  general  and  composite  classification  on  which 
depends  the  general  status  of  the  individual  in  practical 
affairs.  When  I  am  told  that,  zoologically  considered,  I 
am  much  like  a  dog,  it  does  not  follow  that  I  am  morally 
or  intellectually  like  a  dog  or  that  I  should  be  housed  or  fed 
like  a  dog.  If  it  did,  I  should  resent  it,  but  as  it  is, 
resentment  or  sensitiveness  would  be  ridiculous.  It  is  just 
such  a  sensitiveness  which  so  long  provoked  opposition  to 
the  doctrine  of  evolution.  The  idea  that  man  descended 
from  a  monkey  was  resented  as  an  insult  to  family  pedi- 
gree This  feeling  has  been  slowly  overcome  in  this  con- 
nection and,  as  a  result,  zoology  is  a  science. 

In  economics,  classification  is  still  hampered  by  precisely 
similar  considerations.  Everybody  can  see  that  a  coolie 
who  pulls  a  cart  is,  from  a  certain  economic  standpoint, 
precisely  analogous  to  a  horse  that  does  the  same.  A 
singer,  a  physician,  etc. ,  are  almost  as  obviously  so.  They 
perform  functions  which  conduce  to  our  happiness  and 
therefore  we  desire  them  for  a  longer  or  shorter  time.  We 
cannot  buy  them,  it  is  true,  but  neither  can  we  buy  a  high- 
way, a  navigable  river,  a  picture  from  the  national  gallery, 
or  even  a  livery  horse  if  the  owner  chooses  to  retain  him. 
All  these  things  are  withdrawn  from  the  market  for  good 
and  sufficient  reasons,  no  doubt,  but  reasons  which  concern 
the  jurist  and  are  entirely  alien  to  our  purpose.  So  with 
men ;  they  could  once  be  bought  for  any  purpose*  but  it  has 

[347] 


Taa 


ar»«*E5w!<^*8^«Ma?*#^Eew»feK*w^s«fiS«*4*«6s^«^^*-' 


MnM~x'«v  1— T-n  V  ■•vixmvtimfttwwt^t^*-"^*^  " 


H 


ANNAI3  OF  THE  AMERICAN  AcADEMY. 


Wealth  and  Wei^fare. 


25 


been  found  conducive  to  social  interests  to  subject  them 
only  to  the  limited  and  conditional  sale,  known  as  hire. 
How  closely  this  arbitrarily  limited  sale  may  approxi- 
mate to  unconditional  sale  we  need  not  here  stop  to 
inquire. 

The    confusion    which    has    attended    this    discussion 
strikingly  illustrates  the  results  of   excluding  subjective 
factors  from    economic    inquiry.     The    science    becomes 
headless,  uncertain  as  to  what  it  is  really  after,  and  its 
classifications  are  fickle  and  unsatisfactory.     Once  seize  the 
salient  fact  of  economic  life,  satisfaction  sought  and  expe- 
rienced, that  for  which  and  of  which  everything  economic 
is,  and   order  comes  out  of  chaos.     Looked  at  from  this 
standpoint  how  irrelevant  such  a  criterion  as  materiality 
appears !     This  has  to  do  with  philosophy  or  physics,  not 
with  economics.     If    I  can   secure   satisfaction   from   an 
immaterial  source  in  exchange  for  material  goods  or  Z7r^ 
versa,  what  is  the  question  of  materiality  to  me?     And 
after  all  does  the  economist  want  to  take  the  responsibility 
of  deciding  what  is  material  or  immaterial,  or  whether  any 
thing  is  immaterial?     Other  criteria  are  equally  irrelevant 
and  troublesome.     The  one  thing  to  be  noted  is  that  we 
are  conscious  that  certain  satisfactions  are  derived  from 
objects,  personal  or  otherwise,  which  are  external  to  our- 
selves.     Some  of   these    objects  are  scarce  and  we  thus 
become  eager  to  secure  and  control  them.     If  our  need  of 
them  is  permanent  we  strive  to  secure  permanent  control  of 
them;  if  temporary  and  partial,  the  control  we  seek  varies 
accordingly.     We  buy  or  hire  a  horse  according  to  the 
nature  of  our  need.     We  should  do  the  same  with  men, 
buying  a  cook  and  hiring  a  physician,    were  it  not  that 
social  obstacles,  reinforced,  it  may  be,  by  personal  scruples, 
prevent  the  unhindered  pursuit  of  what  would  otherwise  be 
our  interest.     Analogous  obstacles  may,   in  like  manner, 
limit    the    acquisition   of  other  goods.     Their   economic 
character  is  not  thereby  changed. 

C348] 


Looked  at  from  the  standpoint  of  the  individual  who  is 
eagerly  seeking   satisfactions    all    external  sources  from 
which  satisfactions  may  be  derived  have  a  common  char- 
acter which  is  fundamental  to  our  inquiry.     It  may  be  that 
to  call  them  all  wealth  is  as  great  a  violation  of  the  laws  of 
popular  speech  as  any  we  have  criticised.     So  be  it,  but  if 
we  must  do  violence  to  popular  usage  let  it   be  in  the 
interest  of  economics  rather  than  in  that  of  physics.     If 
the  term  wealth,  like   so  many  others,    is  popularly  so 
defined  as  to  be  unsuited  to  this  larger  use  I  will  not  insist 
upon  its  redefinition.     Terminology  is  a  secondary  matter. 
I  only  insist  that  this  common  character  of  all  objective 
sources  of  enjoyment,  men  and  things,  shall  be  recognized, 
not  concessively  as  a  personal  whim  not  worth  disputing 
about,  but  appreciatively  as  a  fact  of  fundamental  impor- 
tance   in    the  discussion    of    the  primary    problems    of 
economics.     At  least  from  the  standpoint  of  enjoyment  the 
analogy  between  man  and    things  is  complete.     A  man 
does  not  differ  generically  from  a  horse  or  a  house.     All 
are  prized  as  sources  of  satisfaction  and  secured  on  such 
terms  as  may  be  desirable  and  possible.     All  may  con- 
tribute to  enjoyment  indirectly  by  producing  certain  inter- 
mediaries, or  they  may  be  enjoyed  directly  with  no  other 
intermediary  than  the  universal  and  inevitable  vibrations. 
That  is,  men,  like  things,  may  be  either  capital  or  final 
goods. 

But  while  men  from  this  standpoint  of  enjoyment  are 
sources  of  satisfaction,  things  to  be  enjoyed,  human  goods, 
it  is  obvious  that  from  this  same  primary  standpoint  they 
have  another  character.  They  are  the  users  of  goods,  the 
ones  who  do  the  enjoying.  This  character  is  as  universal 
and  fundamental  as  the  other,  but  it  should  not  make  us 
forget  the  other.  It  is  not,  indeed,  a  characteristic  pecu- 
liar to  men.  The  animals  which  man  employs  to  further  his 
enjoyment  are  likewise  users  of  goods  who  enjoy  and  seek 
satisfactions,  often  quite  parallel  to  those  sought  by  men. 

[349] 


■3 


■^tOff.  '~yi~-=^ 


"^„ir'»^iT^^"«™7"'grT 


1 


26 


Annals  op  thb  American  Academy. 


Nor  is  .man  wholly  indifferent  to  their  enjoyment.  But 
while  their  efforts  and  experiences  presimiably  obey  the 
same  laws  as  those  which  govern  our  own,  it  is  probable 
that  we  have  nothing  to  gain  by  including  it  in  our  study. 
The  entire  range  of  economic  objects  known  to  us  is  thus 
comprised  in  two  classes,  the  non-sentient  and  the  sentient, 
or  ignoring  animals,  the  non-human  and  the  human.  The 
former  have  a  single  character  in  fundamental  economic 
relations;  they  are  used.  The  latter  have  a  double  char- 
acter ;  they  are  user  and  used. 

From  the  closely  related  standpoint  of  production   we 
again  find  a  double  character  in  economic-  objects.     They 
are  producer  and   produced.     In  popular    thought,   as  is 
natural,  one  of  these  characters  is  usually  emphasized  to 
the  exclusion  of  the  other.     Man  is  counted  as  a  producer 
and  goods  are  counted  as  products.     But  man  is  also  pro- 
duced with  cost  and  under  laws  which  may  be  definitely 
assigned.     The  refinement  of  this  product    by  technical 
education  is  a  conspicuous  illustration  of  cold-blooded  calcu- 
lations of  economic  advantage.     Other  stages  are  only  more 
obscurely  so.     Commodities,  too,  are  productive,  albeit  in 
ways  peculiar  to  them.     There  are,  of  course,  goods  which 
are  not  economic  products  as  there  are  economic  products 
which  are  not  goods,  but  this  simply  means  that  the  fields 
of  enjoyment    and    production  are  not    co-extensive  and 
identical.     Within  the  proper  field,  however,  we  again  find 
the  two  classes  of  objects,  the  one  having  the  double  char- 
acter of  producer  and  product,  and  the  other  the  single 
character  of  product,  producing  nothing  but  enjoyment. 
In  this  sense — not  a  very  important  sense — not  only  the 
men  whom  Mill  enumerates,  but  all  final  goods  are  unpro- 
ductive.    It  is  a  curiously  inappropriate  word,  however,  to 
apply  to  the  last  stage  on  the  route  to  economic  finality, 
the  consummation  of  our  desire. 

We  have  already  seen  that  the  same  reciprocal  relation 
holds  in  exchange,  men  being  both  seller  and  sold— latterly, 

[350] 


WEAI^TH  and  WEI.FARE. 


27 


of  course,  with  wholesome  but  economically  arbitrary  limita- 
tions. A  careful  study  of  distribution,  the  other  problem 
of  secondary  economics,  will  reveal  the  same  double  char- 
acter. This  was  to  be  expected.  In  the  nature  of  the  case 
all  phenomena  must  have  the  double  character  of  cause  and 
effect  (producer  and  product),  and  if  sentient  this  involves 
the  farther  double  character  of  feeler  and  felt  (en j oyer  and 
enjoyed). 

Enumerations  of    wealth  must    therefore  be   relative. 
From  the  standpoint  of  the  individual  who  looks  out  upon 
the  world  in  quest  of  enjoyment  all  available  objects  have  a 
common  character;  they  are  sources  of  enjoyment.     He  is 
as  likely  to  seek  control  of  one  as   of  another.     He  gives 
his  wares  for  men  (services)  or  for  other  wares  as  suits  his 
purpose,  from  like  motives  and  with  like  results.     To  him 
all  are  goods.     To  another  man  the  relation    is  in  part 
reversed.     He  is  not  the  first  man's  wealth;  the  first  man 
is  his  wealth,  that  is  a  possible  source  of  enjoyment  to  him. 
It  will  be  apparent  later  why  this  essential  identity  of  char- 
acter in  all  useful  objects  external  to  us  is  not  recognized 
in  the  use  of  the  term  wealth.     The  popular  definition  of 
wealth  was  not  determined  by  scientific  considerations,  but 
it  is  one  which  science  may  be  compelled  to  respect.     To 
minimize  the  difficulty  of  innovation  I  have  used  the  some- 
what more  pliable  term  goods  to  designate  the  objective 
counterpart  of  enjoyment  in  all  connections.     I  recognize 
the  unsatisfactoriness  of  this  use  and  shall  be  glad  to  adopt 

a  better  term. 

The  foregoing  facts  will  not  be,  and  indeed  cannot  be, 
denied,  but  my  statement  of  them  is  likely  to  be  sharply 
criticised  as  involving  a  most  objectionable  use  of  terms. 
Indeed,  I  have  written  these  paragraphs  with  the  knowledge 
that  it  encounters  one  of  the  most  vigorous  and  incisive 
criticisms  to  be  found  in  economic  literature  on  innovations 
of  terminology,  a  criticism  as  directly  applicable  to  the 
present  instance  as  though  it  had  been  inspired  by  it.     I 

[351] 


t 


•■■■■<&■  i 


28 


Annai^  of  the  American  Academy. 


refer  to  Bohm-Bawerk  's  discussion  of  definitions  of  capital, 
and  particularly  to  his  criticism  of  the  use  of  the  term  to 
include  the  person  of  the  laborer.  As  the  subject  of 
terminology  is  sure  to  come  up  sooner  or  later  and  to 
trouble  us  until  disposed  of,  it  may  be  well  to  tackle  it  at 
once.  But  before  quoting  the  criticism  I  have  mentioned  I 
will  say  that  I  desire  to  innovate  as  little  as  possible.  I 
shall  not  at  any  time  wantonly  use  words  in  a  new  sense. 
But  for  reasons  which  I  hope  later  to  make  clear  I  desire  to 
emphasize  a  neglected  identity  of  character  between  men 
and  goods.  I  could  afiirm  the  identity  and  stop  with  that, 
but  then  my  statement  would  be  discounted  and  the  identity 
would  dwindle  to  a  feeble  analogy.  So  I  have  called  them 
all  goods,  which  says  exactly  what  I  mean  and  is  the  only 
adequate  means  I  have  for  saying  it.  I  shall  be  thankful 
for  a  better  word.     Now  for  the  criticism. 

"First  of  all.  if  the  title  is  given  to  all  acquisitive  instruments  it 
can  only  be  at  the  cost  of  refusing  it  to  any  narrower  group  of  ac- 
quisitive instruments  which  likewise  claims  it.  .  .  .  Even  were 
the  question  then  in  other  respects  an  open  one,  we  should  on  the 
ground  of  economy  of  terms  decide  against  the  use  of  the  word 
capital  for  the  totality  of  acquisitive  instruments.  But  it  is  not  an 
open  question ;  it  is  already  prejudiced  by  universal  usage.  .  . 
Capital  and  labor,  capitalism  and  socialism,  interest  on  capital  and 
wages  of  labor,  are  certainly  not  harmless  synonyms ;  they  express 
the  strongest  conceivable  social  and  economical  contrasts. 

"Now  what  would  be  the  result  if  people  began  all  at  once  to  call 
labor  capital?  In  the  most  favorable  circumstances  it  would  be  an 
innovation  in  terminology  with  little  to  recommend  it.  If  all  the 
world  were  to  adapt  iself  to  the  innovation,  and  were  to  do  so  in 
full  consciousness  that  it  was  an  innovation  in  terminology  and 
nothing  more,  it  would  remain  perfectly  clear  that  in  putting 
under  one  common  name  the  real  differences  that  separate  labor 
from  what  has  hitherto  been  called  capital,  these  differences  are  not 
in  the  least  reconciled.  As  before,  everybody  would  notice  these 
differences,  and  work  without  bias  at  the  social  problems  to  which 
they  give  rise.  Economic  theory  would  not  then  suffer  any  material 
injury  beyond  the  inconvenience  of  having  no  name  for  the  chief 
object  of  such  inquiries ;  for  of  course  from  the  moment  that  labor 

[352] 


WeaIvTh  and  Welfare. 


29 


is  reckoned  capital  we  must  cease  to  give  the  name  of  capital  to  its 
social  opposite. 

♦•This,  I  say,  might  be  the  result  under  the  most  favorable  cir- 
cumstances ;  unfortunately  such  a  result  is  most  unlikely.  It  is 
much  more  probable  that  the  blending  of  the  names  would  bring 
confusion  into  the  matter.  .  .  .  How  could  one  resist  the  tempt- 
ing opportunity  which  the  new  meaning  of  the  word  capital  would 
offer?  Between  capital  and  labor  as  these  words  were  used  formerly, 
there  was  discord,  contrast,  conflict.  Now  one  single  happy  word 
unites  all  contrasts ;  what  we  thought  opposites  are  really  homo- 
geneous ;  labor  is  capital ;  wage  and  interest  are  at  bottom  one. ' ' 

Then  follow  illustrations  from  economic  literature  of  the 
mischief  wrought  by  such  innovations. 

I  have  no  desire  to  disparage  the  considerations  here 
advanced.     They  must  have  impressed  the  mind  of  every 
one  who  has  struggled  with  the  vagaries  of  quasi-economics 
or  who  has  even  carefully  revised  his  own  words.     The 
argument  would  be  as  conclusive  as  it  is  brilliant  were  its 
premises  sound.     But  among  these  premises  is  an  unex- 
pressed assumption  which  weakens  if  it  does  not  vitiate  the 
conclusion.      The  critic  assumes  as  conditions  of  a  sound 
terminology   («)  that  the    conception    adopted    must    be 
logically  unassailable,  (d)  that  we  must  economize  terms, 
{c)  that  the  conception  must  be  ** scientifically  important," 
and  {d)  that  it  should  square  with  previous  usage  so  far  as 
possible.     All    this   will    be    admitted.     But    he   tacitly 
assumes   further  that    the  conception  adopted   should   be 
single  and  rigid  in  all  uses  save  as  limited  by  qualifying 
adjectives.     This  probably  seemed  too  obvious  to  require 
mention.     Now,  if  this  delightful  simplicity  could  be  had 
just  as  well  as  not  its  desirability  might  indeed  be  conceded. 
But  when  goods  can  not  be  had  for  the  taking  we  may 
sometimes  hesitate  to  purchase  even  the  most  desirable. 
Unfortunately   economics  cannot  have  such  a  one-meaning 
terminology  without  accepting  some  disagreeable  alterna- 
tives.    It  all  comes  back  to  this,  that  there  are  not  enough 
words  to  go  round.     If  it  were  botany  or  physics  we  could 

[353] 


1. 
.^1 


-t^r  ^^^^        ^^'  -p^',"-'^^.;^.  '^, 


L.A,.-.,.=j».  iK|".»  adiSi?J 


30 


Annals  of  the  American  Academy. 


Wealth  and  Welfare. 


31 


manufacture  as  many  terms  as  we  needed  and  ask  no  word 
to  do  double  service.  But  in  economics  by  common  consent 
and  almost  immutable  tradition  we  cannot.  We  must  use 
such  terms  as  are  furnished  by  popular  speech.  It  is  char- 
acteristic of  popular  speech  that  it  makes  words  do  multiple 
duty,  marking  the  transition  from  one  meaning  to  another 
by  the  connection  in  which  it  is  used.  Even  for  popular 
purposes  there  are  not  enough  words  to  go  round,  though 
only  the  more  prominent  distinctions  are  noted.  For 
scientific  purposes  the  deficiency  is  far  greater. 

This  difficulty  becomes  the  more  apparent  when  we  note 

the  true  nature  of  classifications  in  a  science  like  economics. 

The  phenomena  must  be  classified  not  once,  but  separately 

for  each  line    of    inquiry.     Such    a  distinction  as   that 

between  final  and  mediate  goods  can  not  profitably  be  the 

same  for  all  inquiries.     From  the  standpoint  of  enjoyment 

it  is  one  thing,  from  that  of  distribution  another  and  from 

that  of  the  exchanger  or  the  money-lender  still   another. 

Yet  the  bulk  of  the  goods   in   either  class,    say   that  of 

mediate  goods,  will  be  the  same  in  all  these  classifications. 

So  far  as  popular  speech  deals  with  such  distinctions  it  will 

invariably  apply  one  name  to  these  goods  in  the  different 

connections,  trusting  to  circumstances  to  interpret  it  and 

putting  up  with   the  inevitable  ambiguities.      The  ideal 

thing  for  economics  would  be  to  have  a  different  word  for 

the  class  in  each  connection,  a  word  which  should  indicate 

both  the  class  and  the  connection  in  which  it  is  considered. 

But  so  long  as  we  have  to  take  our  cue  from  popular  speech 

we  must  get  along  with  less  than  the  ideal  thing,  with  a 

single  word,  capital.     How  shall  we  use  it?     We  have  a 

number  of  alternatives. 

First,  we  may  use  it  vaguely  as  it  is  used  in  popular 
speech,  neither  indicating  nor  perhaps  perceiving  the 
ambiguity  involved.  This  has  been  common  enough  in 
the  writings  of  economists,  even  of  those  who  have  devoted 
long  discussions  to  its  meaning. 

[354] 


Second,  we  may  use  the  single  term  with  distinguishing 
adjectives  to  mark  its  different  meanings,  as  acquisitive 
capital,  productive  capital,  loan  capital,  etc.  This  is  a 
common  expedient  and  effectively  prevents  misunderstand- 
ing, or  would  do  so  if  the  qualifiers  were  well  chosen  and 
used  with  consistency,  which  is  not  always  the  case.  But 
the  same  considerations  which  forbid  the  coining  of  words 
for  economic  purposes  militates  heavily  against  this  cum- 
bersome terminology,  namely,  the  demand  of  an  amateur 
and  untechnical  public  for  a  facile  and  attractive  style. 
The  adjectives  load  the  exposition  and  are  soon  dropped  or 
if  retained  it  is  with  doubtful  advantage. 

Third,  we  may  use  the  word  in  the  single  sense  that  suits 
our  special  purpose  and  leave  the  rest  to  shift  for  them- 
selves. This  is  approximately  Bohm-Bawerk's  conclusion. 
After  discussing  eleven  different  conceptions  of  capital  to 
be  found  in  as  many  different  authors  he  decides  in  favor  of 
one  of  them  as  the  most  useful.  It  is  noteworthy  that  this 
is  the  one  which  precisely  coincides  with  his  own  highly 
specialized  inquiry  into  the  subject  of  interest.  It  is  a  con- 
ception which  would  be  entirely  unsuited  to  the  discussion 
of  production  which  most  would  regard  as  the  more  funda- 
mental economic  relation.  This  he  recognizes  by  using  the 
term  productive  capital,  which  he  classes  as  a  species  under 
the  genus.  Whatever  may  be  the  relation  of  productive 
to  acquisitive  capital  it  is  not  that  of  species  to  genus. 
It  is  true  that  it  is  a  smaller  class  and  wholly  included  in 
the  other,  but  this  is  an  accident  of  no  logical  importance. 
Aside  from  this  accident  the  conception,  productive  capital, 
is  every  way  the  more  fundamental  of  the  two. 

But  criticism  must  be  lenient  where  the  choice  lies 
between  evils,  which  is  certainly  the  case  here.  There  is 
another  alternative  which  is  at  least  worth  considering. 
It  is  merely  to  do  consciously  what  popular  speech  does 
unconsciously,  namely,  to  use  the  word  in  different  senses 
in  different  connections  with  all  reasonable  precautions  to 

[355] 


%r 


*1 


■li 


-5  ! 


i 


i^Ksr  %  ^~i7^= 


32 


ANNAI.S  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 


make  the  meaning  clear  in  each  connection  and  the  transi- 
tions plain.  There  is  no  infallibility  in  such  a  procedure, 
but  it  is  convenient  and  likely  to  prove  quite  as  accurate  in 
practice  as  the  more  cumbersome  expedients  we  have  con- 
sidered. It  is  a  mistake  to  assume  that  accuracy  inheres  in 
the  pre-definition  of  terms.  It  is  far  more  a  matter  of  skillful 
combination  with  a  view  to  manipulating  those  associations 
which  words  acquire  quite  without  the  writer's  or  lexicog- 
rapher's consent.  If  we  are  definite  and  conscious  in  this 
elastic  use  of  terms  they  may  safely  be  made  even  more 
elastic  than  in  popular  speech.  In  other  words,  they  may 
be  made  evenly  and  symmetrically  elastic  instead  of  fortui- 
tously so. 

I  hesitate  to  pronounce  with  confidence  as  to  the  merits 
of  an  elastically  simple  as  contrasted  with  a  rigidly  com- 
plex terminology.  Temperament  and  literary  instincts 
wnll  affect  a  writer's  judgment  on  such  questions.  For  my 
own  part  I  hesitate  to  cumber  all  allusions  to  familiar  con- 
ceptions by  the  introduction  of  polysyllabic  adjectives  or  to 
talk  much  about  the  "totality  of  acquisitive  instruments.  " 
Nor  can  I  believe  that  conceptions  with  such  names,  if 
frequently  referred  to,  are  "already  sufficiently  provided 
for. ' '  I  would  rather  make  it  as  clear  as  I  can  by  such 
literary  tact  as  I  possess  that  when  I  am  discussing  produc- 
tion I  use  the  word  in  one  sense  and  in  another  connection 
in  another  sense  and  run  the  risk  of  being  misunderstood. 
Perhaps  it  is  better  after  all  to  be  a  little  misunderstood 
than  to  deter  the  reader  by  a  forbidding  technicality. 
Frankly,  however,  I  do  not  expect  to  be  seriously  misunder- 
stood. It  has  seemed  to  me  feasible  to  indicate  an  impor- 
tant identity  of  character  between  men  and  goods  as  objects 
of  enjoyment  by  applying  the  term  goods  to  both.  I  think 
my  meaning  will  be  clear  to  all.  Nor  do  I  believe  any  false 
inferences  as  regards  social  problems  are  likely  to  result. 
In  any  case  there  is  a  limit  to  a  writer's  responsibility  for 
the  heedless  use  which  may  be  made  of  his  words.     That 

[356] 


i"* 


^fKa:^mT^T^' 


'm!f>tr-^'>'V^9m^T''f^f^^'^^fW^^^'*^9*^- 


Weai^th  and  Welfare. 


33 


this  enlarged  meaning  of  the  word  goods  should  become 
general  or  leave  permanent  associations  with  the  word  is 
neither  probable  nor  desirable.  It  will  serve  its  temporary 
purpose  and  disappear.  It  remains  to  be  seen  whether 
reasonable  care  and  ingenuity  cannot  make  of  our  limited 
terminology  a  more  adaptable  and  efficient  instrument  than 
it  has  so  far  been.  This  particular  innovation  is  a  minor 
matter. 


Chapter  III, 

IMPORTANT  ECONOMIC  CONCEPTIONS. 

The  cases  are  fortunately  few  in  which  it  will  be  neces- 
sary to  use  words  in  several  senses  or  in  a  sense  widely 
different  from  that  which  they  have  in  popular  speech.  But 
whether  used  in  a  new  sense  or  an  old  sense,  in  one  sense 
or  many  senses,  there  is  equal  need  of  definiteness  and  con- 
sciousness of  our  own  processes.  There  is  all  possible 
difference  between  systematic  elasticity,  and  indefiniteness 
and  vagueness.  In  addition  to  the  important  distinction 
between  object  and  subject,  considered  in  the  preceding 
chapter,  a  number  of  important  conceptions  require  analysis 
before  we  can  safely  proceed  with  our  discussion. 

The  group  of  words,  happiness,  pleasure,  enjoyment,  etc., 
have  not  been  more  fortunate  than  wealth  at  the  hands  of 
careful  writers.  We  saw  that  philanthropy  and  class  con- 
flict have  had  a  hand  in  shaping  the  definition  of  wealth. 
Philosophical  controversy  has  had  a  hand  in  defining  hap- 
piness, which  is  incomparably  worse.  The  first  gives  us 
only  the  tangle  of  accident ;  the  second  gives  us  the  tangle 
of  planful  ingenuity. 

Is  happiness  one  thing  or  more  than  one?  Do  happiness 
and  pleasure  stand  for  distinct  and  inconvertible  experi- 
ences, or  are  they  but  species  under  a  true  genus?  Is  hap- 
piness attainable  as  the  result  of  conscious  search,  or  is  it 
incidental  to  the  pursuit  of  something  else?  Into  the  dis- 
cussion of  these  questions  we  cannot  now  enter  with  profit. 
It  is  reasonable  to  hope  that  our  inquiry  into  the  nature  of 
the  satisfactions  which  men  derive  from  their  contact  with 


•fa 


•I 


't?'-'tir9;-^M'f'.''*! 


34 


Annals  of  the  American  Academy. 


Wealth  and  Welfare. 


35 


persons  and  things  will  throw  some  light  upon  these  ques- 
tions, bul:  we  will  not  prejudice  our  inquiry  by  needless 
assumptions.  For  the  present  all  we  need  to  decide  is 
which  of  these  terms  we  are  going  to  employ  and  in  what 
sense. 

The  terms  happiness  and  pleasure  have  become  relatively 
specialized  and  contrasted  with  each  other.  Happiness 
suggests  a  relatively  permanent  state  of  mind  and  pleasure 
a  temporary  and  superficial  experience.  The  one  is  associ- 
ated with  character  and  virtue,  the  other  with  circumstance 
and  indulgence.  The  familiar  definition  of  happiness  in 
treatises  on  ethics  as  "pleasure  resulting  from  right  action" 
gives  technical  sharpness  to  this  popular  distinction. 
Whatever  may  be  the  validity  of  this  distinction,  it  plainly 
is  not  so  fundamental  as  to  require  us  to  recognize  it  at  the 
outset.  Underneath  the  specific  difference  there  is  still  a 
generic  unity  which  is  artificially  obscured  by  the  popular 
emphasis  upon  prominent  characteristics.  When  a  man 
enjoys  actions  and  experiences  which  most  men  associate 
with  discomfort,  his  enjoyment  is  naturally  attributed  to  a 
predisposing  character  on  his  part.  His  enjoyment  is 
attributable  to  himself.  But  if  he  enjoys  what  other  men 
enjoy  it  does  not  seem  peculiar.  Attention  is  directed  to  the 
circumstances  which  are  familiar  to  all  as  fugitive  condi- 
tions of  enjoyment.  Such  enjoyment  is  attributable  to  cir- 
cumstances. Of  course  both  explanations  ignore  that  which 
is  common  to  both  and  so  unemphasized  by  contrast.  No 
amount  of  susceptibility  in  itself  creates  happiness.  Men 
do  not  enjoy  susceptibility,  they  enjoy  by  means  of  it. 
Equally,  no  amount  of  favoring  circumstance  can  produce 
enjoyment  without  some  degree  of  favoring  susceptibility. 
Character  enjoyment  and  circumstance  enjoyment  are  alike 
dependent  on  two  factors,  character  and  circumstance,  which 
though  differing  widely  in  kind  and  amount,  must  invari- 
ably co-operate.  This  co-operation  of  character  and  cir- 
cumstance, susceptibility  and  environment,  subjective  and 


objective,  is  fundamental  and  generic,  is  precisely  the  rela- 
tion we  are  to  consider  in  the  broadest  sense.  The  differ- 
ences of  kind  and  amount  are  specific  and  subordinate.  That 
they  may  be  and  often  are  of  the  profoundest  practical 
import,  I  by  no  means  deny  and  in  all  relevant  connections 
am  eager  to  affirm,  but  they  are  not  basal  to  our  inquiry. 

What  is  the  generic  character  for  which  we  seek  a  name  ? 
The  one  fact  which  is  common  to  all  these  experiences  is 
that  thej'  are  experie^ices  which  an  individual^  knowing  their 
character^  would  undergo  for  their  own  sake.  Such  a  cate- 
gory would  exclude  many  wholesome  experiences,  which 
though  conducive  to  ultimate  enjoyment,  are  not  in  them- 
selves enjoyable;  it  would  also  include  many  experiences 
which  are  ruinous  in  their  consequences  but  enjoyable  in 
themselves.  The  criterion  applies  to  the  experience  itself, 
not  to  some  other  which  precedes  or  follows  it.  It  applies 
equally  to  all  agreeable  experiences,  no  matter  how  concen- 
trated or  diffused. 

The  terms  happiness  and  pleasure  do  not  ordinarily 
designate  any  such  inclusive  category.  They  are  popular 
names  for  species  under  the  genus.  We  cannot  profitably 
use  them,  therefore,  until  we  come  to  discuss  these  specific 
differences.  The  term  enjoyment,  on  the  other  hand,  has 
acquired  no  such  limiting  associations,  but  is  comprehen- 
sive in  its  suggestions  and  fitted  to  designate  the  aggregate 
of  the  experiences  we  are  to  study.  I  shall  continue  to  use 
it  in  this  sense  as  I  have  hitherto  done. 

But  this  use  has  one  great  disadvantage.  Enjoyment  has 
no  correlative  term  to  express  its  opposite.  We  have  hap- 
piness and  misery,  pleasure  and  pain,  comfort  and  discom- 
fort, but  no  such  correlative  for  enjoyment.  Whenever  we 
have  no  occasion  to  emphasize  this  distinction  the  word  may 
very  well  stand  for  both.  The  term  enjoyment  would  there- 
fore be  applied  to  all  agreeable  and  disagreeable  experiences 
taken  together,  while  all  objects  would  be  called  enjoyable 
which  in  any  way  affect  enjoyment.     But  the  moment  we 


I A 


36 


Annals  of  the  American  Academy. 


wish  to  distinguish  between  agreeable  and  disagreeable  ex- 
periences we  are  embarrassed.  I  have  already  expressed 
my  aversion  for  such  clumsy  phrases  as  positive  enjoyment 
and  negative  enjoyment,  whose  scientific  advantages  are 
more  than  counterbalanced  by  their  literary  defects.  Of 
the  various  correlatives  available  for  this  purpose  pleasure 
and  pain  seem  least  objectionable.  It  will  be  understood 
therefore  that  when  used  as  correlatives  pleasure  and  pain 
are  inclusive  terms  referring  respectively  to  agreeable  and 
disagreeable  experiences  in  general  and  with  no  reference 
to  differences  between  high  and  low,  sensual  and  spiritual, 
character  and  circumstance. 

The  word  consumption  has  had  a  most  unfortunate  experi- 
ence in  economic  literature.  At  least  three  meanings  can 
be  traced,  with  the  usual  variations  and  blendings.  It  is 
an  open  question  whether  the  term  has  not  become  radically 
and  incorrigibly  misleading,  not  so  much  because  of  its 
different  meanings  as  because  of  its  inherent  unsuitableness 
for  them.  Its  primary  and  irrepressible  suggestion  is  that 
goods  are  used  up.  The  word  was  selected  at  a  time  when 
attention  was  concentrated  on  goods  of  which  this  was  con- 
spicuously true.  These  goods  still  have  undue  prominence 
in  the  minds  of  economists.  Of  course  Walker  and  others 
have  called  attention  to  the  fact  that  goods  are  not  destroyed 
by  use  to  anything  like  an  equal  extent,  some  not  at  all,  to 
which  may  be  added  that  some  goods  are  actually  preserved 
by  using  and  perish  by  disuse.  But  still  the  incident  of 
the  process  is  more  prominent  than  its  essence — thanks  to 
this  same  ill-chosen  word.  Sometimes  the  essence  is  for- 
gotten altogether,  as  in  the  recent  treatise  of  Nicholson. 

' '  On  the  other  hand,  sometimes  the  work  of  consmnption  is  per- 
formed by  nature  altogether  against  the  wishes  of  the  possessor  of 
the  commodity.  Thus  breakwaters,  embankments  and  docks  are 
wasted  by  the  powers  of  wind  and  water ;  buildings  crumble  away 
under  atmospheric  influences;  useful  plants  and  animals  are  destroyed 
by  living  plagues;  whilst  in  addition  to  the  accumulated  effects  of 


Weai^th  and  Welfare. 


37 


slowly-working  causes,  we  have  occasional  catastrophes  through  hur- 
ricanes, floods  and  earthquakes." 

And  this  is  not  the  worst.  This  conception  of  consumption 
is  at  least  definite,  if  not  wholly  justified,  by  the  etymology 
of  the  word.  It  means  destruction,  nothing  more  nor  less, 
and  might  be  dismissed  with  no  other  commentary  than  that 
the  word,  destruction,  would  have  been  a  better  name  for  it. 
But  this  same  writer  mixes  this  conception  inextricably 
with  the  other  which  economists  have  been  striving  to  asso- 
ciate with  the  unfortunate  term,  namely  enjoyment  or  use, 
thus  sanctioning  the  very  confusion  which  it  is  so  impor- 
tant to  avoid.  We  have  small  reason  to  wonder  that  popular 
conceptions  of  economic  relations  are  vague. 

The  deterioration  of  goods,  either  through  use,  accident 
or  causes  inherent  in  their  nature,  is  a  matter  of  impor- 
tance in  economics  as  in  practical  affairs,  and  one  which  can 
not  be  ignored  in  a  consideration  of  enjoyment.  But  to 
describe  this  process  the  word  deterioration  is  as  unambig- 
uous as  words  are  apt  to  be.  For  that  specific  kind  of 
deterioration  which  is  incident  to  use  the  word  consumption 
is  admirably  adapted.  The  deriving  of  satisfactions  from 
goods  is  a  perfectly  distinct  process,  bearing  only  a  for- 
tuitous relation  to  the  foregoing.  For  this  process,  too,  we 
have  a  number  of  terms — use,  enjoyment,  utilization — none 
of  them  ideal,  but  all  of  them  fairly  available.  But  fate  has 
willed  that  this  process  should  be  known  as  consumption  in 
all  recent  discussions.  It  is  not  without  hesitation  that  I 
decide  to  try  to  stem  this  current  of  vicious  tendency,  but  if 
such  an  effort  is  ever  worth  while  it  is  so  here.  All  prin- 
ciples of  terminology  demand  the  change.  We  are  dealing 
with  distinct  conceptions  which  need  names,  and  usage, 
while  piling  up  words  on  one  of  them,  leaves  the  other  with 
no  distinctive  designation.  The  use  of  the  word  consump- 
tion to  indicate  the  enjoyment  of  goods  by  processes  often 
involving  no  consumption  at  all,  is  in  defiance  of  an 
etymology  that  is  visible  on  the  surface  and  an  extensive 


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38 


Annai^  of  thk  American  Academy. 


Wealth  and  Welfare. 


39 


counter  usage  with  its  powerful  current  of  suggestion. 
Even  within  the  technical  field  where  this  incongruous 
meaning  has  grown  up,  the  original  and  incompatible  mean- 
ing has  persisted  with  most  mischievous  results.  So  I  will 
venture  to  excuse  the  term  from  its  new  duties  and  confine 
it  to  its  original  use.  Except  when  quoted  or  in  references 
to  quotations  from  other  authors,  I  will  use  the  word  only 
to  indicate  the  destruction  of  goods  incident  to  their  use. 
This  is  not  necessarily  all  the  destruction  which  is  simul- 
taneous with  use,  since  nature  destroys  on  her  own  account, 
a  destruction  for  which  use  is  not  responsible.  Nor  does  it 
necessarily  involve  a  net  increase  of  destruction,  for  con- 
sumption may  displace  a  destruction  which  would  be  more 
serious  than  itself,  or  finally  there  may  be  no  effect,  destruc- 
tive or  preserv^ative,  in  connection  with  use,  in  which  case 
consumption  is  nil.  But  it  is  only  to  this  incident  of  use 
that  the  word  refers,  a  distinctly  objective  phenomenon  as 
contrasted  with  enjoyment,  which  is  a  subjective  phenome- 
non. The  generic  term  for  these  unfavorable  changes  in 
goods  is  deterioration,  of  which  consumption  and  destruc- 
tion are  species,  the  one  incident  to  use  and  the  other  inde- 
pendent of  it. 

The  word  use  is  an  excellent  example  of  that  elasticity  of 
meaning  which  we  have  noticed  as  the  characteristic  of 
popular  speech  and  which  in  this  case  at  least  has  proved 
safe  and  serviceable  in  scientific  discussion.  In  such 
expressions  as :  What  is  the  use  of  doing  that  ?  the  use  of 
silk  is  increasing;  the  muscles  are  developed  by  use,  the 
variety  and  the  definiteness  of  meaning  are  both  apparent. 
There  seems  to  be  no  occasion  to  protest  against  this  free 
use  of  the  term,  but  it  is  desirable  to  notice  the  fundamental 
meaning  of  the  word  and  its  relation  to  other  conceptions 
which  we  have  considered. 

All  economic  processes  are  reducible  to  two,  getting  good 
out  of  things,  and  putting  good  into  things.  The  first  and 
more  fundamental  process  is  use,  the  second  and  subsidiary 


one  is  production.     The  good  which  men  are  thus  busy  in 
getting  out  and  putting  into  things  is  usefulness  or  the 
power  to  further  our  enjoyment,  and  things  which  have 
this  good,  artificially  or  naturally,  are  goods.     These  goods 
are  of  two  kinds,  final  and  mediate,  the  former  yielding  up 
their  usefulness  in  the  form  of  enjoyment,  the  latter  passing 
it  on  into  another  good.     The  former  goods  are  enjoyable, 
the  latter  are  not,  but  all  are  useful.     Usefulness  is  there- 
fore the  capacity  to  produce  enjoyment,  directly  or  indi- 
rectly;   enjoyableness  the   power   to  produce   it  directly. 
Enjoyableness  is  therefore  a  variety  of  usefulness,  the  final 
form  into  which  it  passes  as  the  result  of  its  many  transfor- 
mations.    Thus  we  enjoy  pictures,  but  we  use  paint.     The 
latter  does  not  assume  an  attractive  form  which  directly 
contributes  to  our  enjoyment  till  the  painter  has  used  it  and 
produced  a  picture.     The  laws  of  use  are  therefore  closely 
analogous  to  the  laws  of  enjoyment,  the  same  laws  in  fact  in 
wider  application. 

It  will  be  noted  that  while  use  is  entirely  distinct  from 
production  in  the  case  of  final  goods,  it  is  apparently  iden- 
tical with  it  in  the  case  of  mediate  goods  or  capital.     We 
can  not  use  such  goods  without  producing  goods,  since  by 
hypothesis  that  is  the  only  thing  they  are  good  for.     But 
after  all,  the  identity  of  the  two  is  merely  apparent.     When 
we  use  flour  we  produce,  but  we  do  not  produce  flour;  we 
produce  bread.     Logically  and  in  their  bearing  upon  a  par- 
ticular good  the  two  processes  are  fundamentally  opposed. 
To  pour  wine  out  of  a  bottle  and  into  a  glass  is  a  single 
process,  but  for  all  that  there  is  a  difference  between  pour- 
ing out  and  pouring  in.     While  therefore  use  is  intimately 
associated  with  production,  it  is  never  to  be  confounded 
with  it.     It  is  one  aspect  of  a  process  which  in  its  other 
aspect  is  either  production  or  enjoyment  according  to  the 
nature  of  the  good. 

I  have  so  far  avoided  the  term  utility,  which  is  generally 
regarded  as  the  more  scientific  synonym  for  usefulness.     So 


s. 


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40 


Annals  of  the  American  Academy. 


WEAI.TH   AND  WEI«FARE. 


41 


» 
4 


far  the  two  terms  have  not  been  differentiated,  because  the 
two  conceptions  toward  which  they  severally  gravitate  have 
not  been  clearly  distinguished.     But  it  is  plain  that  there 
are  two  conceptions  and  that  the  word  utility,  which  has 
been  applied  to  both,  has  been  used  in  a  double  sense.     The 
first  of  these  is  power  to  further  enjoyment,  which  I  have 
designated  as  usefulness.     The  second  is  apparent  or  anti- 
cipated power  to  further  enjoyment,  which  may  be  con- 
veniently called  utility.     So  far  as   etymology  goes  this 
distinction  is  an  arbitrary  one,  but  it  is  plainly  foreshad- 
owed by  recent  discussion.     In  all  discussions  of  value  and 
in  the  definition  of  value  as  marginal  utility  it  is  this  anti- 
cipation or  estimate  of  enjoyment  which   is  considered. 
The  distinction  is  important  because  anticipation  not  only 
differs  from  realization  but  it  differs  from  it  pretty  regularly 
and  in  accordance  with  principles  which  may  be  formu- 
lated, at  least  in  part.     In  certain  connections,  however, 
this  approximate  parallelism  between  the  two  makes  the 
distinction  unimportant.     When  we  consider  the  relation  of 
utility  to  any  other  phenomenon  it  must  be  sharply  dis- 
tinguished from  usefulness.     But  if  we  consider  the  relation 
of  one  kind  of  utility  to  another,  it  makes  no  difference 
whether  we  consider  actualities  or  anticipations.     What  is 
true  of  the  one  will  be  true  of  the  other,  with  slight  differ- 
ences of  degree.      Wherever  relations  can    be  discussed 
equally  well  as  anticipated  or  realized  it  will  be  convenient 
to  use  the  term  utility  without  emphasis  upon  the  special 
meaning  here  defined.     Although  standing  for  the  less  fun- 
damental of  the  two  conceptions  it  is  the  more  familiar  of 
the  two  terms  and  can  be  safely  used  in  the  more  represen- 
tative sense. 


Chapter  IV. 

ECONOMICS  AND   EVOI.UTION. 

In  considering  the  nature  and  extent  of  economic  juris- 
diction we  have  so  far  confined  our  attention  to  internal 
problems.  We  now  turn  to  the  problem  of  foreign  relations. 
These  present  somewhat  perplexing  examples  of  dependence 
and  independence,  joint  and  rival  jurisdiction.  The  most 
important  of  these  inquiries  is  that  of  the  relation  of  eco- 
nomics to  evolution.  Economic  problems  are  problems  of 
enjoyment.  We  have  seen  that  this  is  the  lodestone  of  all 
economic  impulse,  whether  recognized  or  unrecognized, 
visible  or  concealed.  The  problem  before  us  is  therefore 
that  of  the  relation  of  enjoyment  to  evolution. 

The  economist  has  seldom  troubled  himself  with  such  an 
inquiry,  has  often  indeed  been  conspicuously  averse  to 
doing  so.  And  strictly  speaking,  it  is  hardly  a  part  of  eco- 
nomics. But  if  he  cares  more  to  come  to  correct  conclusions 
than  to  be  exclusively  economic  such  an  inquiry  will  be 
profitable.  It  concerns  the  main  premise  of  the  science  and 
one  which  has  been  the  subject  of  persistent  fallacies.  The 
study  of  organic  evolution  has  thrown  much  light  upon  the 
origin,  nature  and  limitations  of  the  impulse  to  enjoyment, 
and  in  assuming  it  as  the  starting-point  of  economic  inquiry 
it  is  well  to  know  what  we  are  assuming.  In  revising  the 
premises  of  our  science  we  have  much  to  gain  by  a  careful 
study  of  the  laws  of  evolution,  the  process  to  which  all  the 
phenomena  with  which  we  deal  owe  their  existence.  Im- 
pulses and  energies  must  be  understood  in  their  largest 
relations  if  they  are  to  be  made  the  basis  of  sound  conclu- 
sions. This  is  a  very  different  thing  from  merely  translat- 
ing economics  into  the  language  of  biology  under  the  plea 
of  making  it  an  evolutionary  science. 

One  of  the  most  persistent  obstacles  to  an  understanding 
of  this  relation  is  the  assumption  that  enjoyment  (happi- 
ness) is  the  purpose  of  evolution,  or  in  older  phrase,  the 


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42 


Annai^  of  the  American  Academy. 


WEAIvTH  and  WEI.FARE. 


43 


purpose  of  nature  or  of  creation.  The  assumption  that 
nature  goes  about  her  work  knowingly  and  has  an  eye  to 
the  satisfaction  to  be  gotten  out  of  her  work  is  so  instinc- 
tive and  universal  that  it  has  governed  the  development  of 
language  so  that  we  can  not  speak  of  nature  without  seem- 
ing to  subscribe  to  the  theory.  Such  an  assumption  would 
be  profoundly  significant  if  it  were  not  the  obvious  result  of 
our  limitations  rather  than  of  our  insight.  We  naturally 
explain  the  unfamiliar  by  the  familiar,  the  actions  of  others 
by  our  own,  the  activities  of  nature  by  the  activities  of 
men.  The  echo  is  supposed  to  be  somebody  speaking; 
actions  are  regarded  as  malign  which  would  have  been 
malign  had  we  committed  them.  The  process  is  valid 
enough,  but  with  the  meagre  data  of  individual  experience, 
its  conclusions  are  often  false.  There  are  few  better  tests 
of  culture  than  the  ability  to  escape  from  the  provincialism 
of  individual  experience.  In  accord  with  this  tendency  the 
savage  peoples  his  little  world  with  ghostly  agents;  Ulysses, 
baffled  by  storms,  attributes  the  hindrance  to  the  anger  of 
Neptune,  and  the  philosopher,  noticing  adaptations  in 
nature  with  little  attention  to  the  changes  that  produce 
them,  reverts  to  the  same  ready  explanation  of  personal 
purpose.  In  all  these  explanations  we  can  discern  the  rea- 
sonings of  men  too  absorbed  in  their  own  activities  and  dis- 
proportionately conscious  of  the  causes  which  emanate  from 
their  own  minds. 

By  a  slow  but  wholesome  process,  exceedingly  wholesome 
in  its  reaction  on  human  conduct,  nature  is  exonerated  from 
the  motives  thus  attributed  to  her  specific  acts.  Storms 
become  impersonal  and  men  build  breakwaters  instead  of 
altars  to  Neptune.  Disease  is  attributed  to  bacteria  instead 
of  demons  and  inoculation  takes  the  place  of  incantation. 
The  attribution  of  purpose  retreats  from  the  specific  to  the 
general.  It  is  there  that  we  encounter  it  as  the  assumption 
that  the  purpose  of  evolution  is  enjoyment,  that  this  is  the 


goal  toward  which  the  whole  movement  has  from  the  first 
been  and  still  is  intentionally  directed. 

I  am  far  from  asserting  that  this  assumption  is  false,  but 
it  is  certainly  premature.  We  know  all  too  little  of  the 
direction  of  evolution  in  its  various  stages  and  are  still  too 
ignorant  of  what  it  has  accomplished  in  the  way  of  conscious 
happiness  to  warrant  so  sweeping  a  conclusion.  The  most 
that  we  can  confidently  assert  is  that  force  is  not  in  equilib- 
rium, that  change  is  constant,  and  that  for  a  long  time  back 
this  change  has  been  in  the  direction  of  increasing  com- 
plexity of  organic  life;  that  finally,  pleasure  and  pain  are 
familiar  experiences  to  higher  organisms  and  bear  to  each 
other  an  uncertain  proportion,  whether  favorable  or  unfav- 
orable, constant  or  changing  in  the  aggregate  we  can  not 
say.  Avoiding,  therefore,  any  such  dangerous  working 
hypothesis  as  this,  we  have  simply  to  observe  the  circum- 
stances under  which  enjoyment  appears  and  the  r61e  which 
it  plays  in  the  evolution  of  organic  life.  Why  has  life 
developed  the  power  of  feeling  pleasure  and  pain  ?  What 
function  do  these  experiences  perform? 

The  general  law  of  organic  evolution  is  familiar.  There 
is  reproduction  in  geometric  ratio,  (quite  inevitably)  over- 
crowding, struggle  for  existence  and  natural  selection  or 
survival  of  the  fittest.  The  result  is  an  increasing  adapta- 
tion of  the  organism  to  its  environment.  If  the  environ- 
ment itself  were  fixed  the  adaptation  would  become  complete 
and  the  species  would  have  an  absolute  hold  on  life.  But 
as  the  environment  itself  is  subject  to  change,  and  as  the 
rate  and  direction  of  the  change  in  the  two  cases  may  not 
be  the  same,  the  evolving  organism  may  run  a  losing  race 
and  eventually  be  ruled  off  the  field.  How  is  this  process 
affected  by  the  susceptibility  to  pleasure  and  pain  ? 

An  organism  that  knows  nothing  of  evolution  and  is 
oblivious  of  remoter  consequences  will  do  its  best  to  secure 
pleasure  and  avoid  pain.  But  it  does  not  follow  that  because 
the  organism  seeks  enjoyment  nature  will  co-operate  to  that 


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end.  Au  individual  may  conceivably  enjoy  things  which 
are  detrimental  to  him,  in  which  case  nature  may  mark  him 
for  extinction  instead  of  furthering  his  desires.  Pleasures 
are  not  necessarily  profitable  experiences  and  any  amount 
of  divergence  is  possible  between  the  desires  of  an  organism 
and  the  necessities  of  its  existence. 

Yet  in  the  long  run  pleasures  and  pains  tend  to  identify 
themselves  with  profitable  and  unprofitable  experiences, 
respectively,  or  rather,  there  is  a  tendency  for  those  experi- 
ences, and  only  those  experiences  which  are  favorable  to 
existence  to  become  pleasurable.  If  we  introduce  into  a 
sheep  pasture  a  plant  which  is  injurious  to  sheep  and  dif- 
ferent from  any  with  which  the  sheep  are  familiar,  there  is 
likely  to  be  at  first  a  difference  of  taste  regarding  it  on  the 
part  of  the  sheep.  Some  will  like  it  and  some  will  not. 
Eventually,  as  the  result,  it  may  be,  of  a  heavy  mortality 
among  the  sheep,  all  will  come  to  dislike  and  avoid  the 
noxious  plant,  not  so  much  because  of  any  observation  of 
its  consequences  as  because  the  plant  will  have  sorted  the 
sheep  and  eliminated  those  with  unfortunate  predilections. 
Thus  conduct  unfavorable  to  life  becomes  associated  with 
disagreeableness  or  pain.  In  the  same  manner  experiences 
favorable  to  life  become  associated  with  pleasure,  not 
because  there  is  any  necessary  or  predetermined  relation  of 
this  kind,  but  because  only  those  species  can  permanently 
exist  whose  members  establish  such  a  relation. 

This  seems  at  first  sight  to  point  to  the  conclusion  already 
referred  to  that  enjoyment  is  the  end  of  evolution,  but  such 
a  conclusion  is  subject  to  serious  qualifications.  Aside  from 
the  fact  that  evolution  encourages  pleasure  apparently  as  a 
means  rather  than  as  an  end,  there  is  the  farther  and  more 
serious  fact  that  pain  is  developed  and  used  in  precisely  the 
same  way.  The  two  seem  to  serve  a  similar  purpose  and  to 
be  employed  by  nature  in  no  fixed  proportion.  Whether 
she  rewards  the  necessary  act  or  punishes  its  neglect,  it  is 
likely  to  be  performed  in  either  case  if  the  connection  is 


Wealth  and  Welfare. 


45 


perceived  and  the  incentive  sufficient.  Doubtless  the  one 
line  of  incentive  is  better  adapted  to  certain  cases  than  the 
other,  but  we  can  discern  no  fixed  necessity  calling  for  an 
increased  proportion  of  pleasure  as  evolution  proceeds. 

In  the  second  place,  evolution  does  not  assure  increasing 
adjustment,  only  a  constant  tendency  toward  it  on  the  part 
of  the  organism.  Lesson  after  lesson  may  be  learned  and 
the  proper  adjustment  established  between  profit  and  pleas- 
ure, and  still  the  lessons  to  be  learned  may  be  more  numerous 
and  perplexing  than  before.  There  may  be  more  perilous 
pleasures  and  more  ambiguous  pains  than  at  an  earlier 
period,  all  because  the  environment  to  which  the  species  is 
trying  to  adapt  itself,  will  not  stay  fixed,  but  goes  on 
changing  under  the  pressure  of  forces  which  have  no  regard 
for  these  adaptations. 

Finally,  changes  in  the  environment  may  make  previous 
adjustments  into  misadjustments  and  thus  give  the  lie  to 
their  associated    pleasures  and  pains.     A  line  of  action 
which  has  long  been  profitable  and  so  has  become  uniformly 
pleasurable  by  selection,  may  become  by  a  change  of  circum- 
stances unprofitable  and  dangerous,  while  still  for  a  long 
time  its  pleasurableness  persists.     This  is  peculiarly  true 
of  the  human  species  in  its  relatively  recent  social  evolution. 
Countless  centuries  of  organic  evolution  have  established 
instincts  and  pleasures  useful   in   a  pre-social   state,  but 
inimical  to  associate  life.    The  most  poignant  of  our  miseries 
are  connected  with  this  painful  undoing  of  nature's  amaz- 
ingly perfect  work.     These  social  requirements  are  but  an 
extreme  example  of  what   is  continually  taking  place,  a 
change   in   environment  requiring  new  or  even  contrary 
adjustments.     If  such  a  change  is  more  rapid  than  the 
adaptive  changes  in  the  organism,  the  adjustment  between 
pleasure  and  pain  on  the  one  hand  and  wholesomeness  on 
the  other,  becomes  less  perfect,  and  for  a  time  we  have 
retrogression,  a  decrease  in  enjoyment  and  a  lower  general 
vitality  in  the  species.     Periods  of  retrogressive  evolution 


t  '■ 


,  ,*■'  "•WQfls^sSsaiSSRSS^Wi^v^^SBi.-i^iiiig 


ll^.:^f^>iV^^ 


46 


Annals  of  thk  Amkrican  Acadkmy. 


Wealth  and  Welfare. 


47 


or  decreasing  adaptation  seem  to  be  unfavorable  to  enjoy- 
ment and  the  same  is  apparently  true  of  all  periods  of  exten- 
sive readjustment.  In  periods  of  relative  quiescence  the 
species  seems  to  enjoy  with  less  discount  the  fruits  of  hard- 
won  adaptation,  but  even  here  the  good  of  pain  is  not 
absent  nor  the  pleasure  of  life  unmixed.  We  can  not 
assume  that  there  is  any  force  outside  the  individual  which 
tends  irresistibly  to  secure  a  preponderance  of  pleasures 
over  pains  in  his  experience. 

We  have  now  to  consider  what  opportunity  is  granted  to 
the  individual  by  this  all-enveloping  process  to  work  out  his 
own  enjoyment.  For  the  individual  knows  nothing  of 
evolution  and  its  ends,  as  evolution  knows  nothing  of  him 
and  his.  He  prefers  the  enjoyable  as  uniformly  as  nature 
prefers  the  livable.  That  his  preference  must  be  subordi- 
nate to  hers  is  plain,  for  if  he  chooses  the  inadmissible  he 
will  not  live  to  do  much  choosing.  Nature  seems  not  to 
have  created  man  with  any  intention  of  making  him  happy 
or  making  him  miserable,  but  those  whose  inclinations  and 
aversions  are  such  as  to  impel  them  along  the  straight  and 
narrow  path  that  leads  to  life,  these  persist  and  perpetuate 
their  type  and  their  inclinations. 

So  far  as  the  foregoing  considerations  have  to  do  with  the 
problem  of  survival  they  are  apart  from  the  problem  of 
economics  which  is  concerned  with  enjoyment  rather  than 
with  life.  To  this  problem  we  must  now  more  definitely 
turn.  What  bearing  has  this  subordination  of  enjoyment 
to  vital  interests  upon  our  study  of  the  laws  of  enjoy- 
ment? 

In  the  first  place  this  general  subordination  of  enjoyment 
to  vital  interests  is  in  itself  the  fundamental  law  of  enjoy- 
ment, one  which  limits  all  others.  It  is  thus  the  main 
premise  of  our  science.  Every  tendency  to  pleasure  is  sure 
sooner  or  later  to  encounter  the  inexorable  requirements  of 
life  and  to  suffer  subordination  or  annihilation  as  a  result. 
This  inevitable  encounter  is  of  interest  alike  to  the  study  of 


enjoyment  and  to  the  study  of  life.  We  have  not  com- 
pleted the  life  history  of  an  enjoyment  until  we  have  fol- 
lowed it  to  this  critical  point  and  discovered  what  becomes 
of  it.  To  study  subordinate  phenomena  and  ignore  their 
subordination  is  misleading  in  both  theory  and  practice. 
We  lose  sight  of  the  co-ordinating  principle  and  open  the 
way  to  all  manner  of  baseless  assumptions.  In  the  present 
connection  we  also  lend  countenance  to  mischievous  fallacies 
in  practice.  The  notion  that  all  enjoyments  are  matters  of 
taste  and  that  one  man's  taste  is  as  valid  as  another's, 
while  not  without  a  certain  limited  justification,  is  trouble- 
somely  prominent  in  popular  thought.  But  what  has  eco- 
nomics to  say  against  such  a  notion  if  it  ignores  the  ultimate 
subordination  of  enjoyment  to  vital  interests,  that  is,  its 
functional  character  in  the  evolution  of  the  species?  We 
need  not  be  disturbed  by  the  temporary  moral  consequences 
of  scientific  inquiry,  but  we  may  well  have  a  concern  for 
the  moral  consequences  of  unscientific  inquiry.  This  is  our 
main  premise:  Enjoyment  is  the  servant  of  life. 

But  is  this  serviceable  pleasure  the  only  enjoyment  to 
which  man  may  attain?  Such  an  assumption  would  poorly 
account  for  the  phenomena  of  life  as  we  now  see  it.  In 
spite  of  the  inexorableness  of  nature's  processes,  there  is  in 
them  much  of  alternative,  much  of  elasticity.  Some  things 
man  must  do  or  forbear  doing  on  pain  of  death,  but  there 
are  many  more  which  he  may  do  or  not  as  he  likes.  Eating 
is  a  necessity  to  which  man  is  impelled  somewhat  by  the 
promise  of  pleasure,  more  by  the  threat  of  pain.  But  gas- 
tronomy is  not  a  necessity.  It  is  man's  deliberate  effort  to 
enhance  the  feeble  pleasure  of  eating.  Nature  looks  on 
indifferent  at  man's  manipulation  of  his  surplus  resources, 
knowing  full  well  that  whether  he  succeed  much  or  little, 
suflBcient  incentives  will  remain  for  the  accomplishment  of 
her  necessary  purpose.  Man  is  equally  concerned  to  lessen 
the  pain  which  constantly  attends  upon  nature's  require- 
ments.      The    numberless    pitfalls     in    man's    primitive 


yfe.#£.l%A*{««^fe 


^m^  ,S.  fe.»>r'^  '^i#^!*i*>J 


48 


Annals  op  the  American  Academy. 


■!^ 


environment  are  avoided  only  by  the  admonitions  of  nature, 
which  are  more  or  less  painful  in  their  working.  Man 
undertakes  extensive  modifications,  which  by  removing  the 
pitfalls  make  the  admonitions  unnecessary.  Thus  all  the 
way  from  the  growing  of  seedless  grapes  and  thornless 
roses  to  the  blasting  of  Hell-Gate  the  pain-destroying  pro- 
cess goes  on,  nature  not  forbidding  till  by  an  unlucky  ven- 
ture some  pain  is  removed  which  guards  an  interest  or 
some  pleasure  devised  which  betrays  him  whom  it  tempts. 
Then,  again,  remorseless  nature  intervenes  with  her 
Draconian  penalty.  Thus  eating  is  required,  gastronomy 
permitted,  gluttony  forbidden. 

Man  is  thus  permitted  to  achieve  for  himself  a  happiness 
to  which  the  process  of  evolution  is  indifferent  and  which  it 
does  not  assure.     He  exploits  the  neutral  territory,  not 
without  danger,  for  to  trespass  beyond  its  uncertain  bound- 
aries is  death.    It  remains  to  note  that  this  neutral  territory 
is  perhaps  an  enlarging  one.     As  man  acquires  power  over 
nature  and  masters  her  secrets  he  finds  new  ways  of  meet- 
ing her  requirements  with  less  of  risk  and  pain.     More  of 
marginal  resource,  more  time  and  strength,  are  thus  avail- 
able for  his  chosen  purpose.     The  requirement  to  eat  is 
as  imperative  as  ever,  but  a  requirement  which  once  took  all 
his  time  and  strength  now  takes  but  a  small  part  of  it.   The 
rest  is  free  for  activities  before  impossible.     Doubtless  these 
activities  tend  to  become  essential  in  turn,  if  not  for  physi- 
ological, at  least  for  social  reasons  which  are  not  less  imper- 
ative for  the  perpetuation  of  the  individual  living  under 
social  conditions,  but  this  takes  time,  and  such  pleasures 
remain  often  for  a  long  time  functionless  and  self -justifying. 
Dangerous  pleasures,  too,  are  handled  with  more  skill  in 
the  light  of  greater  knowledge.     Gastronomy  has  greater 
possibilities  than  before  without  lapsing  into  gluttony.  The 
range  of  territory  which  may  be  exploited  in  the  interest  of 
enjoyment    is   thus  extended.     Though   it   is  constantly 
encroached  upon  by  the  growing  requirements  of  life,  it  is 


^: 


WBAI.TH    AND  WKI<FARR. 


49 


as  constantly  enlarged  by  the  exploring  pleasure  interests. 
This  neutral  territory  is  thus  a  shifting  but  a  perpetual  fact. 
Specific  pleasures  after  a  probationary  period  acquire  a 
definitely  favorable  or  unfavorable  character,  but  in  a  pro- 
gressive evolution  there  are  always  pleasures  on  probation. 
These  probationary  enjoyments  constitute   a   second   and 
important  part  of  our  subject.     They  are  of  the  profoundest 
importance  to  the  problem  of  survival,  since  from  them  are 
recruited  the  ultimate  forces  that  make  for  or  against  life. 
They  determine,  too,  which  of  many  alternative  paths  life 
will  follow  in  its  growth  and  the  kind  of  necessities  which 
it  will  develop.       But  for  the  time  at  least  this  territory  is 
one  of  relative  freedom  for  the  exploiting  interests. 

These  neutral  pleasures   are  not  necessarily  higher   or 
lower  than  others,  as  these  terms  are  commonly  used,  but 
are  intimately  associated  with  pleasures  of  every  order.    No 
illustration   can   be   given   which   is  not  purely  relative. 
Eating  is  the  most  mandatory  of  obligations,  but  the  eating 
of  an  orange  to  one  who  has  an  unimpaired  digestion  may 
not  affect  in  the  slightest  degree  the  chances  of  survival, 
either  of  himself  or  his  posterity.     Like  illustrations  may 
be  found  in  the  intellectual  and  emotional  spheres.     There 
is  apparently  no  form  of  human  activity  which  may  not 
under  certain  conditions  have  this  neutral   character  as 
regards  vital  interests. 

In  contrast  with  these  neutral  pleasures  and  pains  whose 
character  is  sufficiently  plain,  stand  those  already  described 
as  guarding  interests  which  affect  the  existence  of  the  indi- 
vidual and  the  species.  These,  which  may  be  appropriately 
designated  as  vital  pleasures  and  pains,  present  variations 
and  complications  which  have  occasioned  much  confusion 
in  economic  inquiry.  In  spite,  therefore,  of  their  subordi- 
nate character,  we  can  not  profitably  postpone  their  con- 
sideration.    We  can  best  get  at  the  problem  by  means  of  an 

illustration. 

Picking  my  way  absent-mindedly  across  a  muddy  street, 


4,     -._j| 


HI 


'^^^^&SS'S^f  |E^»^-^i«'  ^  ai^  "■^^^     .**?:«*F-^-^ 


50 


Annals  of  the  American  Academy. 


I  am  suddenly  apprised  that  a  runaway  team  is  almost  upon 
me.  With  a  frantic  effort  I  escape  the  whirlwind  that 
sweeps  past  me  and  stand  exhausted  and  trembling  with  the 
awful  terror,  from  which  it  takes  me  some  time  to  recover. 
But  after  a  while  I  meet  danger  in  a  new  form  and  my  con- 
duct is  strangely  inconsistent.  The  physician  tells  me  that 
certain  ominous  symptoms  imply  over-work  or  ill-regulated 
life  and  prescribes  rest  or  dieting  as  imperatively  necessary. 
I  almost  resent  the  information  and  the  advice.  My  action 
instead  of  being  instant  and  strenuous  is  probably  both 
grudging  and  ineffectual.  Similar  contrasts  are  manifest  in 
the  eating  of  food.  The  starving  man  eats  the  most  indif- 
ferent food  with  frantic  eagerness,  while  the  normal  individ- 
ual gets  from  dainties  only  a  finite  satisfaction. 

In  recent  discussions  of  utility  these  facts  have  been  obvi- 
ously embarrassing.  The  intense  eagerness  with  which  the 
first  few  mouthfuls  of  food  are  eaten  after  a  long  fast  had  to  be 
accounted  for.  As  it  seemed  to  be  out  of  proportion  to  the 
immediate  pleasure  of  eating,  the  utilitarian  has  usually 
fallen  back  on  one  of  those  pseudo-explanations  which 
always  stand  ready  to  relieve  embarrassment.  These  first 
mouthfuls  furnish  infinite  satisfaction  because  they  are  the 
condition  of  life  itself.  Farther  eating  is  pleasant,  but 
nowise  necessary ;  so  we  get  less  pleasure  from  it.  The 
general  acceptance  of  this  explanation  is  surprising,  in  view 
of  the  obvious  objections  to  which  it  is  open.  It  certainly 
speaks  poorly  for  the  power  of  psychological  observation 
which  has  been  at  the  disposal  of  economics. 

First  of  all,  whatever  may  be  the  net  advantage  of  living, 
it  is  not  infinite.  It  may  even  be  nil  or  less.  If  the  morsel 
of  food  which  keeps  a  man  from  starving  assures  him  all 
the  pleasures  which  after-life  can  furnish,  it  just  as  certainly 
assures  all  the  pains  which  after-life  involves.  Whatever 
the  balance  between  these  two  may  be,  it  is  not  the  prin- 
cipal determinant  of  men's  action.  Our  illustration  makes 
this  clear.     In  the  first  place,  the  same  man  acts  differently 


Wealth  and  Welfare. 


51 


tmder  different  circumstances  in  defence  of  the  same 
interest.  A  sudden  menace  to  his  life  produces  energetic 
action;  a  slow  one,  weak  and  ineffectual  action.  If  the 
action  is  naturally  less  frantic  in  the  second  case  than  in 
the  first  it  remains  to  be  explained  why  it  is  less  willing  and 
effectual.  On  the  other  hand,  men  act  alike  who  estimate 
the  value  of  life  very  differently.  The  suicide  planning 
his  own  destruction  will  dodge  a  bullet  or  flee  from  sudden 
peril  quite  as  effectually  as  the  exuberant  optimist.  The 
man  who  insists  that  life  is  not  worth  living  may  be  an 
exceptionally  anxious  observer  of  his  own  physical  symp- 
toms. 

In  the  second  place,  it  is  clear  from  these  same  considera- 
tions that  whatever  maybe  the  net  value  of  life,  men  do  not 
calculate  that  value  before  they  dodge  a  runaway  or  begin 
to  take  medicine.  Indeed  such  calculations  tend  rather  to 
weaken  than  to  reinforce  their  efforts,  for  the  instinct  of 
self-preservation  acts  most  vigorously  in  creatures  which 
are  incapable  of  making  such  calculations.  The  value  of 
life  is  therefore  in  no  constant  proportion  to  the  effort  which 
is  put  forth  to  preserve  it,  and  if  it  were,  the  organism 
would  not  know  it  or  act  in  deference  to  it. 

But  if  these  efforts  are  not  to  be  explained  as  motived  by 
the  pleasure  of  living,  can  they  be  explained  by  any  refer- 
ence to  pleasures  or  pains?    Patten,  the  most  acute  of  recent 
writers  on  this  subject,  seems  to  think  that  they  can  not. 
He  distinguishes  between  "absolute"  and ''positive"  utility. 
Absolute  utility  is  the  capacity  which  a  good  has  of  main- 
taining life.     Absolute  utilities  take  precedence  of  all  other 
considerations,  no  matter  how  important,  by  virtue  of  their 
paramount  necessity.     ' ' No  matter  how  great  a  sum  of  sat- 
isfaction   is    sacrificed,    these   absolute   utilities  must   be 
secured. "     "  Life  is  precious  and  we  are  willing  to  sacrifice 
other  ends  to  preserve  it"  (a  statement  which  unconsciously 
involves  the  theory  which  we  have  mentioned  and  which 
Patten  rejects).     "In  contrast  with  these  absolute  utilities, 


^^%.^^^'#*V*«?#^#"«^*"'^ 


HX,     '^^^:^  .-^'    -l%^^^i'^V^fL'-  'm-^' 


52 


Annals  of  the  American  Academy. 


positive  utilities  refer,  not  to  life,  but  to  the  content  of  life ; 
they  are  the  sum  of  satisfactions  that  can  be  added  to  a  bare 
living.*'     From  these  and  other  passages  it  is  plainly  to  be 
inferred,  though  nowhere  explicitly  stated,  that  the  first 
increments  of  a  commodity  used  produce  a  particular  kind 
of  result  which  demands  full  precedence  of  the  other  result. 
This  primary  result  once  accomplished  and  out  of  the  way, 
a  new  kind  of  use  begins  which  produces  a  result  which  did 
not  in  any  degree  follow  from  the  earlier  use.     Patten  does 
not  indeed  draw  the  line  so  sharply,  but  his  words  necessi- 
tate the  inference  we  have  drawn.     In  the  interest  of  clear- 
ness  it   is  to  be  regretted   that   the  matter  was  left   to 
inference.     But  postponing  for  the  present  the  question  of 
the  order  or  combination  in  which  these  utilities  appear,  let 
us  inquire  whether  they  are,  after  all,  so  radically  different. 
Different,  they  certainly  are,  but  are  they  so  different  that 
one  impulse  is  referable  to  pleasure  instincts  and  the  other 

not? 

We  have  seen  the  fallacy  of  trying  to  completely  identify 
these  impulses.     It  involves  an  ingenious  philosophy  of  life 
resting  on  reasons  which  the  individual  never  thought  of 
and  motives  which  he  does  not  feel.     The  starving  man  not 
only  makes  no  calculation  as  to  the  net  value  of  life,  but 
there  is  no  telling  what  his  conclusion  would  be  if  he  did. 
If  all  the  good  of  after-living  is  contained  in  a  morsel  of 
food,  all  the  pain  of  living  is  wrapped  up  in  it,  too.     The 
sweet  may  entice  us,  but  the  mixture  of  bitter  and  sweet  is 
of  doubtful  attraction.     And  even  when  the  food  is  eaten 
and  life  assured,  all  its  good  things  remain  to  be  paid  for  at 
much  their  full  value.     Why  pay  an  infinite  price  for  the 
food  which  only  assures  us  the  privilege  of  making  farther 
purchases?     I  am  not  trying  to  prove  the  futility  of  living, 
but  rather  to  prove  the  futility  of  such  calculations  as  are 
here  presupposed.     The  agonizing  struggle  for  existence 
could  not  be  accounted  for  by  any  such  calculus  of  pleasures 
if  there  were  one;  but  there  is  not.     The  great  majority  of 


Wealth  and  Welfare. 


53 


mankind  live  on  by  default,  asking  no  questions  as  to  the 
aggregate  profit  of  the  transaction. 

But  if  the  preservative  impulses  can  not  be  explained  by 
reference  to  the  pleasure  of  living,  either  present  or  pros- 
pective, have  they  no  relation  to  pleasures  and  pams? 
Must  we  assume  them  to  be  absolute,  i.  e,,  inexplicable?    1 
am  surprised  that  the  alternative  explanation  has  not  com- 
mended itself  to  writers  on  this  subject,  the  more  so  as  it  is 
confirmed   by  unmistakable   experience.     The  impulse  to 
escape  sudden  danger  is  not  a  struggle  for  pleasure;  it  is  a 
recoil  from  an  awful  terror  which  nature  has  evolved  m  all 
species  as  a  condition  of  their  existence  and  which,  while 
it  lasts   is  the  most  terrible  of  all  agonies.     The  enormous 
value  of  the  means  to  that  escape  as  of  a  plank  to  a  drown- 
ing man,  is  due,  not  to  the  exceeding  joy  of  living,  but  to 
the  terrible  pain  of  dying,  which  this  means  enables  us  to 

escape.  .     .       ,     j  •     . « 

If  we  could  consider  calmly  all  that  is  involved  in  the 
two  alternatives  of  living  and  dying,  we  might  act  very 
differently.     To  live  is  too  often  to  suffer,  and  after  all,  the 
dying  must  come.     As  a  mere  matter  of  advantage,  there- 
fore  why  should  a  man  flee-it  may  be  ignobly-from  the 
peril  of  sudden  death  to  the  prospect  of  living  unhappily 
and  dying  with  lingering  disease?     But  when  confronted 
by  sudden  danger  we  can  not  figure  things  out  like  this. 
Present  pleasures  and  pains  necessarily  occupy  the  fore- 
ground of  consciousness,  and  if  they  are  very  near  they 
hide  all  else  from  view.     On  the  other  hand,  when  the 
danger  is  remote  and  we  have  an  opportunity  to  compare 
and  estimate  advantages,  we  do  make  just  such  calcula- 
tions, and  our    action   is   correspondingly  uncertain   and 

inefficient.  . 

These  same  principles  hold  true  of  preservative  pleasures. 

but  the  extremes  are  less  marked.     No  appetite,  at  least  m 

man,  acts  with  the  suddenness  and  intensity  of  the  dread  of 

death,  unless  it  be  in  those  extreme  cases  where  again  the 


1  .'ial 
^1 


1 


54 


Annals  of  the  American  Academy. 


motive  is  pain  rather  than  pleasure.  But  who  has  not 
known  the  experience  that  present  pleasures  have  been 
inordinately  tempting  and  have  subordinated  considera- 
tions of  prudence  to  a  degree  inexplicable  in  moments  of 
later  reflection  ? 

The  conclusion  of  all  this  is  so  obvious  that  it  may  seem 
to  have  been  unwarrantably  deferred.  Vital  pleasures  and 
pains,  though  more  intense  and  urgent  than  others,  involve 
no  new  principle.  The  most  intense  instinct,  like  the  most 
far-reaching  plan  or  the  feeblest  inclination,  is  but  a  phase 
of  the  universal  recoil  from  suffering  and  attraction  toward 
enjoyment.  The  intensity  of  this  recoil  or  attraction  is 
determined,  not  by  the  intensity  of  the  ultimate  experi- 
ences, but  by  the  vividness  with  which  they  are  anticipated 
at  the  moment  in  question,  a  fact  that  explains  many 
apparent  inconsistencies.  Incidentally  it  is  of  interest  to 
note  that  the  more  intense  preservative  instincts  are  based 
on  pain  stimuli  rather  than  on  pleasure  stimuli.  Their  grati- 
fication involves  no  infinite  satisfaction,  indeed  no  positive 
satisfaction  at  all,  a  fact  abundantly  attested  by  experience. 
If  it  involved  the  infinite  satisfaction  so  often  assumed,  the 
ideal  condition  of  life  would  be  to  live  in  continual  peril  or 
on  the  verge  of  starvation. 

There  are  not  two  kinds  of  utility,  therefore,  but  one. 
When  we  include  pain  in  our  calculations  we  are  quite  able 
to  explain  why  a  few  morsels  of  food  may  at  times  have  such 
an  extraordinary  value  without  imagining  computations 
which  nobody  makes  or  presupposing  any  inexplicable 
impulses.  We  have  now  to  note  that  this  "infinite  value 
of  the  first  increment"  is  ordinarily  a  pure  fiction.  The 
pleasure  derived  from  the  first  mouthfuls  of  one's  dinner  is 
nothing  so  very  considerable.  If  they  exorcise  the  spectre  of 
famine  they  may  indeed  be  precious,  but  ordinarily  there  is 
no  such  spectre  to  be  exorcised.  Only  in  the  rarest 
cases  have  the  earlier  increments  of  consumption  any 
such  exaggerated  importance.     On  any  such  supposition 


Wealth  and  Welfare. 


55 


iro'^nSloaTor  plank,  even  though  it  be  the  firs^of 

>:\Tnd   has   but   a  commonplace  opportunity.     It    s  a 

r   .n  L^rrience  to  assume  that  the  first  morsels  of 

rrdfnSSer^ave  an  incalculable  u.Uty  to  a  person 

who  never  got  -hole-mely  hungry  m  hj  W- 

^■^''rirs  tniiftrindte  to  wholesome  and  deter 

T  Z^Z^^T^^^^^^^^-  ^«  -'^^^  ''^-  ''-'■ 

.'  rshavTbecoie  obsolete  or  even  reversed.     There  are 
ciations  have  become  o  forbidden  pleasures,  and 

^^^ntry  rutrL::CSy  Pai-.     Th^e  more  urgent 
monitory,  neutra  s   self-preservation,  are  in  gen- 

"I'fSutog  those  of   procreation,    are  secured   by 
urgent,    mciuuiug  Tforhidden  pleasures  and 

niandatory  pleasure- apP^^^^^^^^^^^^^ 
obligatory  pains  are  in  general^^^^  of  disturbances  in 

have  disaPP^'^'^^'^'^'V^^^^le  appearance  of  new  interests, 
settled  adjustments  ^-^  °  *^;/PP;3:;'Tssociated  with  vital 

Pleasures  and  ^-^^^^^^/ZilnUt.^^^^^^nyvro&t. 
interests  can  -o;b"on^  ous  V         p^^  ^^^^^^  ^^^  ^ 

""^.Td'SCo^fy  ngindividuals  so  as  to  bring  them 
rr  ha^on^y  S  naU-s  requirements.      This  can  be 


&i 


^k^-^r^t-'^^^im. 


56 


Annals  op  the  American  Academy. 


temporarily  accomplished  by  education,  the  encouragement 
or  repression  of  tastes  as  need  may  require,  but  its  perma- 
nent accomplishment  must  depend,  we  are  constrained  to 
believe,  principally  upon  the  efficiency  of  natural  and  social 
selection,  a  process  to  which  as  yet  our  conscious  efforts 
lend  but  doubtful  assistance.  With  this  process,  conscious 
or  unconscious,  we  are  not  at  present  concerned,  save  in  so 
far  as  its  consideration  is  inseparable  from  enjoyment.  It 
is  the  subject  of  a  distinct  study. 

Neutral  pleasures  and  pains,  those  not  yet  drafted  into 
the  service  of  vital  interests,  or  those  that  have  been  set 
free  from  that  service,  those  indeed  which,  like  eating,  are 
charged  with  important  functions,  but  have  a  certain  margin 
of  freedom  at  their  disposal,  these  may  be  legitimately 
manipulated  in  the  interest  of  immediate  enjoyment.  Of 
course  the  enjoyments  which  economics  must  consider  are 
not  confined  to  those  which  vital  interests  would  pronounce 
legitimate.  Prohibited  pleasures  are  feverishly  pursued  and 
monitory  pains  are  deadened  with  opiates,  but  these  manip- 
ulations are  ephemeral.  There  is  not  and  can  not  be  any 
permanent  tampering  with  vital  interests.  These  enjoy- 
ments, whether  legitimate  or  illegitimate,  wholesome  or 
unwholesome,  are  the  subject  of  our  present  study.  Taken 
in  connection  with  the  activities  to  which  they  give  rise 
they  are  the  subject  of  economics. 


Chapter  V. 

ECONOMICS  AND  PSYCHOLOGY. 

The  associations  connected  with  the  term  economics  are 
for  the  most  part  objective  and  concrete,  and  a  proposal  to 
discuss  its  relations  to  psychology  may  suggest  a  senous 
innovation.     But  this  innovation  is  only  apparent.     Econom- 
ics has  never  been  a  mere  study  of  things  like  chemistry 
or  physics,  but  a  study  of  the  relation  between   men  and 
things  at  first  with  emphasis  upon  the  latter,  but  the  former 
have  never  been  ignored.     A  psychological  basis   for  eco- 
nomics is  altogether  indispensable.     The  only  question  is 
whether  it  shall  be  a  conscious  or  an  unconscious,  an  accu- 
rate or  an  inaccurate  one. 

The  relations  of  economics  to  psychology  may  be  stated 
in  a  few  words.     It  is  but  an  application  of  the  pnnciple 
which  governs  all  such  relations.     The  sciences  are  distin- 
guished, not  by  the  materials  they  investigate,  but  by  the 
purpose  with  which  they  investigate  them.     Economics  and 
physics  may  study  the  same  things,  but  not  with  the  same 
purpose.     To  put  it  technically,  a  science  is  the  study  of  an 
abstraction,  that  is,  of  a  particular  aspect  of   phenomena 
disentangled  from  all  other  aspects  with  which  it  may  be 
associated.     This  abstraction  once  determined,  the  science 
may  go  anywhere  and  study  anything  that  contributes  to  its 
purpose.     Thus  sociology  studies  association,    psychology 
studies  sensation  and  enonomics  studies  enjo^mient.     The 
great  majority    of  the  concrete  processes   studied  are  the 
Lme  in  the  three  cases,  but  the  sciences  are  radically  dis- 
tinct      The  sociologist  studies  division  of  labor  as  affecting 
the  development  and  perpetuity  of  social  organization.     Its 

[57] 


.>s.«^iii«S*r-.' 


58 


Annals  of  the  American  Academy. 


r,0 


§3 


bearing  on  happiness  is  ignored  or  considered  only  in  its 
further  bearings  on  association.  The  economist  reverses 
the  order  of  procedure,  formulating  all  relations  from  his 
particular  point  of  view.  A  similar  relation  exists  between 
economics  and  psychology.  The  latter  science,  starting 
with  sensations,  analyzes  psychic  processes,  the  mechanism 
of  feeling  and  thinking.  Of  course  this  is  the  field  in  which 
all  enjoyment  is  located,  but  enjoyment  is  not  the  subject  of 
psychological  inquiry.  Pleasures  and  pains  are  rather  con- 
sidered merely  as  the  constant  stimuli  inciting  to  psychic 
development,  a  means  to  psychic  ends.  Here  again  eco- 
nomics, though  studying  the  same  phenomena,  reverses  the 
relation.  It  investigates,  not  the  reaction  of  pleasures  and 
pains  upon  psychic  processes,  but  the  reaction  of  psychic 
processes  on  pleasures  and  pains.  Even  ignoring  the  phy- 
sical side  of  economic  investigation,  the  two  sciences  are 
wholly  distinct  despite  their  intimate  association  and  their 
constant  appeal  to  each  other.  The  one  gives  us  an  analysis 
of  psychic  activities  and  the  other  an  analysis  and  inventory 
of  enjoyments. 

But  what  is  needed  in  this  connection  is  not  so  much  an 
idea  of  the  relation  of  economics  to  psychology  in  the 
abstract  as  of  its  relation  in  the  concrete,  that  is,  a  careful 
statement  of  those  psychological  principles  which  must  be 
assumed  as  the  premises  of  economic  inquiry.  Perhaps  we 
may  say  that  what  we  need  is  a  sound  and  adequate  eco- 
nomic psychology.  Doubtless  it  would  be  profitable  to  have 
a  complete  formulation  of  psychology  as  of  other  sciences 
with  reference  to  the  study  of  economics.  But  whatever 
may  be  desirable  or  possible  in  this  connection,  no  such 
ambitious  attempt  is  here  proposed.  It  will  be  sufficient 
for  the  purpose  of  the  present  inquiry  to  enumerate  some- 
what systematically  some  of  the  more  important  principles 
of  familiar,  perhaps,  I  may  say,  popular  psychology,  princi- 
ples which  are  not  questioned,  but  which,  as  experience 
proves,  are  frequently  overlooked.     Here  as  elsewhere  the 

[174] 


Wealth  and  Welfare. 


59 


principal  task  of  economics  is  to  note  new  relations  between 
commonplaces  of  experience.  It  is  seldom  that  we  discover 
a  novel  process,  but  it  is  surprising  how  often  sections  of  our 
experience  are  found  lodged  in  separate  compartments  of  the 
mind  to  the  concealment  of  the  relations  between  them.  If 
I  tax  the  patience  of  the  reader  by  enumerating  fami  lar 
things,  it  is  only  that  I  may  later  indicate  their  unfamiliar 

sisfnificance.  .  i*.:^^ 

The  fundamental  psychological  fact  is  sensation,  resulting 
from   some  sort   of  direct  contact  with  objects,  as  touch, 
sieht   etc.     These  sensations  have  in  general  the  character 
of  pleasures  or  pains,  and  as  such  they  are  the  interpreters 
of  environment  and  the  stimuli  which  prompt  us  to  adapt 
ourselves  to  it.     They  are  the  primary  or  original  pleasures 
and  pains  from  which  all  others  are  derived,  and  no  matter 
what  proportions  the  derived  feelings  may  attain,  we  never 
think  of   them  as  having  quite  the  same  concreteness  as 
these  original  experiences.     We  may  disparage  the  pleasures 
of  sense  in  deference  to  prevailing  sentiment  or  personal 
conviction,  but  we  never  get  over  the  feeling  that  they  are 
more  real  and  certain  and  more  definitely  ours  than  their 
worthier  rivals.    And  this  rests  on  the  psychologi^l  fact 
that  these  primary  sensations  are  more  universal  and  more 
vivid  than  secondary  or  derived  sensations. 

But  primary  enjoyments  once  experienced  may  reappear  in 
a  weakened  form  and  in  various  relations,  thus  giving  rise  to 
secondary  enjoyments  which,  despite  their  secondary  origin 
and  relative  faintness,   become   vastly   more  important  as 
sources  of  satisfaction  than  the  primary  ones.     Simplest  of 
these  is  memory,  the  reappearance  in  weaker  fonn  of  past 
sensations.     Whatever  recollection  may  lose  m  vividness^  it 
may   gain,   perhaps  many  times  over,   by  repetition,   thus 
becoming  an  important  source  of  enjoyment.     One  of  the 
principal  objects  of  economic  activity  is  therefore  to  stimu- 
late and  develop  the  memory,  and  a  large  class  of  goods  owe 
their  importance  to  their  services  in  this  counecUon. 

[175] 


il  .1 


M& 


i^ss? 


,^%\^-^      4^ 


6o 


Annai^  of  thk  American  Academy. 


But  memory  does  not  recall  past  experiences  automati- 
cally and  without  occasion.  A  suggestion  is  necessary  to 
set  it  going.  Something  happens  like  that  which  happened 
before  and  that  reminds  us,  as  we  say,  of  other  things  that 
happened  in  the  same  connection.  A  part  of  the  original 
experience  being  thus  reproduced,  memory  goes  on  and 
fills  out  the  whole  along  the  former  lines.  The  recollection 
of  a  past  experience  may  thus  become  the  ground  for  antici- 
pating a  future  experience.  The  sight  of  an  orange  not 
only  recalls  the  pleasure  we  have  had  in  eating  other  oranges 
but  it  suggests  the  pleasure  we  are  going  to  have  when  we 
eat  this  one.  Thus  we  not  only  re-experience  sensations  but 
we  pre-experience  them,  so  to  speak.  This  too  may  happen 
any  number  of  times,  so  that  in  spite  of  the  relative  feeble- 
ness of  these  pre-experiences  their  aggregate  importance  in 
a  given  case  may  far  exceed  that  of  the  ultimate  experience 
itself.  In  this  sense  at  least  anticipation  may  be  better  than 
realization. 

The  mind  thus  reaches  forward  into  the  future  as  it 
reaches  backward  into  the  past.  In  precisely  the  same  way 
it  extends  its  reach  laterally,  as  it  were,  quite  beyond  the 
original  limits  of  sensation.  It  learns  to  read  between  the 
lines  of  the  scanty  reports  brought  to  it  by  the  senses.  Such 
an  inference  is  involved  in  the  anticipation  already  men- 
tioned. The  outside  of  the  orange  suggests  the  nature  of 
the  inside,  which  is  the  thing  that  excites  pleasant  anticipa- 
tions. This  process  of  inference  is  so  natural  and  universal 
that  we  are  not  always  able  to  separate  it  from  the  primary 
and  usually  very  rudimentary  sensations  on  which  it  is 
based.  Beginning  with  simple  cases  like  that  just  men- 
tioned we  may  pass  on  to  cases  in  which  inference  is  piled 
upon  inference  in  the  utmost  complexity.  Things  thus 
acquire  an  enjoyment-character  which  is  entirely  unlike  and 
out  of  all  proportion  to  their  original  power  over  the  senses. 
Goods  become  symbols  fraught  with  vast  import,  due  not  to 
any  enjoyableness  of  their  own  but  to  the  fact  that  they 

[176] 


Wealth  and  Welfare. 


61 


serve  as  mental  stepping-stones  to  other  things.     We  may 
get  an  idea  of  the  scope  of  suggestion  as  affecting  human 
enjoyments  if  we  notice  its  application  to  human  relations. 
Originally  we  may   assume  that  persons  have  a  certain 
enjoyableness  based  on  their  concrete  character  andmdepen- 
dent  of  all  inferences.     They  can  be  made  useful  m  various 
ways  and  on  the  other  hand  they  may  become  annoying 
and  injurious.     According  as  they  amuse  and  serve  us  or 
strike  and  bite  we  size  up  their  economic  character,  their 
usefulness  to  us.     But  observation  teaches  us  to  anticipate 
their  action.    Instead  of  waiting  till  they  strike  us,  we  watch 
to  see  if  they  look  like  striking.     Their  looks  and  gestures 
thus  become  a  new  source  of  comfort  and  discomfort  by 
reason  of  the  inferential  character  they  thus  acquire.     A 
man  who  never  touches  us  may  by  such  means  make  us 
thoroughly  uncomfortable  for  an  indefinite  time. 

Having  thus  learned  to  notice  looks  and  gestures,  and 
interpreting  them  of  necessity  by  comparison  with  our  own, 
we  come  through  inference  to  another  fact  of  the  utmost 
importance,  namely  the  feelings  of  others.     While  we  at 
first  became   conscious  of   feelings  which    are    especially 
directed  toward  ourselves  this  is  only  the  startmg-pomt. 
Sooner  or  later  the  various  expressions  of  feelmg  become 
intelligible  to  us,  and  we  live  in  a  consciousness  thronged 
with  the  experiences  of  others.     The  walls  that  separate  us 
from  our  fellows  seem,  as  it  were,  to  grow  transparent,  and 
we  see  what  passes  beyond  them  so  plainly  that  at  times  we 
forget  their  very  existence.     These  alien  experiences  reach 
us  of  course,  dimmed  by  transmission   and  distorted  by 
refraction,  but  their  scope  is  so  vast  that  their  aggregate 
importance  may  easily  outweigh  that  of  all  other  feelings 
direct  and  indirect.     Especially  is  this  true  when  natural 
cries    and   gestures  become  organized   into  language,   an 
instrument  of  precision  for  the  transfer  of   feelings  and 
thoughts.     This  generalization  of  individual  experiences  by 
suggestion  and  inference  is  aptly  designated  by  the  old 

[177] 


KS9'-«?'-^- -'"'"' 


62 


AnnaIvS  of  thr  American  Acadkmy. 


Greek  term  sympathy  or  fellow-feeling.  Thus  on  the 
basis  of  a  few  primary  feelings  suggestion  builds  the  won- 
derful structure  of  individual  experience,  each  later  addition 
eclipsing  all  preceding  ones.  It  is  in  these  later  experiences 
that  the  developed  mind  lives  and  moves  and  has  its  being. 
Even  when  the  pleasures  of  sense  seem  prominent  they  are 
really  valued  primarily  for  the  trains  of  suggestion  which 
they  set  in  motion.  The  student  of  these  phenomena  must 
not  ignore  this  true  perspective.  The  theory  of  enjoyment 
must  be  more  than  a  theory  of  eating  and  other  crude  pri- 
mary pleasures.  Above  all  things  he  must  avoid  that  pro- 
vincialism of  individual  taste  which  is  naively  expressed  in 
the  statement  that  "  a  diamond  has  scarce  any  value  in  use.'* 
In  the  analysis  of  these  subtle  elements  of  enjoyment  and 
the  resulting  incentives  to  action  must  be  sought  the  princi- 
pal benefit  to  be  derived  from  such  a  study. 

But  the  feelings  acquired  through  sympathy  are  by  no 
means  the  end  of  this  remarkable  evolution.  They  become 
in  turn  the  starting-point  of  a  new  development.  Through 
the  transparent  walls  which  separate  mind  from  mind,  we 
not  only  look  into  other  people's  mental  premises,  but  we 
perceive  they  are  looking  into  ours,  and  that  not  indifferently 
but  with  farther  emotions  induced  by  what  they  see.  Sym- 
pathy, gratitude,  admiration,  respect,  sentiments  long  asso- 
ciated with  profitable  relations  and  pleasurable  to  contem- 
plate, and  resentment,  suspicion,  disapproval,  etc.,  with  their 
opposite  character  become  new  and  patent  factors  in  deter- 
mining our  enjoyment.  These  are  not  simply  other  people's 
feelings,  but  they  are  feelings  specifically  focused  upon  us. 
It  is  obvious  that  these  particular  feelings  generate  new 
feelings  in  us  which  become  manifest  in  turn  and  produce 
farther  reactions  and  new  complications  of  our  own  emo- 
tional environment  and  so  on  ad  infinitum.  It  is  the  purpose 
of  the  present  chapter  to  indicate  the  existence  and  empha- 
size the  importance  of  these  derived  feelings  rather  than  to 
trace  their  various  forms  and  enumerate  their  peculiarities. 

[178] 


Wealth  and  Welfare. 


63 


An  attempt  at  this  fuUer  analysis  wUl  be  made  later,  though 
it  is  needless  to  say  that  no  more  than  a  bare  begmnmg  is 

as  yet  possible.  .  . 

As  the  result  of  the  development  of  successive  faculties 
we  thus  find  ourselves  surrounded  by  a  fourfold  environ- 
ment    The  first  consisting  of  things  is  the  most  concrete, 
the   nearest,  the  earliest  and   the  least.     Next  com^  the 
circle  of  our  own  objectified  sensations  experienced  in  dupli- 
cate by  the  aid  of  memory  and  anticipation.     Then  comes 
the  circle  of  other  people's  experiences  made  visible  by  sug- 
gestion and  inference.     And  finally  there  is  the  circle  of 
other  people's  sympathies,  or  feelings  induced  m  them  by 
their  contact  with  our  feelings  as  revealed  by  suggestion. 
These  four  elements  in  our  environment  produce  correspond- 
ing feelings  by  contact.     I  do  not  mean  to  imply  either  that 
these  four  orders  of  feeling  arise  in  the  order  in  which  I 
have  described  them,  or  that  there  is  any  very  fiindamental 
separation  between  them,  least  of  all  that  the  classification 
here  suggested  is  the  only  one,  or  one  suitable  for  other  pur- 
poses     But  I   think  it  will  hardly  be   denied   that  these 
sources  of  feeling  are  realities,  or  that  they  may  serve  a  use- 
ful purpose  in  guiding  our  present  inquiry .     This  is  all  that 

I  assume. 

Having  thus  briefly  noticed  the  r61e  of  suggestion  in  mul- 
tiplying and  varying  our  original  sensations,  we  have  now 
to  consider  certain  systematic  metamorphoses  which  facts 
and  feelings  undergo  under  the  influence  of  suggestion. 
We  will  again  begin  with  memory,  the  simplest  case. 

It  is  a  familiar  fact  that  we  do  not  remember  accurately. 
Not  only  is  the  second  impression  less  vivid  than  the  first, 
but  it  is  distinctly  different.  Some  parts  of  the  original 
experience  have  fallen  out  altogether,  while  others  have 
become  exaggerated.  It  is  as  though  some  colors  m  the 
ori-inal  picture  had  affected  the  sensitive  plate  of  memory 
unduly  and  others  scarcely  at  all.  And  as  time  goes  on, 
along  with  the  general  weakening  of  the  picture,  there  goes 

[179] 


i 


%(i 


,j41 


1 

^ 


64 


Annai^  of  the  American  Acabemy. 


an  increase  of  this  process  of  distortion  or  retouching  as  we 
may  better  call  it,  until,  despite  all  sincerity  and  care,  recol- 
lection often  comes  to  bear  but  little  resemblance  to  the  expe- 
rience which  it  purports  to  reproduce.  But  a  little 
observation  of  these  caprices  of  memory  shows  that  there 
is  method  in  her  madness.  In  the  first  place  the  more 
prominent  features  of  the  original  experience  are  longer  and 
better  remembered  than  others.  The  obliteration  of  details 
thus  gives  them  still  greater  prominence  and  simplifies  the 
experience.  But  prominence  is  a  relative  term  depending 
quite  as  much  on  subjective  as  on  objective  conditions.  The 
items  that  most  impress  one  mind  will  impress  another  but 
slightly.  Hence  as  the  process  of  obliteration,  retouching 
and  simplification  goes  on  in  different  minds  it  brings  about 
very  different  results.  The  simplification  thus  becomes  an 
assimilation  and  the  stored  up  residue  of  our  experiences 
becomes  unified  and  harmonized  with  our  own  character. 
That  part  of  an  experience  which  is  at  first  the  principal 
thing,  and  later  the  only  thing  that  we  remember,  is  simply 
that  part  to  which  we  are  most  susceptible.  We  often  won- 
der that  men  are  so  little  influenced  by  experience.  The 
reason  is  that  experience  is  so  much  influenced  by  men. 

Anticipation,  we  have  seen,  is  but  an  inference  based  on 
memory.  It  will  of  course  be  affected  by  these  deviations 
of  memory  from  fact.  If  we  have  slowly  idealized  an  expe- 
rience, that  which  leads  us  to  anticipate  its  repetition  will  in 
fact  suggest  not  the  actual  experience,  but  the  idealized 
experience  to  our  expectant  mind.  But  aside  from  this 
inevitable  de\dation,  anticipation  involves  new  deviations  of 
its  own.  The  thing  that  recalls  the  past  experience  is  not 
quite  like  anything  that  was  actually  connected  with  it,  but 
has  peculiarities  of  its  own.  So  we  shall  not  expect  quite 
the  same  experience  as  we  had  before,  nor  yet  quite  the  same 
as  we  think  we  had  before,  but  such  a  variation  of  it  as  com- 
ports with  the  changed  conditions.  Here  is  a  new  and 
liberal  element  of  elasticity  in  our  mental  processes.     The 

[180] 


Wealth  and  Wei^fare. 


65 


pressure  of  temperament  again  makes  itself  felt  and  remodels 
the  yielding  material  of  suggestion  pretty  much  to  its  mind 
and  each  new  anticipation  becoming  in  turn  a  new  sugges- 
tion and  the  starting-point  of  a  new  construction,  reality  and 
probability  are  easily  forgotten,  and  anticipation  passes  over 
into  unfettered  fancy.  Here  most  of  all,  perhaps,  where  aU 
idea  of  realization  is  abandoned  and  imagination  becomes 
an  end  in  itself,  do  these  far-off  echoes  of  experience  assume 
their  true  importance  as  a  factor  in  enjoyment.  In  its  more 
restrained  form  where  it  bordersclosely  on  the  concrete  it  is  the 
guide  of  the  inventor  and  the  scientist,  a  means  to  valuable 
ends,  but  in  its  wider  range  it  is  such  an  end  in  itself,  one  of 
the  principal  objects  of  human  endeavor.  What  a  multi- 
tude of  servants  man  employs  to  minister  to  this  supreme 
pleasure-giving  faculty ! 

It  is  interesting  in  passing  to  note  the  influence  exerted 
upon  human  evolution  by  this  metamorphosing  process  by 
which  all  our  derived  experiences  receive  the  stamp  of  our 
individuality.     It  is  clear  that  the  recollection  of  past  expe- 
riences and  inference  as  to  future  ones  is  necessary  to  enable 
us  to  choose  between  the  different  alternatives  offered  to  us; 
but  what  is  the  effect  of  this  systematic  warping  or  falsifi- 
cation of  experiences  by  memory  and  imagination  ?  Simply 
to  more  completely  differentiate  them  for  purposes  of  choice. 
As  we  work  over  these  experiences,  sorting  out  and  magni- 
fying the  elements  that  are  in  the  line  of  our  emotional 
specialty  and  eliminating  those  that  are  not,  they  gradually 
move  to  one  side  or  the  other  till  choice  becomes  unhesitat- 
ing.    As  idealization  thus  blackens  or  whitens  the  neutral 
gray  of  reality,  it  not  only  intensifies  the  differences  between 
experiences,  but  it  intensifies  the  differences  between  tem- 
peraments and  so  facilitates  natural  selection  as  it  before 
facilitated  individual  choice.     The  accentuation  of  choices 
is  the   accentuation   of  character,  and  upon  this,  nature's 
choice  of  the  individual  is  based.     Here  is  to  be  found  the 
explanation  of  the  almost  universal  triumph  of  the  sanguine 

[181] 


h 


W?.jtsf-S;{Sj:4-%.*»f'*«^  s:*S:,a 


^ 


66 


Annals  of  the  American  Academy 


temperament.  Whatever  may  be  said  for  pessimism,  nature 
is  irrevocably  against  it.  She  does  not  proceed  against  the 
philosophy  but  against  the  philosopher,  and  exterminates 
the  one  by  exterminating  the  other.  A  prudent  optimism 
is  as  certain  to  be  the  dominant  philosophy  of  all  time  as 
confident  energy  is  certain  to  be  the  condition  of  sur\^ival 
for  individuals  and  societies.  No  matter  whether  it  is  true 
or  not,  a  philosophy  cannot  live  unless  it  is  livable  ;  and  in 
the  last  resort  what  else  is  the  criterion  of  truth  ?  Human 
experience  pronounces  as  true  those  impressions  which 
prove  to  be  permanently  compatible  with  the  necessities  of 
existence.  Beyond  this  we  know  nothing.  It  is  as  impos- 
sible that  a  race  should  be  permanently  and  pre-eminently 
pessimistic  as  that  it  should  be  permanenUy  and  pre-emi- 
nently unhappy. 

The  work  of  suggestion  in  the  field  of  sympathy  is  not 
more  infallible  than  in  that  just  considered.     Our  knowl- 
edge of  other  people's  feelings  at  the  best  is  derived  from 
inference  based  on  their  action  and  expression,  and  these 
are  necessarily  interpreted  by  reference  to  our  own  habits  of 
action  and  expression.     Comparison  of  many  observations 
eventually  shows  us  that  we  have  our  bias  in  all  these  infer- 
ences, but  it  is  only  by  inference  that  we  can  discover  what 
that  bias  is.     Examples  are  common  enough  of  the  miscon- 
ception of  other  people's  feelings  by  a  sympathy  which  is  so 
largely  under  the  control  of  temperament.     Manifestations 
of  pain   are   attributed  by  one   observer  to  sensitiveness, 
which  to  another  suggests  cowardice.     A  sensitive  person 
suffers  more  from  seeing  a  horse  whipped  than  the  horse 
does  from  the  whipping,  while  the  little  girl  who  shed  tears 
of  sympathy   when   her  brother  whipped   the  broomstick 
which  he  was  astride,  suggests  the  possibilities  of  sympa- 
thetic misrepresentation.     Here  as  elsewhere,  temperament 
projects  itself  upon  environment  and  so  derives  from  that 
environment  pleasures   and  pains  which  are  fashioned  to 
its  own  susceptibility.     Here  again  the  individual  adjusts 

[182] 


Wealth  and  Welfare. 


67 


himself,  not  to  realities,  but  to  imaginations,  and  so  puts 
himself  and  his  imaginations  continually  to  the  test  of  liva- 

bleness. 

Perhaps  the  foregoing  mention  of  psychological  processes 
will  answer  our  purpose.  It  remains  for  us  to  consider  cer- 
tain principles  which  govern  the  growth  of  our  feelings  and 
which  have  a  far  more  direct  and  important  bearing  on 
present  economic  and  social  problems  than  anything  so  far 
noted.  The  first  may  be  described  metaphorically  as  the 
transplanting  of  emotional  interests.  It  resembles  the 
action  of  those  plants  which,  putting  out  runners  from  an 
original  centre,  strike  root  at  a  new  point.  For  a  time  the 
new  plant  draws  its  nourishment  from  the  old,  but  eventu- 
ally it  becomes  independent  and  self-supporting  and  the 
runner  dies  away.  The  plant  thus  lives  for  itself  and  for- 
gets its  origin. 

Something  like   this  is  continually  happening   m   our 
psychological  development.     It  must  not  be  forgotten  that 
psychological  development  is  but  a  phase  of  that  general 
development  which  is  governed  in  all  its  details  by  the  neces- 
sities of  existence.     Whatever  new  faculties  or  experiences 
are  permanently  acquired  in  the  course  of  our  development 
must  in  the  long  run  be  useful  faculties  and  experiences.  We 
continually  speak  of  a  certain  small  number  of  things  as 
*  *  necessaries, ' '  implying  that  the  great  mass  of  goods  which 
we  strive  for,  and  the  activities  to  which  they  minister,  are 
superfluities  serving  no  other  purpose  than  our  delectation. 
But  nature  tolerates  no  such  burden  of  superfluities.     That 
which  does  not  help,  hinders  and  eventually  kills.     We  have 
an  all  too-rudimentary  notion  of  the  necessities  of  life  under 
modern  conditions.     When  a  person  speaks  of  higher  prod- 
ucts of  culture  as  necessities,  it  is  usually  taken  as  a  mere 
extravagance.     But  it  is  a  literal  truth.     There  is  no  per- 
manent  demand  of  culture  which  does  not  become  a  physi- 
cal necessity  of  existence,  either  for  the  individual  or  his 
posterity      Food  and  clothing  may  maintain  existence  for 

[183] 


1/ 


m 


hi 


•^^'^mii'»*^-''^  *$i*-!%»;s»tt».  /-«*/' 


I?'  i 

L.I 


68 


ANNAI.S  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY. 


brief  periods  and  for  individuals,  but  for  societies  and  in  the 
long  run  they  will  not.  It  requires  but  a  superficial  obser- 
vation of  society  to  show  that  a  man's  choice  of  neckties 
and  his  manners  at  table  are  factors  in  determining  whether 
or  not  he  shall  perpetuate  his  kind. 

Bearing  in  mind  this  dependence  of  all  progress  on  the 
primary  vital  interests  another  step  will  bring  us  to  impor- 
tant conclusions.  It  is  plain  that  human  progress  as  seen 
in  the  development  of  civilization,  is  merely  an  increasing 
control  of  the  means  of  existence.  Beginning  with  the  few  pri- 
mary needs  man  fixes  his  attention  upon  the  things  that 
immediately  interest  him  and  seeks  to  control  them.  Even- 
tually he  discovers  that  other  things  lie  back  of  these  which 
it  is  desirable  to  control.  Instead  of  fighting  for  a  deer  the 
savage  learns  that  he  is  less  likely  to  go  hungry  if  he  fights 
for  the  hunting-ground  on  which  the  deer  is  taken.  Other 
conditions  again  are  discovered  back  of  these  which  he 
seeks  to  control  for  his  advantage.  Instead  of  living  from 
hand  to  mouth  he  lays  by  much  goods  for  many  years;  he 
takes  note  of  the  most  remote  and  indirect  forces  which  can 
be  made  to  contribute  to  his  ends.  Activities  are  continued 
for  many  years,  which  have  so  remote  a  bearing  on  the  ele- 
mentary needs  with  which  he  started,  that  they  seem  to  be 
arbitrary  and  unnecessary.  So  intricate  does  this  network  of 
activities  become  that  not  only  the  man  himself,  but  even 
the  careful  observer  loses  sight  of  its  controlling  purpose. 

What  makes  men  do  all  these  things  ?  Necessity,  undoubt- 
edly, in  the  long  run,  but  that  is  not  the  reason  which  appeals 
to  the  individual  mind.  This  objective  development  of 
civilization  is  possible  only  on  condition  of  a  like  develop- 
ment of  perception  and  feeling  which  follows  it  step  by 
step.     In  what  does  this  subjective  development  consist  ? 

The  first  and  natural  answer  is  that  it  consists  in  the 
development  of  foresight.  If  man  plans  farther  ahead  it  is 
because  he  sees  farther  ahead.  If  he  reaches  out  to  con- 
trol more  forces  it  is  because  he  perceives  more  relations. 

[184] 


i  n 


Wealth  and  Welfare. 


r.f 


Thus  it  comes  that  beyond  the  circle  of  enjoyable  goods 
and  activities  we  slowly  become  aware  of  other  circles  of 
goods  and  activities  which  interest  us,  not  because  they  are 
enjoyable,  but  because  they  are  useful.     The  first  group  of 
goods  and  activities  are  final,  so  far  as  anything  outside 
ourselves  can  be;  the  others  are  mediate.     Hence  grows  up 
the  great  distinction  between  final  and  mediate  goods  and 
activities  which  plays  so  large  a  r61e  in  economic  discussion. 
The  psychic  development  which  we  are  considering  is  gene- 
rally conceived  as  an   enlarged  perception   of   usefulness 
which  is  continually  extending  our  interest  to  another  and 
remoter  circle  of  means.     It  is  generally  assumed,  however, 
implicitly  if  not  explicitly,  that  the  division  between   the 
useful  and  the  enjoyable  is  sharp  and  fixed,  and  that  we 
have  entirely  different  feelings  toward  the  two.     Industrial 
progress  thus  appears  as  an  ever-enlarging  care  and  effort 
for  a  fixed  good,  surely  a  questionable  advantage. 

Whether  or  not  such  a  progress  would  be  advantageous 
or  possible  it  is  certainly  not  the  kind  of  progress  that  we 
have  had.     In  nothing  have  we  grown  any  faster  than  m 
enjoyments  themselves.     We  do  not  simply  discover  new 
means  for  securing  old  pleasures;  we  discover  new  pleasures. 
Where  do  these  new  enjoyments   come   from?     Precisely 
where  the  first  enjoyments  came  from.     That  which  makes 
for  life  eventually  becomes  enjoyable.     If  we  discover  a  new 
and  remoter  force  which  can  be  turned  to  account,  it  must 
eventually  also  become  enjoyable  if  of  permanent  advantage. 
When  we  see  its  usefulness  we  prize  it  as  a  means;  when  we 
feel  its  usefulness  we  prize  it  as  an  end.     The  sentiment  of 
usefulness  is  nothing  but  the  offshoot  of  enjoyableness  which 
has  not  yet  struck  root.     But  it  is  a  psychological  law  as 
inexorable  as  gravitation  that  that  which  is  long  the  object 
of  our  attention  and  effort  eventually  becomes  the  object  of 
our  feeling      The  widening  circle  of  interest  is  closely  fol- 
lowed by  the  widening  circle  of  enjoyment.     How  impossible 
would  be  all  this  vast  and  labyrinthine  development  of 

[185] 


--v'-'t-^S'^^"^ 


pv^.'^^^^^ti^^^^sli^^^''*^^'^^'*^ 


i>l 


I 
1 


K 


70  Annai^  of  the  American  Academy. 

activities  if  men  had  no  pleasure  in  it  all,  if  they  had  only 
the  meagre  stimulus  of  primitive  satisfactions  to  impel  them 
to  patience  and  ingenuity  !  Of  course  nobody  supposes  this 
to  be  the  case.  It  is  known  that  civilization  has  enlarged 
the  circle  of  enjoyments  while  it  has  enlarged  the  circle 
of  activities.  But  it  is  still  supposed  that  the  latter 
has  been  enlarged  much  farther  and  faster  than  the 
former.  This  is  a  psychological  impossibility.  Men  can 
carry  their  activities  only  a  little  way  beyond  the  pleasure 
line  and  that  but  feebly  and  fitfully.  No  activity  is  firmly 
established  or  approximates  to  its  fullest  efl&ciency  until  it 
acquires  emotional  independence  and  becomes  self-justifying 
and  self-remunerating.  The  reason  why  the  growth  of 
economic  activities  has  been  traced  so  much  farther  and  so 
much  better  than  the  growth  of  economic  impulses  is  to  be 
found  in  the  tendency  so  often  noted  to  observe  the  objective 
and  overlook  the  subjective.  Action  is  visible  and  feeling 
is  concealed;  the  one  is  tangible  and  the  other  intangible. 
Thus  while  our  analysis  of  the  one  is  up  to  date  our 
analysis  of  the  other  omits  those  later  additions  which  have 
not  yet  forced  themselves  into  prominence  and  which  are 
nevertheless  indispensable  to  an  understanding  of  modem 
activities.  No  factor  in  economic  life  has  been  more  con- 
stantly or  perniciously  disregarded  than  the  tendency  of 
economic  activities  to  become  self-remunerating.  I  need 
but  allude  to  the  prevalent  theories  of  capital  formation  in 
illustration  of  my  point.  Theories  which  ignore  the  main- 
springs of  human  action  are  in  turn  made  the  basis  of  schemes 
of  social  reconstruction,  socialistic  and  anti-socialistic,  which 
are  travesties  on  economic  psychology.  The  application  of 
this  principle  to  some  of  the  more  important  economic  prob- 
lems here  suggested  will  be  the  subject  of  a  later  chapter. 
For  the  present  it  is  sufficient  to  note  that  we  learn  to  like 
the  things  with  which  we  busy  ourselves  profitably.  The 
farmer  comes  to  dote  on  his  cows,  the  gardener  on  his  garden, 
the  student  on  his  books.     The  mind,  at  first  busying  itself 

[186] 


Wealth  and  Wei^fare. 


TT 
/  * 


with  these  things  in  the  interest  of  enjoyments  elsewhere, 
eventually  comes  to  transfer  its  emotional  headquarters  to 
the  new  centre,  gradually  withdrawing  all  inter^ts  from  the 
old  station  and  grouping  them  about  the  new.  The  student 
who  at  first  devoted  himself  to  books  in  order  that  he  might 
earn  his  bread  at  last  denies  himself  bread  in  order  that  he 

may  buy  books. 

Now  let  us  suppose  that  the  object  of  interest  is  a  person. 
The  psychological  principle  involved  is  precisely  the  same, 
but  the  nature  of  the  object  introduces  some  interesting  and 
confusing  variations.  There  is  the  same  slow  learning  to 
like  the  same  transfer  of  the  emotional  headquarters,  but 
the  new  emotional  centre  is  sentient,  having  its  own  inde- 
pendent interests.  This  puts  us  out  of  all  our  reckonmgs. 
Let  us  see  if  we  can  get  our  bearings. 

When   a   man    devotes  himself    fondly   to  his   garden, 
delighting  in  each  additional  touch  of  perfection  that  he 
can  give  it,  his  purpose  is  clearly  to  please  himself,  for  there 
is  no  such  thing  as  pleasing  the  garden.     But  a  pr«:isety 
similar  devotion  to  a  person  we  call  altruistic,  or  an  effort  to 
please  another.    The  reason  is  that  the  person  being  sen- 
tient, and  thought  of  as  such,  his  feeling  -  .the  matter  of 
supr;me  concern  to  others.    If  a  man  is  to  enjoy  his  garden 
he  must  cultivate  the  agreeable  plants  to  uxunance  and 
keep  down  the  disagreeable  ones.     If  he  is  to  enjoy  h^s 
neighbor  he  must  do  the  same,  cultivate  that  which  pleases 
him  and  repress  that  which  does  not.     But  in  this  case  he 
has  to  deal  with  a  different  kind  of  plants,  namely,  the  feel- 
ings  of  the  other  person.    This  brings  us  to  what  is  perhaps 
the  most  important  application  of  the  principle  we  h^e 
been  considering.     A  man's  treatment  of  his  neighbor  wiU 
depend  upon  the  relative  maturity  of  the  relation  between 
them    This  relation  seems  to  be  at  the  outset  one  of  interest 
or  profit.  He  finds  that  his  neighbor  can  be  useful  or  trouble- 
some and  tries  to  influence  his  conduct  accordlngl5^     The 
neiehbor  is  a  means  to  his  enjoyment,  but  not  an  object  of 

[187] 


!j~  ,'  i--  fi'""^' 


72 


Annals  of  thk  American  Academy. 


I 


enjoyment.  His  feelings  are  a  force  to  be  reckored  with, 
but  not  an  object  of  concern  otherwise.  But  the  inevitable 
transfer  takes  place  and  the  means  becomes  an  end.  Atten- 
tion to  the  actions  and  feelings  of  others,  as  mere  factors 
contributing  to  other  ends,  has  at  last  developed  a  new  sen- 
sitiveness and  made  these  feelings  an  immediate  condition 
of  enjoyment.  The  old  purpose  of  our  solicitude  may  be 
forgotten,  and  in  the  enjoyment  of  the  feelings  which  dis- 
pose men  to  serve  us  we  may  cease  to  care  to  be  served. 
The  egoist,  who  regards  other  people's  feelings  as  capital, 
becomes  the  altruist  who  regards  other  people's  feelings  as 
final  goods.  With  the  growth  of  our  sympathies,  that  is, 
our  susceptibility  to  other  people's  feelings,  otu:  gardening 
becomes  more  and  more  a  problem  of  growing  the  right 
kind  of  feelings  which  we  may  enjoy  by  suggestion  or  sym- 
pathy. It  is  constantly  objected  to  this  explanation  of 
altruism,  which  recognizes  its  fundamental  dependence  upon 
the  laws  of  enjoyment,  that  altruistic  action  is  not  directed 
by  any  conscious  purpose  of  self-enjoyment.  Of  course  not, 
neither  is  good  gardening.  There  is  no  line  of  action  that 
can  be  pursued  with  profit  if  the  energies  of  the  mind  are 
constantly  diverted  to  sordid  self-consciousness  or  morbid 
self-introspection.  The  law  of  all  successful  effort  is  that  it 
should  be  directed  outward  to  an  object  on  which  attention 
is  focused  and  which  is  conceived  as  an  end.  This  is  no  pecu- 
liarity of  altruistic  action.  As  long  ago  as  the  days  of  Sis- 
mondi  it  was  observed  to  be  the  ground  of  the  immense 
advantage  of  peasant  proprietorship  in  agriculture.  To  the 
hired  laborer  and  the  tenant  at  will  the  land  is  an  object  of 
interest;  to  the  peasant  proprietor  it  is  an  object  of  affection. 
The  attitude  of  the  true  gardener  is  a  model  of  altruism. 

Our  excursion  into  the  field  of  social  psychology  may 
profitably  be  extended  a  step  farther.  We  have  observed 
the  enormous  extension  of  individual  experience  through 
suggestion  or  sympathy.  Not  only  other  people's  temporary 
feelings,   but  their   more  permanent  inclinations.      Their 

[188] 


Wealth  and  Welfare. 


73 


thoughts  and  judgments  are  forced  into  our  consciousness, 
welcome  or  unwelcome,  to  the  utter  disregard  of  that  psychic 
privacy  which  we  call  our  individuaUty.  With  this  openmg 
of    our  private  premises  to  the  great  currents  of   public 
traffic  our  own  little  individual  and  independent  doings,  if 
there  are  «uch,  dwindle  into  insignificance.     The  point  now 
to  be  noticed  is  that  this  overwhelming  invasion  brings  with 
it  an  all-mastering  control.  It  is  not  chaotic,  but  orderly.  If 
our  own  few  thoughts  are  lost  in  the  throng,  they  move  with 
the  throng.     If  the  most  of  our  thoughts  are  other  people's 
thoughts,  the  few  that  we  originate  wiU  be  like  other  peo- 
ple's thoughts.     The  result  of  sympathetic  suggestion  is, 
therefore,  not  merely  to  amplify  our  experiences,  but  to 
assimilate  our  experiences  to  the   prevailing  type.     The 
impulses  of  the  individual,  therefore,  tend  inevitably  to  be 
like  those  of  the  society  to  which  he  belongs,  and  especially 
like  those  of  the  group  or  industrial  class  with  which  he  is 
more  closely  identified.     If  this  group  control  of  individual 
experiences  does  not  enable  us  to  predict  with  confidence  the 
action  of  every  individual,  it  enables  us  to  predict  with 
absolute  certainty  the  feelings  and  actions  of  the  group  as  a 
whole,  of  which  he  is  a  representative.     In  the  study,  there- 
fore, of  both  enjoyments  and  incentives  we  have  to  do  with 
group  phenomena  far  more  than  with  individual  phenomena. 
Individual  peculiarities  are  but  the  surface  play  on  the 
current  of  social  life. 

All  this  is  no  secret,  and  the  dominance  of  class  feeling 
and  incentive  has  usually  been  tacitly  assumed  in  economic 
discussion.  But  here  as  elsewhere  tacit  assumption  does  not 
seem  to  be  sufficient  to  insure  consistent  application.  Over- 
sights are  common  enough  and  not  without  serious  conse- 
quences. Perhaps  no  single  inquiry  would  be  more  remun- 
erative in  its  contribution  to  the  vexed  problems  of  modem 
industry  than  that  as  to  the  real  scope  and  influence  of  the 
social  instincts  in  the  economic  field.  The  tremendous  r61e 
played  by  the  anarchist,  the  capitalist  and  the  speculator 

[189] 


-si 


74 


Annals  of  the  American  Academy. 


lif 


with  modem  equipments  has  made  society  nervously  appre- 
hensive as  to  its  dependence  on  individuals,  and  has  instituted 
anxious  inquiry  as  to  the  adequacy  of  the  guarantees  which 
protect  society  from  individual  caprice.  In  the  formation 
and  management  of  capital,  the  allotment  of  individual 
shares  in  the  product  of  joint  industry  and  the  organization 
of  collective  enjoyment  everywhere  the  question  is  raised. 
No  question  can  be  more  important,  and  society  must  grate- 
fully recognize  any  dispassionate  statement  of  the  inadequacy 
of  its  safeguards  and  all  helpful  suggestions  with  regard  to 
their  extension  and  improvement.  But  the  inevitable  ten- 
dency to  over-emphasize  the  objective  and  the  concrete  in 
all  observations  and  analyses  of  society  is  here  conspicuously 
manifest.  There  is  great  danger  that  the  real  forces  of  social 
control  should  be  overlooked  or  disparaged  and  that  forces 
should  be  invoked  which  are  more  tangible  but  less  efl&cient 
and  less  compatible  with  the  conditions  of  individual  develop- 
ment. It  can  hardly  be  doubted,  indeed  it  is  seldom  denied, 
that  the  development  of  industry  is  and  should  be  toward 
greater  co-ordination  as  well  as  toward  greater  socialization 
or  subserviency  to  the  general  weal.  But  there  is  the  pro- 
foundest  difference  of  opinion  as  to  how  that  co-ordination 
should  be  effected  and  that  subserviency  secured.  Without 
anticipating  later  discussions  of  particular  problems  it  may 
suffice  to  suggest  in  closing  this  chapter  that  the  psychic 
forces  are  probably  more  efficient  and  far-reaching  than  is 
usually  supposed  and  that  they  are  destined  to  play  an 
increasing  part  in  the  development  of  organized  industry. 

The  latter  part  of  this  inquiry  would  be  equally  relevant 
to  a  discussion  of  the  relation  between  economics  and  sociol- 
ogy, two  sciences  which  are  intimately  associated  as  regards 
their  subject-matter  but  wholly  distinct  as  regards  their 
object.  The  discussion  in  this  and  the  following  chapter 
will  suffice  incidentally  to  make  that  relation  plain. 


[190] 


Wealth  and  Welfare.  75 


Chapter   VI. 

ECONOMICS  and  ethics. 

In  contrast  with  the  general  unity  and  consistency  of 
earlier  economic  thought,  the  past  half  century  has  been  a 
period  of  protest,   discord  and  reconstruction.     The  com- 
placency with  which  Mill  regarded  the  work  of  his  distin- 
guished predecessors  seems  to  have  been   the   exception 
among  later  economists,  whose  varied  criticisms  reflect  the 
popular  dissatisfaction   with  the   ''dismal   science."     The 
effort  at  a  critical  period  to  reduce  Ricardo's  abstractions  to 
rules  of  thumb  for  practical  guidance  was  a  predestined 
failure,  but  the  result  which  only  demonstrated  their  abstract- 
ness  seemed  to  demonstrate  their  falsity.     In  the  confusion 
which  has  followed  we  may  distinguish  two  main  movements 
or  tendencies,  the  historical  and  the  ethical.     The  first  has 
been  so  frequently  and  thoroughly  discussed  that  we  may 
pass  directly  to  the  second  which  has  been  less  satisfactorily 

examined. 

Whatever  be  the  merits  of  * '  ethical  economics ' '  there  can 
be  no  doubt  as  to  its  popularity.     There  seems  to  be  a  gene- 
ral impression  that  instead  of  being  a  dismal  science,  ethical 
economics  is  a  sort  of  gospel,  bringing  a  message  of  good 
will  to  men.     Under  the  influence  of  this  welcome  belief 
enthusiasm  for  economics  has  grown  apace.     Chairs  have 
been  endowed  and  lecture  rooms  crowded,  not  wholly  for 
this  reason  to  be  sure,  but  there  has  been  a  marked  prefer- 
ence for  the  more  benevolent  aspects  of  the  science.     How 
much  the  science  will  ultimately  profit  by  this  popularity  is 
hard  to  say,  but  for  the  present  it  is  in  unwonted  favor.     It 
will  be  well  for  us  to  examine  the  movement  more  closely 
to   determine,  if  possible,   first,  what   the   present  ethical 
tendency  really  means,  and  second,  what  the  relation  of 
economics  to  ethics  must  ultimately  be. 

[191] 


»,<,-f  t'.-4*.  *»-^.'i  <  wi*^ie&  !;!#*?=  i* , 


1, 


Wejalth  and  Wklfark. 


77 


76 


Annai^  op  the  American  Academy. 


L3i 


It  is  plain  at  the  outset  that  the  movement  has  little  more 
than  a  verbal  unity.  Ethics  is  a  good  word  to  conjure  with, 
the  more  so  because  it  so  often  carries  with  it  little  more  than 
a  suggestion  of  good  things  generally.  It  is  natural,  there- 
fore, that  this  nebulous  term  should  stand  for  very  different 
tendencies.  In  trying  to  distinguish  these  tendencies  we 
shall  get  little  help  from  the  direct  statements  of  the  writers 
of  this  school.  The  tendencies  in  question  are  diffused 
through  their  writings  rather  than  formulated,  and  distinct 
tendencies  are  usually  unconsciously  blended  into  a  seeming 
unity.  As  my  purpose  is  to  distinguish  principles  rather 
than  to  find  who  is  responsible  for  them,  these  paragraphs 
are  written  with  little  reference  to  individual  writers. 

The  most  conspicuous  form  of  ethical  economics  we  may 
perhaps  call  hortatory  economics.  It  is  developed  in  con- 
nection with  efforts  to  reform  or  perfect  the  industrial  order. 
Starting  with  some  sort  of  a  conception  of  what  order  is, 
the  reformer  urges  that  these  things  ought  not  so  to  be. 
The  laborer  should  receive  a  larger  part  of  what  he  pro- 
duces. The  disinherited  should  have  access  to  the  soil;  the 
burden  of  taxation  should  be  more  equitably  distributed; 
monopolies  should  be  restrained  or  abolished,  etc.  And 
these  things  are  to  be  accomplished,  not  by  the  natural 
working  of  forces  now  in  operation,  but  by  direct  inter\^en- 
tion  under  the  impulse  of  an  aroused  conscience.  The 
whole  impulse  implies  a  relative  emphasis  upon  the  con- 
scious and  ethical  factors  in  social  evolution,  the  unconscious 
and  egoistic  factors  being  even  assumed  at  times  to  endanger 
the  social  organism  and  deprave  individual  character.  To 
arouse  the  necessary  moral  activity  exhortation  and  denun- 
ciation alternate  in  the  reformer's  program.  Economic 
analysis  occupies  but  a  second  place,  no  matter  how  elaborate 
and  voluminous  its  form. 

I  sincerely  regret  that  economists  have  so  often  treated  the 
persons  referred  to  with  scant  respect.  The  result  has  not 
been  favorable  either  to  science  or  to  reform.    The  economic 

[192] 


I 


agitator  has  his  place  in  the  economy  of  society  quite  as 
much  as  the  economic  investigator,  and  he  easily  surpasses 
him  in  generous  impulses,  if  not  in  general   ability  and 
knowledge  of  practical  affairs.    But  he  is  not  a  scientist.  On 
this  point  all  experience  is  a  unit.     From  the  Gracchi  to 
Henry  George  the  economic  agitator  has  made  no  perma- 
nent contribution  to  the  science.     He  has  done  well  when 
he  has  borrowed  judiciously  and  avoided  misrepresentation 
and  absurdity.     Doubtless  the  same  man  can  be  both  sci- 
entist and  reformer  in  a  limited  way,  but  he  plays  the  two 
r61es  best  who  mixes  them  least  and  forgets  the  one  when 
he  is  playing  the  other.     In  the  nature  of  the  case  this  is  all 
but  impossible.     The  two  activities  are  backed  by  different 
impulses,  and  in  their  fuller  development  they  are  essen- 
tially incompatible.     The  man  who  becomes  possessed  of 
definite  purposes  which  fill  his  mind  and  control  his  action 
and  engage  his  sympathies,  which  persist  against  all  oppo- 
sition and  through  all  delay  and  beyond  all  disappointments, 
bending  all  forces  to  their  accomplishment,  such  a  man  can 
not  divest  himself  of  these  purposes  as  of  a  garment  and 
forget  what  manner  of  man  he  was.     Men  do  not  do  it,  too 
often  do  not  even  try.     That  which  dominates  their  action 
dominates  their   thinking.     They  sort  over   facts  in   the 
interest  of  their  purpose  and  size  them  up  according  to  their 
special  serviceableness.     Especially  welcome  or  unwelcome 
discoveries  will  set  them  hunting  after  confirmations  and 
counter-weights,  and  so  rob  their  investigations  of  all  sym- 
metry and    proportion.      Valuable  finds  will  be  ignored 
because  they  do  not  ''help  along  the  cause.''     This  will 
be  true  at  the  best  when  the  study  is  of  tangible  things 
and   realities  are  stubbornly  obtrusive,  but  in  the   study 
of  psychic  phenomena,  where  fancy  so  easily  counterfeits 
reality,  a  man  can  usually  come  to  any  conclusion  he  wishes 
if  he  only  wishes  it  enough.     Only  those  conclusions  have 
a  presumption  of  truth  which  are  reached  without  consult- 
ing our  preferences. 

[193] 


I.f 


78 


Annai^  of  the  American  Academy. 


It  -. 


w 


^^^^ 


Doubtless  quite  as  bad  a  case  can  be  made  out  against  the 
scientist  from  the  other  standpoint.  He  is  made  of  no  better 
stuff  to  start  with,  and  is  also  a  victim  of  specialization. 
There  is,  also,  much  in  his  occupation  which  tends  to  lessen 
sympathy  between  himself  and  the  reformer.  It  is  his  ungra- 
cious task  to  expose  fallacies  and  destroy  illusions,  to  declare 
a  dozen  brilliant  schemes  impracticable  for  every  modest 
proposal  that  he  can  commend.  As  the  mouthpiece  of  nature, 
he  seems  to  those  who  are  trying  to  stampede  society  toward 
progress  the  most  stubborn  of  all  obstructionists.  His 
respect  for  the  ponderous  inertia  of  nature,  against  which 
radical  and  reactionary  alike  storm  in  vain,  is  mistaken  for 
unsympathy  and  temperamental  conservatism.  Doubtless 
these  charges  have  some  foundation.  Scientists  have  tem- 
peraments like  the  rest  of  mankind,  and  are  apt  to  acquiesce 
somewhat  in  the  r61e  which  is  persistently  thrust  upon  them. 
While  no  man  who  lives  in  intimacy  with  nattu-e  talks  of 
the  good  old  times,  on  the  one  hand,  or  hopes  for  a  speedy 
millennium,  on  the  other,  it  would  be  strange  if  the  scientist 
did  not  at  times  identify  himself  with  one  side  or  the  other 
under  the  pressure  of  persistent  attack. 

But  this  is  a  side  issue.  I  am  not  undertaking  to  defend 
or  criticise  a  profession  or  class,  but  merely  to  distinguish 
between  functions.  I  know  that  these  functions  are  not 
thus  distinguished  in  practice,  that  the  differentiation  is 
only  approximate  and  that  it  can  never  be  complete.  But 
that  does  not  mean  that  there  is  no  point  in  the  distinction. 
The  indispensable  condition  of  sound  inquiry  is  that  the 
process  of  observing  things  should  be  distinguished  from 
the  process  of  fixing  things.  The  more  a  man  desires  a 
conclusion  the  less  it  is  worth  when  he  gets  it.  Reform 
and  propaganda  are  not  science,  no  matter  how  valuable 
they  may  be.  All  this  has  been  said  many  times  before,  but 
as  often  forgotten,  which  is  my  reason  for  saying  it  again. 

I  have  a  suspicion  that  the  new  popularity  of  economics 
is  due  iii  no  small  degree  to  the  breaking  down  of  this 

[194! 


WEAI.TH  AND   WELFARE. 


79 


distinction.    Pseudo-systems,  introducing  plausible  programs 
of  reform,  have  attractions  which  are  quite  extra-scientific. 
The    picture    of    present    conditions,    which    may    seem 
''dismal"  by  itself,  serves  so  much  the  better  to  heighten 
by  contrast  the  attractiveness  of  the  substitute   proposed. 
What   is  desired   is  not   diagnosis,   but  remedy,  and  the 
sooner  a  man  is  done  with  the  first  and  hastens  to  the 
second  the  better  he  will  suit.     Only  slowly  does  careful 
diagnosis  reveal  its  worth.     It  is  hardly  necessary  to  add 
that  this  hortatory  economics  is  not  an  ethical  economics. 
Ethics  is  not  a  moralizing  science,  but  a  science  of  morals. 
If  economics  is  to  be  made  an  ethical  science  it  must  be, 
not  by  pleading  the  cause  of  morals,  but  by  investigating 
the  nature  of  morals.     He  has  little  real  faith  in  science 
who  does  not  trust  to  the  ultimate  efficacy  of  simple  reve- 
lation. 

Before  inquiring  how  far  economics  can  or  should  be  made 
an  ethical  science  in  this  strict  sense  we  may  notice  another 
subordinate  phase  of  the  ethical  movement.     The  science  of 
Smith  and  Ricardo  was  individualistic.     The  one  believed 
that  individual  self-interest  would  work  out  an  equilibrium 
conducive  to  the  general  good;  the  other,  without  assuming 
that  the  egoistic  impulses  were  beneficent,  accepted  them  as 
a  matter  of  course.     Their  conclusions  were  unfavorable  to 
interference  with  the  natural  order  in  the  name  of  justice 
and  benevolence.      Their  personal   moral  code  was  above 
criticism,  but  they  assigned  to  social  or  group  action  and 
feeling  a  relatively  small  function.     But  the  conclusions  ot 
science  have  been  modified  by  the  logic  of  events.     Egoistic 
competition  has  not  yet  brought  the  beneficent  equilibrium 
that  WPS  predicted,  nor  is  it  certain  that  it  ever  will.     In 
any  case  men  have  grown  tired  of  waiting  for  the  slow 
result,  and  conscious  social  forces  have  been  turned  loose 
upon  the  scene  of  the  disorder.     Whatever  may  be  the  ulti- 
mate results,  they  seem  to  have  mended  matters  for  the 
present      In  the  light  of  recent  experience  economics  seems 

[195] 


n 

nnnl 


^e??  ■,SfE?",;j!f3"?sos*e^'™™3e-'«"  r- 


'   -1 


80 


Annals  of  the  American  Academy. 


to  assign  a  larger  function  to  moral  factors  in  the  industrial 
organization  of  society.  But  this  again  does  not  mean  that 
the  science  has  become  ethical,  it  merely  recognizes  the  fact 
that  society  has  become  more  ethical  in  its  recent  economic 
policy,  and  that  social  consciousness  and  social  conscience 
have  modified,  and  presumably  must  always  modify,  the 
interplay  of  individual  and  egoistic  factors. 

This  once  admitted  it  is  plain  that  economics  has  a  new 
subject  for  analysis.  It  is  not  enough  to  recognize  moral 
forces  merely  as  *  *  disturbing  factors ' '  in  the  industrial 
order.  Such  a  recognition  is  a  subtle  begging  of  the  ques- 
tion as  regards  both  their  importance  and  legitimacy.  There 
are  no  disturbing  factors  but  merely  contributing  factors  of 
various  degrees  of  importance.  If  some  of  these  are  so 
unimportant  that  they  may  be  safely  ignored,  this  cannot  be 
said  of  the  ethical  factors.  It  is  of  the  utmost  importance 
to  determine  how  far  and  in  what  respect  they  influence 
economic  relations.  In  this  particular  there  has  been  more 
change  in  the  theory  than  in  the  practice  of  economists. 
The  earlier  writers,  even  when  professing  to  deal  with  self- 
interest  as  contrasted  with  moral  sentiments,  seldom  confined 
themselves  to  this  part  of  their  subject.  There  has  been  a 
tendency  on  the  part  of  modem  writers  to  consider  more 
systematically  what  was  before  considered  incidentally,  to 
make  the  altruistic  impulses  co-ordinate  if  not  co-extensive 
with  the  egoistic  as  economic  incentives.  Whatever  may  be 
the  result  of  this  analysis  there  can  be  no  question  of  its 
propriety.  It  is  as  legitimate  to  study  the  economic  results 
of  ethical  forces  as  to  study  the  economical  results  of  chemical 
forces.  The  only  question  is,  are  we  confining  ourselves  to 
economic  results,  that  is,  to  the  bearing  of  these  forces  on 
human  enjoyment,  or  if  we  will,  on  the  means  to  human 
enjoyment  ?  In  this  sense  and  in  this  sense  only  economics 
may  and  must  become  ethical.  This  need  not  prejudice  its 
scientific  character  nor  yet  trespass  upon  the  domain  of  other 


sciences. 


[196] 


i 


Wealth  and  Welfare. 


81 


But  while  economics  is  no  substitute  for  ethics  and  has  no 
desire  to  trespass  on  its  domain,  an  understanding  of  the 
nature  of  ethical  forces  and  a  brief  r6sum6  of  ethical  princi- 
ples is  necessary  to  the  investigation  we  have  just  considered. 
If  we  are  to  investigate  the  economic  results  of  ethical  forces 
we  must  know  an  ethical  force  when  we  see  it,  no  matter  in 
what  connection  or  under  what  disguise.     It  is  important 
also  that  we  should  know  the  fundamental  relation  of  the 
ethical  to  other  economic  forces.     Duty  is  one  thing  and 
pleasure   another  thing,  but  not  necessarily  an  unrelated 
thing.     Do  they  differ  as  black  does  firom  white,  or  as  youth 
does  from  old  age?     Our  conception  not  only  of  the  relation 
of  ethics  to  economics  but  of  the  conditions  of  social  progress 
will  be   modified  by  our   answer   to   this  question.     The 
necessity  involved  in  our  own  discussion  is  a  sufficient  ex- 
cuse for  this  brief  discussion  of  ethical  principles.     If  it 
involves  an  incipient  theory  of  ethics,  it  is  as  far  from  pre- 
tensions to  completeness  or  technical   character  as  is  the 
discussion  of  psychology  in  the  preceding  chapter.     It  will 
satisfy  all  requirements  if  it  facilitates  our  fiirther  inquiry 
and  should  be  judged  in  that  connection. 

We  have  seen  that  in  the  evolution  of  an  organism  profit- 
able experiences  become  pleasurable  and  unprofitable  ex- 
periences painful  by  the  action  of  natural  selection.  This 
assures  the  necessary  choices  on  the  part  of  the  individual 
and  is  the  real  advantage  of  sentient  life.  The  longer  an 
organism  lives  under  fixed  conditions  the  more  definite  the 
association  between  pleasure  and  profit  becomes  through 
the  continual  elimination  of  individuals  whose  predilections 
are  unwholesome.  Life  thus  intrenches  itself  behind  in- 
stincts that  steadily  tend  to  become  impregnable. 

But  when  conditions  change,  established  pleasures  and 
pains  become  a  delusion  and  a  snare.  The  old  preferences, 
deeply  seated  in  the  organic  constitutions,  are  perpetuated 
by  heredity  with  characteristic  pertinacity  and  resist  the 
process  of  readjustment  which  the  new  conditions  require. 

[197] 


■  -^1 

I    ^1 


'  ^1 
t  Si 


i 


m 


V 


82 


Annals  of  the  American  Academy. 


Eventually,  of  course,  the  old  preferences  give  way,  new- 
tastes  are  acquired  and  the  organism  is  again  reconciled 
with  nature,  imless  perad venture,  the  readjustment  was 
more  than  it  could  effect  in  which  case  the  species  disappears. 
Illustrations  abound  not  only  in  geologic  records,  but  in  the 
migrations  of  species  effected  by  human  agency,  organisms 
being  brought  under  new  climatic  conditions  or  into  contact 
with  new  enemies.  Everywhere  the  alternative  is,  change 
or  perish.  If  nothing  more  is  needed  than  to  learn  new 
arts  under  the  lead  of  old  inclinations,  it  may  be  quickly 
accomplished,  but  if  inclinations  themselves  have  to  be 
changed  it  is  apt  to  be  exceedingly  slow.  The  American 
shrikes  have  learned  to  deal  with  the  English  sparrow  in  a 
few  years,  their  previous  inclinations  being  quite  appropriate. 
But  the  cat  though  domesticated  for  thousands  of  years 
with  constant  repression  of  its  primitive  instincts,  has  still 
a  vigorous  and  wholly  unnecessary  appetite  for  canary-birds, 
while  the  dog  with  a  domestication,  perhaps  ten  times  as 
long  and  far  more  repressive,  still  shows  at  times  an  atavistic 
inclination  to  kill  sheep. 

It  is  with  one  of  these  changes  of  condition  and  indeed 
with  the  most  far  reaching  and  complex  of  them  all  that  our 
present  inquiry  has  to  do.  This  change  we  may  call  socializa- 
tion or  the  change  from  the  solitary  or  individual  to  the  so- 
cial state.  Combination  for  purposes  of  mutual  protection 
and  assistance  is  only  one  of  many  ways  in  which  a  species 
may  attain  pre-eminence,  but  if  specialization  takes  this 
direction  the  organism  must  undergo  a  pretty  thorough  re- 
construction. For  one  thing,  its  predatory  instincts  and 
even  its  instincts  of  independent  self-gratification  must  be  re- 
strained, for  a  fundamental  condition  of  association  is  mutual 
forbearance,  forbearance  from  direct  injury  to  fellow  mem- 
bers and  forbearance  from  such  pursuit  of  self-interest  as 
may  involve  this  injury.  Of  course  this  forbearance  is 
never  complete  and  perhaps  it  never  can  be,  for  it  is  not  yet 
clear  how  far  socialization  can  be  advantageously  carried — 

[198] 


ti 


Wealth  and  Wblfare. 


83 


this  is  a  side  question— but  the  farther  socialization  goes 
the  more  this  forbearance  is  required.  In  some  respects 
this  restraint  of  impulses  is  more  difficult  than  a  direct 
elimination.  To  maintain  an  instinct  in  full  vigor  and  yet 
restrict  its  action  within  prescribed  limits  presents  peculiar 
difficulties. 

But  the  positive  requirements  are  far  more  complex  than 
the  negative.     Forbearance  is  but  an  incident  to  co-opera- 
tion, which  is  the  real  object  of  association.     There  is  no 
advantage  in  a  mass  of  individuals  unless  they  co-operate, 
that  is,  pool  their  issues  and  act  as  a  unit,  at  least  in  some 
connection  affecting  their  vital  interests.     This  might  con- 
ceivably come  about  by  cool  calculation,  by  a  social  contract 
or  voluntary  partnership  in  which  individuals  co-operated  in 
the  hope  of  private  gain.     As  a  matter  of  fact  it  is  not 
effected  in  that  way,  nor  can  it  be  until  a  condition  of  intel- 
ligence has  been  reached,  which  is  only  possible  as  the  result 
of  long  association.     It  is  effected  at  the  outset  precisely  as 
other  changes  of  condition  are  effected,  by  a  growth  of  new 
inclinations  supplementing,  restraining  or  supplanting  those 
that  preceded  them.     Although  men  do  not  associate  in  the 
first  instance  because  they  like  each  other,  they  must  learn 
to  like  each  other  before  they  can  be  very  firmly  associated. 
They  must  learn  to  do,  and  so  must  learn  to  like  to  do  what 
is  profitable  for  the  group,  if  there  is  to  be  any  group  or 
any  profit  in  having  one.     No  clan  ever  held  together  by 
virtue  of  a  simple  agreement  to  avenge  one  another's  inju- 
ries and  enforce  one  another's  rights.     Such  common  action 
must  be  the  result  of  an  instinct  which  makes  the  group  feel 
and  resent  an  injury  to  one  of  its  members,  as  though  it 
were  an  injury  to  all. 

In  the  preceding  chapter  we  have  noticed  the  psycholog- 
ical process  by  which  the  chief  of  these  group  instincts  is 
developed.  Suggestion  and  inference  combine  to  lay  the 
foundation  of  sympathy  by  which  we  become  conscious  as 
it  were  of  other   people's  feelings,  and  so  become  subject 

[199] 


A I 


#1 


dill 


'.  ^'1 


84 


Annals  of  the  American  Academy. 


i   1 


5 


,t 


9 

I 


^ 


1   ** 


to  their  impulses  and  participants  in  their  interests.  The 
social  instincts  resulting  from  sympathy  are  perhaps  the 
highest  and  the  most  efficient  of  all  those  that  contribute  to 
the  maintenance  of  society.  There  seems  to  be  no  reason 
to  believe  that  these  highest  social  instincts  cannot  be  indefi- 
nitely developed  and  be  made  to  include  any  number  of 
social  relations  in  the  circle  of  their  influence,  but  their 
development  is  a  slow  and  difficult  task,  and  one  by  no 
means  perfectly  accomplished.  Ever  and  anon  the  interests 
of  the  group  come  into  conflict  with  inclinations  which 
were  established  before  there  was  any  group,  and  these 
inclinations,  though  now  false  guides  even  of  individual 
well-being,  long  dispute  the  ascendency  of  the  altruistic 
instincts.  But  that  an  increase  in  these  instincts  is 
the  condition  of  advancing  association  among  men  none  will 
deny,  whatever  their  explanation  of  altruism  may  be.  In- 
dividual experiences  must  become  group  experiences  and 
individual  consciousness,  group  consciousness.  So  and  only 
so  does  individual  action  become  group  action. 

Whether  or  not  men  can  ever  learn  to  love  their  neighbors 
as  themselves,  appreciating  their  pleasures  and  pains  as 
though  they  were  their  own,  it  is  quite  certain  that  they 
have  not  yet  reached  that  point.  Indications  are  not  want- 
ing that  the  social  development  now  in  progress  is  of  com- 
paratively recent  origin,  and  that  the  socializing  process  is 
going  on  rapidly  and  under  high  pressure.  It  would  seem 
that  nature  had  only  recently  discovered  what  immense  pos- 
sibilities there  are  along  this  line  of  development,  and  that 
she  is  pushing  along  rather  precipitately  to  occupy  the  new 
territory.  But  social  development,  we  have  seen,  requires 
the  building  of  new  instincts,  the  development  of  new  and 
difficult  perceptions.  But  instincts  grow  slowly  and  social 
exigencies  may  come  on  apace.  Obviously  the  demand  for 
the  social  instincts  will  be  in  excess  of  the  supply.  During 
the  last  two  or  three  centuries,  for  instance,  the  frontier 
of  socialization  has  been  advanced  theoretically  out  of  all 

[200] 


ImsfcJ-^j 'Alj  q&->.jJii»8  »«»■■•  ■Jtiiv.-a.Trifc..^    ■   ..■ag-il 


Wealth  and  Welfare. 


85 


i 


proportion  to  man's  efiective  power  of  occupancy,  that  is  to 
the  developed  sympathies  among  men.    The  result  is  a  vast 
amount  of  pseudo-society,  whose   paper  constitutions  and 
ornamental  codes  are  in  melancholy  contrast  with  the  actual 
modus  Vivendi  which  exists  among  its  members.     He  would 
be  a  most  unsophisticated  man  who  should  take  altogether 
seriously   the    '' Wberty,    Equality,    Fraternity"    of   the 
French  Republic,  or  the  pledge  of  unqualified  altruism  in 
the  constitution  of  the  ordinary  church.     These  are  but  ex- 
amples of  the  disparity  everywhere  to  be  found  between  exist- 
ing social  instincts  and  the  service  which  is  required  of  them, 
a  disparity  which  is  at  least  as  old  as  history,  though  that 
is  not  so  very  old.     Compare  the  sufficiency,  the  more  than 
sufficiency  of  the  instincts  of  self-preservation  or  of  pro- 
creation, products  of  the   age-long   evolution   of  the  indi- 
vidual, with  the  chronic  insufficiency  of  honesty  and  S}'m- 
pathy,  the   incipient  products  of   social   evolution.      The 
supreme  fact  in  the  historic  consciousness  of  the  race  is  this 
disproportion  and  the  burden  of  the  effi^rt  to  stretch  these 
inadequate  instincts  to  their  impossible  task. 

In  the  long  run  we  may  expect  the  necessary  instincts  to 
be  forthcoming.     If  altruistic  action  continues  to  be  profit- 
able, it  will  eventually  become  pleasurable  and  spontaneous; 
indeed,  to  a  considerable  extent  it  has  become  so  already. 
Maternal  altruism,  the  oldest  of  all,  has  long  been  so  rein- 
forced by  enjoyment  that  it  has  acted  with  the  promptness 
and  spontaneity  of  instinct,  while  persons  are  not  rare  who 
have  an  aversion  for  unsocial  acts  and  to  whom  it  is  a  pleasure 
to  do  most  of  the  things  which  common  interests  require.     A 
thousand  selective  agencies  in  society  tend  to  give  such  indi- 
viduals an  advantage  in  the  struggle  for  existence,  and  there 
is  little  reason  to  doubt  that  if  social  requirements  were  not 
continually  extended  we  should  eventually  become,  within 
the    established    limits,    spontaneously   and   ungrudgingly 
altruistic.     But  until  this  happens,  which  may  be  a  very 
long  time,  other  incentives  have  to  be  provided  to  secure  the 

[201] 


IttAl 


86 


Annai^  of  the  American  Academy. 


Wealth  and  Wei^fare. 


87 


social  action  needed.  The  gap  is  bridged  with  provis- 
ional instincts  which  are  replaced  as  the  more  efficient  ones 
are  developed. 

Such  a  provisional  incentive  is  fear  of  the  group.  If  an 
individual  injures  a  number  of  his  fellows  they  will  all 
resent  it,  not  from  sympathy  for  one  another,  but  from 
common  antipathy  for  him.  For  such  a  combined  hostility 
he  will  have  a  wholesome  fear.  The  same  is  likely  to  hap- 
pen if  he  injures  one  person  in  a  way  that  suggests  to  others 
that  he  is  likely  to  injure  them.  Slowly  certain  kinds  of 
conduct  become  associated  with  personal  danger  and  apart 
from  sympathy  or  esprit  de  corps,  they  arouse  general  oppo- 
sition. 

Nobody  thinks  that  this  fear  of  the  group  is  a  finality  in 
social  evolution,  or  feels  very  safe  so  long  as  this  is  his  only 
protection,  but  in  the  absence  of  other  incentives  it  renders 
valuable  service.  When,  instead  of  a  fortuitous  concert  of 
action  on  the  part  of  persons  independently  offended,  there 
grows  up  a  preconcerted  action  with  reference  to  intimidating 
evil-doers,  we  have  government,  one  phase  but  only  one 
phase  of  social  control. 

Quite  analagous  to  this  is  the  hope  of  social  favor  and 
reward.  It  is  perfectly  clear  that  many  of  the  services  ren- 
dered by  the  individual  to  the  group  are  the  result  of  a  vir- 
tual bargain  between  the  two  parties.  In  the  case  of  a 
mercenary  soldier  this  relation  is  avowed;  in  many  other 
cases  the  bargain  is  a  tacit  one,  but  none  the  less  real.  The 
donor  of  real  estate  for  benevolent  purposes,  who  expects  a 
rise  in  the  value  of  his  adjacent  property,  the  patron  of 
charities  who  enjoys  an  increase  of  trade  or  remunerative 
employment  in  consequence,  the  politician  who  expects  his 
good  deeds  to  be  remembered  on  election  day,  all  these  work 
for  a  consideration  which  differs  from  the  soldier's  pay  only 
in  being  imconfessed  and  indeterminate  in  amount.  A  step 
farther  brings  us  to  cases  less  easy  to  recognize,  but  essen- 
tially the  same,  the  consideration  being  honor,  fame,  the 

[202] 


esteem  and  admiration  of  society,  a  laurel  wreath  or  a  grave 
in  Westminster  Abbey.  There  are  rewards  which  are  not 
convertible  into  money  and  which  in  turn  can  hardly  be 
obtained  for  money,  but  they  are  not  the  less  real  or  direct 
for  being  less  tangible.  No  matter  why  people  enjoy  these 
things;  it  is  enough  that  they  do  enjoy  them  and  that  they 
constitute  high  and  attractive  goods  only  attainable  in 
exchange  for  services  rendered  to  society. 

It  is  plain  that  we  have  here  to  do  with  a  very  large  and 
important  class  of  incentives,  adapted  to  different  stages  of 
development  and  graduated  to  the  services  which  they  are 
used  to  secure.     It  may  be  questioned  whether  we  are  at 
liberty  to  call  them  provisional,  so  exalted  are  the  passions 
which  they  evoke,  and  so  permanent  the  apparent  need  of 
them  in  human  society.     But  while  they  are  doubtless  per- 
manently required  at  the  shifting  frontier  of  socialization  a 
moment's  reflection  will  convince  us  that  they  are  never 
accepted  as  finalities  in  human  judgment  or  securely  trusted 
as  guarantees  of  social  service.     The  mercenary  soldier  has 
long  been  under  the  ban  and  for  a  hundred  years  reliance 
has  been  placed  only  in  patriotic  sentiments  as  the  condition 
of  military  efficiency.     The  result  has  certainly  justified  the 
change.    Interested  charity,  too,  is  tabooed,  plainly  because 
experience   has   demonstrated  that  it  is  less   genuine   and 
reliable.     Even  the  passion  for  glory  and  public  esteem  is 
increasingly  disparaged  as  a  motive  of  public  service.     In 
all  these  cases  the  individual  has  one  object  and  society 
another,  and  he  serves  society  only  to  induce  society  to 
serve  him.     Such  arrangements  may  be  indefinitely  better 
than  none,  but  they  can  not  have  the  reliability  of  those  in 
which  the  two  interests  are  merged  in  one,  in  which  the 
individual  identifies  himself  with  society,  feels  what  it  feels, 
resents  injuries  to  it  as  though  they  were  injuries  to  himself 
and  enjoys  what  it  enjoys  as  though  he  and  it  were  one. 
This  is  the  goal  toward  which  all  social  forces,  selective  and 
educational,    are    constantly   impelling    the    individual,    a 

[203] 


r 


A 


t  -a 


',') 


BS 


Annals  of  the  American  Academy. 


Wealth  and  Welfare. 


89 


requirement  that  is  steadily  advanced  to  one  function  after 
another.  All  arrangements  that  stop  short  of  this  emotional 
identification  of  interests  are  in  practice  regarded  as  pro- 
visional or  stop-gap  arrangements,  and  are  in  fact  constantly 
and  imperceptibly  displaced. 

The  case  is  complicated  but  not  essentially  altered  if  we 
include  the  religious  incentives.  Spiritual  beings,  more  or 
less  vividly  conceived,  may  be  added  to  the  personal  environ- 
ment of  the  individual  or  constitute  such  an  environment  by 
themselves.  They  may  be  served  from  fear  or  through  hope 
of  reward  or  finally,  as  we  say,  from  love,  that  is,  the 
individual  identifies  in  feeling  his  interests  with  theirs.  If 
their  interests  are  in  turn  conceived  as  identical  with  those 
of  society  religion  becomes  a  strong  social  force.  But  what- 
ever its  social  bearing,  it  is  universally  admitted  that  the  fear 
of  punishment  and  the  hope  of  reward  are  only  provisional 
motives  and  that  religion  only  attains  its  normal  develop- 
ment when  the  third  stage  is  reached  and  the  necessary  acts 
become  spontaneous  and  pleasurable.  Still  more  complicated 
cases  occur  where  the  individual  pays  allegiance  to  abstract 
principles  which  have  acquired  a  semi-personal  concreteness 
to  his  mind.  These  cases  offer  interesting  subjects  for 
sociological  analysis  but  present  no  new  principle  of  interest 
to  our  subject. 

Chief  among  these  provisional  instincts  is  the  so-called 
moral  sense  or  sentiment  of  duty.  The  importance  of  this 
sentiment  to  human  society  and  the  ceaseless  effort  required 
of  us  all  to  strengthen  it  and  increase  its  prestige  make  us 
disinclined  to  recognize  its  function  as  temporary  or  to  seem- 
ingly disparage  it  in  any  way.  But  the  exaltation  of  the 
moral  instincts  is  based  on  prudential  rather  than  on  scientific 
considerations.  An  ideal  society  would  know  no  duties, 
and  there  is  no  better  indication  of  the  successful  establish- 
ment of  social  relations  than  the  diminishing  sense  of  duty 
in  the  given  connection.  The  very  mystery  which  has 
always  surrounded   this   strange   impulse  which   seems  to 

[204] 


attract  us  toward  the  unattractive  is  in  itself  a  proof  that  we 
never  have  that  feeling  of  finality  with  regard  to  duty  which 
we  always  feel  toward  enjoyment.  Nobody  ever  ponders 
over  the  problem  of  why  men  do  what  they  enjoy  doing, 
but  the  mystery  of  duty  has  ever  been  a  fascinating  inquiry. 
Most  of  the  subtle  questions  which  this  inquiry  has  raised 
we  may  disregard.  We  are  not  concerned  with  the  origin 
of  these  experiences,  biologically  or  teleologically,  be  they 
duties  or  pleasures.  We  have  to  do  with  a  single  question, 
the  relation  of  ethics  to  economics,  of  duty  to  enjoyment. 

The  traditional  relation  between  the  two  is  that  of  opposi- 
tion. Duties  are  pitted  against  pleasures  as  competing 
claims  upon  the  individual.  But  this  implies  no  fundamental 
difference  between  the  two.  Pleasures  are  quite  as  sharply 
pitted  against  one  another,  however  similar  in  character. 
The  opposition  in  this  case  is  merely  a  matter  of  definition. 
We  do  not  call  an  act  a  duty  which  is  also  a  pleasure,  nor 
is  the  moral  sense  ever  invoked  imless  there  is  a  counter 
inclination  to  be  overcome.  This  means  that  duty  is  always 
opposed  to  a  pleasure,  but  its  relation  to  pleasure  is  wholly 
undetermined  by  this  consideration. 

The  first  thing  to  be  noted  as  defining  the  field  of  morals  is 
that  duty  has  to  do  only  with  social  relations,  that  is,  relations 
between  the  individual  and  other  beings,  natural  or  super- 
natural, real  or  imaginary.  There  is  no  evidence  that  beings 
not  influenced  by  association  have  any  moral  sense  or  any 
use  for  any.     It  is  true  that  when  this  sense  is  developed  it 
may  be  reflected  back  on  to  egoistic  relations.    It  is  possible 
to  talk  about  duties  to  one's  self.     Half  the  time  such 
expressions  are  pure  egoistic  diplomacy.      If  self-interest 
can  be  successfully  passed  off  under  the  guise  of  duty  it 
greatly  facilitates  our  purpose.     In  other  cases,  however, 
the  expression  indicates  a  real,  but  indirect,  social  relation. 
Society  has  an  interest  in  the  preservation  and  development 
of  its  members,  and  so  far  as  that  preservation  and  develop- 
ment mtist  depend  on  their  own  efforts  they  are  not  at 

[205] 


3J 


90 


Annai^  of  the  American  Academy. 


liberty  to  sacrifice  themselves,  even  if  their  own  enjoyment 
would  incline  them  to  do  so.  Their  duty  may  be  to  spend 
their  effort  on  themselves,  though  again  there  is  no  point  in 
calling  it  a  duty  if  it  coincides  with  their  inclination.  Such 
complications  but  momentarily  embarrass  our  conclusion.  A 
truly  isolated  being  could  have  no  duties.  The  only  possible 
deterrent  which  he  could  feel  regarding  a  given  act  would  be 
that  it  was  not  enjoyable  or  that  it  was  not  profitable,  that 
is,  would  not  in  the  end  increase  his  enjoyment.  Duty  is  an 
aspect  of  social  or  inter-personal  relations. 

In  the  second  place,  whatever  may  be  the  ultimate  nature 
of  the  moral  instincts,  they  appear  in  consciousness  as  a 
kind  of  satisfaction  or  discomfort.  I  do  not  refer  to  the 
expectation  of  reward  or  punishment  in  the  concrete.  This 
is,  by  common  consent,  a  different  matter.  But  to  contem- 
plate doing  something  inimical  to  the  interests  of  others  pro- 
duces an  uneasiness  or  discomfort  which  may  become  an 
excruciating  agony.  Precisely  the  opposite  occurs  when  we 
contemplate  doing  something  which  is  favorable  to  those 
interests.  We  experience  a  satisfaction  which  varies  with 
the  act  and  our  own  intelligence  and  susceptibility. 

It  is  not  difiBcult  to  discern  in  these  feelings  of  satisfaction 
and  discomfort  a  consciousness  of  the  social  consequences  of 
our  action.  In  some  cases  we  are  conscious  of  the  pleasure 
or  pain  which  our  action  inflicts  on  particular  persons,  a 
simple  case  of  sympathetic  suggestion.  More  often  we  are 
unable  to  trace  the  effect  of  our  action  on  particular  persons, 
we  cannot  see  that  it  affects  anybody,  but  we  are  conscious 
that  it  is  one  of  those  acts  that  society  approves  or  disap- 
proves in  its  capacity  of  guardian  of  individual  interests, 
and  we  are  conscious  of  the  social  smile  or  frown.  Or, 
again,  we  may  conceive  of  the  guardianship  of  these  inter- 
ests as  vested  in  a  supernatural  being,  whose  attitude 
toward  us  has  a  like  control  over  our  feelings.  Such  a 
being,  to  be  sure,  appeals  less  vividly  to  the  ordinary  imagi- 
nation than  the  more  tangible  beings  with  which  we  are 

[206] 


Wealth  and  Welfare.  9^ 

surrounded,  but  when  he  is  thought  of  as  omniscient,  one 
from  whom  not  even  our  thoughts  can  be  hid,  his  intangible, 
but  per\^asive  oversight  powerfully  affects  the  imagination. 
Finally,  an  abstract  principle  of  conduct  may  acquire  a 
quasi-personal  ascendency  over  our  minds.  We  are  endowed 
with  a  sense  of  symmetry  and  consistency,  an  inevitable 
result  of  race  experience  and  symmetrical  organization, 
which  often  becomes  an  exacting  demand  upon  us  to  fill  out 
the  schedule  which  we  have  adopted  or  vividly  imagined. 

In  one  or  the  other  of  these  perceptions  may  be  found  the 
germs  of  all  those  moral  sentiments  which  exercise  so  won- 
derful a  control  over  human  action.     This  control  is  less 
surprising,  however,  when  we  consider  the  systematic  effort 
of  society  to  organize  these  sentiments  for  the  effective  gov- 
ernment of  its  members.     For  each  stage  of  altruistic  devel- 
opment it  has  appropriate  recognition  and  suitable  rewards 
and  penalties.     The  altruism  that  is  spontaneous  and  un- 
grudging is  everywhere  admitted  to  be  the  highest,  but, 
significantly  enough,  the  altruism  which  has  always-  been 
lauded  and  proclaimed  as  peculiarly  meritorious  is  the  altru- 
ism that  hesitates  and  struggles  and  wins  uncertain   and 
costly  victories  over  a  still  powerful  and  resistant  egoism. 
It  is  not  because  this  weak-kneed  altruism  is  specially  valu- 
able or  specially  noble,  for  it  is  neither,  but  primarily  because 
it  is  weak-kneed  and  most  needs  encouragement.     It  does  not 
lessen  the  value  of  society's  rewards  that  they  are  distributed 
on  strictly  business  principles.    Nature  will  not  permanently 
tolerate  any  other  principle  of  distribution.     Among  socie- 
ties as  elsewhere  the  most  business-like  competitor  distances 
all  rivals.     I  do  not  mean  that  society  is  conscious  of  these 
things.     Unconsciousness  is  often  a  condition  of  successful 
obedience  to  nature's  behests. 

If  the  foregoing  analysis  is  correct,  we  have  here  to  do 
with  merely  a  special  phase  of  the  great  problem  of  enjoy- 
ment. Altruistic  action,  like  any  other  action  which  experi- 
ence  proves   useful,    eventually  becomes   pleasurable   and 

[207] 


jijti 


I 

I 
1 

li 

I!! 


92 


Annai^  op  this  American  Academy. 


spontaneous,  as  a  matter  of  course.     But  it  does  not  becx>me 
so  at  once.     For  a  long  time  group  interests  urge  their 
claims   on   unwilling   ears   and  contend   against  powerful 
counter  currents  of  feeling.    If  w.  waited  for  altruistic  action 
until  it  was  a  matter  of  pleasure  in  itself,  there  would  never 
be  any  such  action,  for  pleasurableness  can  only  result  from 
long  experience.     During  this  apprenticeship  in  the  art  of 
altruistic  action,  the  provisional  incentives  of  fear  and  hope 
of  outside  reward,  awe  of  society,  reverence  for  a  higher 
being  or  attachment  to  principle  render  their  indispensable 
service.     Duty  is  the  abstract  representative   of  altruistic 
interests,  enforcing  its  behests  by  subtle  appeals  to  our  feel- 
ing in  many  connections.     In  its  aim  it  is  a  unit,  but  in  its 
means  it  is  manifold.     Duty  can  never  be  dispensed  with  so 
long  as  the  possibilities  of  group  action  remain  unexhausted, 
nor  will  any  of  the  incentives  used  to  enforce  the  claims  of 
duty  be  outgrown.     But  while  duty  is  a  permanent  thing, 
duties  are  not.     Duty  has  not  done  its  work  until  the  acts 
which   it  urges   us  to  perform   become  self-enforcing   and 
duties  have  been  metamorphosed  into  pleasures. 

To  determine  the  relation  of  duty  to  enjoyment  is  to  de- 
termine apparently  the  relation  of  ethics  to  economics.  But 
the  former  relation,  we  have  seen,  is  essentially  that  of 
species  to  genus.  The  conclusion  seems  natural,  therefore, 
that  ethics  is  but  a  branch  of  economics.  But  such  an 
absorption  is  resisted  not  only  by  the  moralist  but  by  the 
sociologist.  For  we  are  confronted  by  the  fact  that  the 
moral  instincts  are  quite  as  much  phenomena  of  association 
as  they  are  phenomena  of  enjoyment.  Is  ethics  a  branch  of 
economics  or  of  sociology,  or  is  it  an  independent  science  ? 
We  need  to  recall  again  the  principle  already  noted  as 
governing  the  classification  of  the  sciences.  A  science  is 
defined,  not  by  the  things  it  investigates  but  by  the  purpose 
with  which  it  investigates  them.  These  three  sciences  all 
study  a  certain  group  of  phenomena.  Indeed  it  so  happens 
that  the  phenomena  of  morals  lie  wholly  within  the  field 

[208] 


Weai^th  and  Wei«fare. 


93 


investigated  by  the  other  two,  that  is,  within  that  portion 
of  their  fields  where  they  overlap.  Does  this  mean  that 
ethics  belongs  to  either  or  both  ?  Not  necessarily.  Sociology 
is  a  study  of  association,  economics  of  enjoyment,  ethics  of 
duty.  Are  these  terms  in  any  sense  synonyms  ?  As  regards 
the  first  two  there  can  be  no  doubt.  Association  and  en- 
joyment have  much  practical  connection  but  they  are  wholly 
distinct.  Enjoyment  may  contribute  to  association  and 
association  to  enjoyment  but  they  are  different  things  and 
form  the  basis  of  distinct  sciences. 

Is  duty  or  the  moral  sense  synonymous  with  association? 
Obviously  not.     The  moral  instincts  are  a  product  of  as- 
sociation and  in  turn  are  an  indispensable  means  to  associa- 
tion,   but  to  confound    them   with   association  involves  a 
complete  confusion  of  ideas.     If,  therefore,  sociology  is  to 
be  defined  as  the  study  of  association,  a  conclusion  to  which 
we  are  being  irresistibly  forced,  it  is  logically  distinct  from 
ethics  or  the  inquiry  into  the  nature  and  origin  of  the  moral 
instincts.     If  the  sociologist  interprets  his  task  to  include 
the  explanation  of  all  the  impulses   which   contribute   to 
association  or  result  firom  it  he  will  no  doubt  include  ethics 
in  his  inquiry,   but  whatever  may  be  the  practical  reasons 
for  such  a  study  the  fact  remains  that  moral  instincts  are 
individual  sentiments  and  societies  are  composite  structures. 
Ethics  is  rather  tributary  to  than  included  in  sociology. 

Coming  now  to  enjoyments  we  ask:  Are  the  moral  instincts 
resolvable  into  pleasures  and  pains  ?    The  answer  must  be 
that  they  are.     While  there  can  be  no  objection  to  an  inves- 
tigation of  these  particular  enjoyments,  there  is  no  possible 
way  in  which  such  an  inquiry  can  be  made  other  than  as  a 
part  of  the  science  which  undertakes  the  investigation  of 
enjoyments  in   general.     If   in   deference  to  the  logic  of 
events  (rather  than  to  any  other  logic) ,  this  larger  science 
is  known  as  economics,  then  ethics  is  a  part  of  economics 
This  is  not  a  matter  of  opinion,  but  a  simple  matter  of  defi 
nition.     It  is  not  disturbed  by  any  theories  of  morals  or 

[209] 


-■/I 


94  Annals  of  the  American  Academy. 

biology.     No  matter  what  the  origin  of  the  moral  instincts 
their  character  as  pleasures  and  pains  is  not  a  matter  of  dis- 
pute.   The  pangs  of  conscience  and  satisfactions  of  righteous- 
ness are  quite  as  literal  expressions  as  the  pleasures  of  sin 
or  the  pams  of  death.     It  is  accident  rather  than  logical 
dependence  which  has  seemed  to  make  ethics  more  socio- 
logical  than  economic   in  its  affinities.      In  default  of  a 
recognized  science  of  sociology,  ethics  naturally  developed 
a  considerable  sociology  by  itself.     On  the  other  hand   the 
play  of  ethical  or  altruistic  forces  in  economic  life  has  been 
notonously  neglected.     Studies  have  started  at  independent 
centres  and  have  followed  along  lines  of  least  resistance 
determined  by  the  taste  and  training  of  the  investigator  the 
academic  or  social  requirements,  etc.     This  will  doubtless 
long  continue  to  be  the  method  of  development.     Practical 
situations  and  exigencies  have  little  concern  for  the  classifi- 
cation  of  the  sciences,    perhaps  justly   so,    though   these 
questions  of  classification  are  not  without  their  bearing  on 
observation  and  analysis.     But  classifications  are  after  all 
but  matters  of  convenience,  and  logical  considerations  are 
not  the  only  factors  of  convenience.     When  logic  favors  one 
classification  or   method  of  research  and  instruction    and 
concrete  historical  and  social  factors  favor  another  the  bal- 
ance of  advantage,  for  a  time  at  least,  may  easily  be  with 
the  latter.     The  most  perfect  of  classifications  is  that  which 
offers  the  most  convenient  pigeon-holes  for  the  thoughts  of 
men  who   are   the  heirs  of  tradition  and  the  products  of 
history.     Our  logic  must  not  dogmatize. 

In  the  foregoing  chapters  I  have  tried  to  define  and  locate 
the  subject  of  our  inquirj^  Economics  has  been  defined  as 
the  science  of  enjoyment.  Although  this  definition  is  really 
m  harmony  with  the  unconscious  procedure  of  economic 
writers,  it  is  an  innovation  to  lift  this  unconscious  procedure 
into  consciousness  and  demand  due  recognition  of  the  neg- 
lected parts  of  the  subject.  It  has  therefore  seemed  neces- 
sary  to  discuss  this  definition  somewhat  in  detail,  as  weU  as 

[210] 


Weai^th  and  Welfare. 


95 


that  of  other  important  terms,  whose  uncertain  and  incon- 
sistent use  has  been  a  natural  result  of  the  half-hearted 
recognition  of  factors  that  were  none  the  less  indispensable. 
A  second  important  preliminaiy  was  to  determine  the 
setting  of  the  subject,  that  is,  its  relation  to  kindred  sub- 
jects. The  phenomena  of  enjoyment  are  intimately  associ- 
ated with  other  phenomena,  or  what  purport  to  be  other 
phenomena,  and  they  cannot  be  fully  understood  if  this 
relationship  is  ignored.  It  is  true  that  within  the  field 
bounded  by  these  larger  relations  there  are  lesser  relations 
among  enjoyments  themselves  which  we  may  study  in  away 
separately,  but  after  all  these  lesser  relations  find  their 
explanation  in  the  larger  relations  with  which  they  are 
environed.  The  strict  subordination  of  enjoyment  to  vital 
interests  and  the  subordination  in  turn  of  ethical  impulses  to 
the  laws  of  enjoyment  give  a  new  interest  to  our  inquiry 
and  a  new  significance  to  economic  conclusions. 

H.  H.  Powers. 

Berlin. 


om^mMMm' 


:lK^tiiiii 


THE  ACADEMY  AND  ITS  WORK. 

The  American  Academy  of  Pouticai,  and  Social  Science  was  formed 
in  Philadelphia,  December  4,  18S9,  for  the  purpose  of  promoting  the  political 
and  social  sciences,  and  was  incorporated  February  14,  1891. 

While  it  does  not  exclude  any  portion  of  the  field  indicated  in  its  title,  yet 
its  chief  object  is  the  development  of  those  aspects  of  the  political  and  social 
sciences  which  are  either  entirely  omitted  from  the  programs  of  other  societies 
or  which  do  not  at  present  receive  the  attention  they  deserve.  Among  snch 
objects  may  be  mentioned  :  Sociology,  Comparative  Constitutional  and  Admin- 
istrative Law,  Philosophy  of  the  State,  Municipal  Government,  and  such  por- 
tions of  the  field  of  Politics,  including  Finance  and  Banking,  as  are  not 
adequately  cultivated  by  existing  organizations. 

In  prosecuting  the  objects  of  its  foundation,  the  Academy  has  held  meetings 
and  engaged  extensively  in  publication. 

MEMBERSHIP. 

"Any  person  may  become  a  member  of  the  Academy  who  having  been 
proposed    by  a  member  shall  be  approved    by  the  Qovinc\\.'"—Constiiution 
Article  IV.  ^ 

Persons  interested  in  the  study  of  political,  social  and  economic  questions, 
or  in  the  encouragement  of  scientific  research  along  these  lines,  are  eligible 
to  membership  and  will  be  nominated  upon  application  to  the  Membership 
Committee  of  the  Council,  .American  Academy,  Station  B.  Philadelphia. 

There  is  no  Initiation  Fee.     Annual  Dues,  $5.     Life  /Membership  Fee,  $100. 

MEETINGS. 
Public  meetings  have  been  held  from  time  to  time  at  which  the  members  of 
the  Academy  and  others  interested  might  listen  to  papers  and  addresses  touching 
upon  the  political  and  social  questions  of  the  day.  The  meetings  have  been 
addressed  by  leading  men  in  academic  aud  practical  life,  a  wide  range  of  topics 
has  been  discussed,  and  the  papers  have  generally  been  subsequently  published 
by  the  Academy. 

The  first  scientific  session  of  the  Academy  was  held  on  March  14,  1890  ; 
three  othersessions  were  held  in  1S90  ;  seven  in  1891  ;  five  in  1892  ;  five  in  1893  ; 
six  in  1S94  ;  four  in  1895  ;  six  in  1896  ;  eight  in  1897,  and  eight  in  1898,  or  fifty- 
three  in  all. 

PUBLICATIONS. 
^  Since  the  foundation  of  the  Academy,  a  series  of  publications  has  been 
maintained,  known  as  the  Annate  of  the  American  Academy  of  Political  and 
Social  Science  and  the  Supplements  thereto.  These  publications  have  brought 
home  to  members  accurate  information  and  carefully  considered  discussions  of 
all  the  questions  embraced  within  the  field  of  the  Academy's  interests.  The 
Annals  is  sent  ta  all  members  of  the  Academy. 

ANNALS. 

The  Annals  was  first  issued  as  a  quarterly,  but  since  the  second  volume 
it  has  appeared  as  a  bi-monthly.  At  the  present  time,  the  Annals  comprises 
two  volumes  of  about  500  pages  each  per  annum.  The  twelve  volumes  thus 
far  issued  comprise  49  numbers,  constituting  with  the  supplements  8,653  pages 
of  printed  matter  which  have  been  distributed  to  the  members  of  the  Academy. 

Besides  the  larger  papers  contributed  by  many  eminent  scholars  both  at 
home  and  abroad,  especial  attention  has  been  directed  to  the  departments.  All 
important  books  are  carefully  reviewed  or  noticed  by  specialists.  The  depart- 
ment of  Personal  Notes  keeps  the  reader  informed  of  movements  in  the  academic 
and  scientific  world.  Notes  upon  Municipal  Government  and  Sociology  preserve 
a  careful  record  of  events  and  other  matters  of  interest  in  these  subjects, 
which  at  the  present  time  claim  so  large  a  share  of  public  attention. 


OPINIONS  OF  THE  PRESS. 


To  persons  not  members  of  the  Academy,  the  price  of  Vols.  I.-V., 
including  supplements,  is  |6.oo  a  volume,  and  of  Vols.  VI. -XII. ,  S3. 00  each. 
Separate  numbers  $1.00  each.  Special  rates  to  Libraries,  Vols.  I.-V.,  I5.00 
each;  Vols.  VI. -XII.,  |2. 50  each. 

Members  are  entitled  to  discounts  varying  from  1673  per  cent  to  20  per 
cent  on  orders  for  back  numbers  or  duplicate  copies  of  publications.  All  cur- 
rent publications  are  sent  to  members  free  of  charge. 


til 


"the  work  of  the  Academy  touches  tlie  vital  questions  of  political  an^ 

social  Hfe,  and  treats  them  in  a  thoroughly  scientific  manner." 

Chicago  Herald. 

*'The  success  of  the  Academy  is  undoubtedly  due  to  the  very  liberal 
spirit  in  which  it  was  organizetl  and  has  been  conducted.  It  stands  for  n© 
dogma  ;  it  represents  no  party  and  no  institution  ;  its  motto  is  the  promo- 
tion of  science,  and  to  this  work  it  invites  the  professional  economist  and 
political  scientist ;  the  layman  who  h  interested  in  a  general  way  in  the 
scientific  study  of  economics  and  politics  ;  the  man  of  leisure  ;  the  public- 
spirited  citizen ,  and  the  busy  man  of  affairs,  all  of  whom  should  take  a 
pride  and  pleasure  in  assisting  in  the  progress  of  science  as  such  in  every 
department  of  human  affairs."  Public  Ledger,  Philadelphia. 

**  Persons  who  are  interested  in  political  and  social  science  will  find  the 

AMHAI3  of  the  American  Academy  extremely  serviceable." 

New  York  Herald. 

*'The    Annate  of  the  American  Academy  of   Political    and  Social 

Science,  published  in  Philadelphia, perhaps  the  paost  learned 

economic  magazine  in  the  country.  '^  Independent,  New  York.     _ 

"'The  American  Academy  of  Political  and  Social  Science  is  an  institu- 
tion which  is  doing  good  work  in  the  fields  of  Sociology,  Comparative  Con- 
stitutional and  Administrative  Law,  Finance,  etc.,  and  deserves  to  be  widely 
known  in  Europe.'*  Herald,  Rome,  Italy. 

**  The  Annals  of  the  American  Academy  is  issued  bi-monthly,  and  its 

contents  are  solid  and  substantial.  This  is  the  most  scholarly  of  all  the  pub- 
lications of  this  sort  which  are  published  in  the  United  States." 

Boston  Herald. 

**  The  publications  of  the  American  Academy  of  Political  and  Social 
Science  are  always  of  value.  The  papers  and  monographs  range  over  a 
wide  field,  and  are  marked  by  great  care  and  thoroughness." 

Guardian,  Manchester,  England, 

*'  One  of  the  potent  influences  that  have  prompted  the  advancement  of 
scientific  knowledge  in  the  United  States,  in  these  closing  years  of  the  nine- 
teenth century,  is  the  American  Academy  of  Political  and  Social  Science. 
Its  publications  are  exerting  a  powerful  and  wholesome  influence  on  Ameri- 
can thought.'*  Commercial  Gazette,  Cincinnati. 


Pifsms  inigftstid  in  thi  siudv  of  poliitcaU  iconomic  and  social  questions  an 
gUgibli  for  numbersbip.  Thi  ANSAI3  of  the  /Icadsmy  is  smt  to  all  tmmbers  fru 
mf  $hargi.     Thi  annual  mimhirshipfa  is  S^,.og  ;  lifs-numbinhip  /##,  $iOQ. 

Amtrican  Academy  of  Political  and  Social  Science, 
STATION  B.  PHILADELPHIA. 


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IN  fENTiONAL  SEUUNU  EXPOSURE 


THE  ACADEMY  AND  ITS  WORK. 

TiTK  American  Academy  of  Pouticai,  and  Sociai,  Science  was  formed 
in  Philadelphia,  December  4,  18S9,  for  the  purpose  of  promoting  the  political 
and  social  sciences,  and  was  incorporated  February  14,  1891. 

While  it  does  not  exclude  an}-  portion  of  the  field  indicated  in  its  title,  yet 
its  chief  object  is  the  development  of  those  aspects  of  the  political  and  social 
sciences  which  are  either  entirely  omitted  from  the  programs  of  other  societies 
or  which  do  not  at  present  receive  the  attention  they  deser\'e.  Among  such 
objects  may  be  mentioned  :  Sociology,  Comparative  Constitutional  and  Aclmin- 
istrative  Law,  Philosophy  of  the  State,  Municipal  Goveriiinent,  and  such  por- 
tions of  the  field  of  Politics,  including  Finance  and  Eaukiu"-,  as  are  not 
adequately  cultivated  by  existing  organizations. 

In  prosecuting  the  objects  of  its  foundation,  the  Academy  has  held  meetings 
and  engaged  extensively  in  publication. 

MEMBERSHIP. 

"Any  person  mar  become  a  member   of  the  Acadernv  who  having  been 
proposed    by  a  member  shall  be  approved    by  the  QowncWr'— Const Uulion 
Article  IV.  ' 

Persons  interested  in  the  study  of  political,  social  and  economic  questions, 
or  in  the  encouragement  of  scientific  research  along  these  lines,  are  eligible 
to  membership  and  will  be  nominated  upon  application  to  the  Membership 
Committee  of  the  Council.  American  Academv,  i^tation  R.  Philadelphia. 

There  is  no  Initiation  Fee.     Annual  Dues,  $5.      Life  Jl^embership  Fee,  $icO. 

MEETINGS. 
Public  meetings  have  been  held  from  time  to  time  at  which  the  members  of 


OPINIONS  OF  THE  PRESS. 


has  been  discussed,  and  the  papers  have  generally  been  subsequent! V  published 
by  the  Academy. 

The  first  scientific  session  of  the  Academy  was  held  on  March  14,  1890  ; 
three  other  sessions  were  held  in  1S90;  seven  in  1891  ;  five  in  1892  ;  five  in  1893; 
six  in  1S94  ;  four  in  1S95  ;  six  in  1S96 ;  eight  in  1897,  and  eight  in  1898,  or  fifty- 
three  in  all. 

PUBLICATIONS. 
^  Since  the  foundation  of  the  Academy,  a  series  of  publications  has  been 
maintained,  known  as  the  Axnai^s  of  the' American  Academv  of  Political  and 
Social  Science  and  the  Supplements  thereto.  These  publications  have  brought 
home  to  members  accurate  information  and  careful! v  considered  discussions  of 
all  the  questions  embraced  witliin  tlie  field  of  the  Academy's  interests.  The 
Annals  is  sent  to  all  members  of  the  Academy. 

ANNALS. 

The  Ankals  was  first  issued  as  a  quarterly,  but  since  the  second  volume 
it  has  appeared  as  a  bi-monthly.  At  the  present  time,  the  Annals  comprises 
two_ volumes  of  about  500  pages  each  per  annum.  The  twelve  volumes  thus 
far  issued  comprise  49  numbers,  constituting  with  the  supplements  8,653  pa^es 
of  printed  matter  which  have  been  distributed  to  the  members  of  the  Academy. 

Besides  the  larger  papers  contributed  by  manv  eminent  sciiolars  both  at 
home  and  abroad,  especial  attention  has  been  directed  to  the  departments.  All 
important  books  are  carefully  reviewed  or  noticed  by  specialists.  The  depart- 
ment of  Personal  Notes  keeps  tlie  reader  informed  of  movements  in  the  academic 
and  scientific  world.  Notes  upon  ^Municipal  Government  and  Sociology  preserve 
a  careful  record  of  events  and  other  matters  of  interest  in  these  subjects, 
which  at  the  present  time  claim  so  large  a  share  of  public  attention. 


To  persons  not  members  of  the  Academy,  the  price  of  Vols.  I.-V., 
including  supplements,  is  |6.oo  a  volume,  and  of  Vols.  VI. -XII  ,  $3.00  each. 
Separate  numbers  $1.00  each.  Special  rates  to  Libraries,  Vols.  I.-V.,  $5.00 
each;  Vols.  VI. -XII.,  ^2.50  each. 

Members  are  entitled  to  discounts  varying  from  16- ^  per  cent  to  20  per 
cent  on  orders  for  back  numbers  or  duplicate  copies  of  publications.  All  cur- 
rent publications  are  sent  to  members  free  of  charge. 


"The  work  of  the  Academy  touches  the  vital  questions  of  political  an^ 
Bodal  life,  and  treats  them  in  a  thoroughly  scientific  manner." 

Chicago  Herald, 

••The  success  of  the  Academy  is  undoubtedly  due  to  the  very  liberal 
spirit  in  which  it  was  organized  and  has  been  conducted.  It  stands  for  no 
dogma ;  it  represents  no  party  and  no  institution  ;  its  motto  is  the  promo- 
tion of  science,  and  to  this  work  it  invites  the  professional  economist  and 
political  scientist ;  the  layman  who  is  interested  in  a  general  way  in  the 
scientific  study  of  economics  and  politics  ;  the  man  of  leisure ;  the  public- 
spirited  citizen,  and  the  busy  man  of  affairs,  all  of  whom  should  take  a 
pride  and  pleasure  in  assisting  in  the  progress  of  science  as  such  in  every 
department  of  human  affairs. ' »  Public  Ledger,  Philadelphia. 

••Persons  who  are  interested  in  political  and  social  science  will  find  the 
Annals  of  the  American  Academy  extremely  serviceable.'* 

New  York  Herald. 

"The    Annai^  of  the  American  Academy  of  Political   and  Social 

Science,  pubUshed  in  Philadelphia perhaps  the  most  learned 

economic  magazine  in  the  country."  Independent,  New  York.    ^ 

**The  American  Academy  of  Political  and  Social  Science  is  an  institu- 
tion which  is  doing  good  work  in  the  fields  of  Sociology,  Comparative  Con- 
stitutional and  Administrative  Law,  Finance,  etc.,  and  deserves  to  be  widely 
known  in  Europe."  Herald,  Rome,  Italy. 

*'  The  AnnaIvS  of  the  American  Academy  is  issued  bi-monthly,  and  its 
contents  are  solid  and  substantial.  This  is  the  most  scholarly  of  all  the  pub- 
lications of  this  sort  which  are  published  in  the  United  States." 

Boston  Herald. 


^^' 


The  publications  of  the  American  Academy  of  Political  and  Social 
Science  are  always  of  value.  The  papers  and  monographs  range  over  a 
wide  field,  and  are  marked  by  great  care  and  thoroughness." 

Guardian,  Manchester,  England. 

"  One  of  the  potent  influences  that  have  prompted  the  advancement  of 
scientific  knowledge  in  the  United  States,  in  these  closing  years  of  the  nine- 
teenth century,  is  the  American  Academy  of  Political  and  Social  Science. 
Its  publications  are  exerting  a  powerful  and  wholesome  influence  on  Ameri- 
can  thought."  Commercial  Gazette,  Cincinnati. 


Persons  mteristid  in  the  study  of  political,  economic  and  social  questions  are 
eligible  for  membership.  The  Annals  of  the  Academy  is  sent  to  all  members  frei 
of  charge.     The  annual  membership  fee  is  $5-00  ;  life-membership  fee,  Sioo, 

American  Academy  of  Political  and  Social  Science, 
STATION  B*  PHILADELPHIA. 


^ 


The  American  Academy 


Oir 


Political  and  Social  Science 


PHILADELPHIA. 


President^ 
BDMUND  J.  JAMES,  Ph.  D.,  University  of  Chicago. 

Vice-Presidents, 
SAMUEL  M.  LINDSAY,  Ph.  D.,  F.  H.  GIDDINGS,  Ph.  D., 

University  of  Pennsylvania.  Columbia  University. 

WOODROW  WILSON,  Ph.  D., 
Princeton  University. 

Secretaries. 

General  Secretary, 

JOHN  QUINCY  ADAMS,  PH.D. 

37th  and  Locust  Street. 


Corresponding  Sefy, 
H,  R.  SEAGER,  Ph.D., 
37th  and  Locust  Street. 


Recording  Sec'y, 

CLINTON  ROGERS  WOODRUFF, 

Girard  Building. 

Treasurer,  Librarian, 

STUART  WOOD,  JOHN  L.  STEWART, 

400  Chestnut  Street.  Lehigh  University. 


GENERAL  ADVISORY  COMMITTEE. 


RT.  HON.  ARTHUR  J.  BALFOUR,  M.  P., 
London,  England. 

PROF.  C.  F.  BASTABLE. 
Dublin  University. 

PROF.  F.  W.  BLACKMAR, 

University  of  Kansas. 

SIR  JOHN  BOURINOT.  K.C.M.G.,  D.C.L.. 
Ottawa,  Canada. 

PROF.  R.  T.  ELY, 

Wisconsin  University. 

PROF.  HENRY  W.  FARNAM, 
Yale  University. 

PROF.  W.  W.  FOLWELL. 

University  of  Minnesota. 

HON.  LYMAN  J.  GAGE, 
Washington,  D.  C. 

RT.  HON.  LORD   HERSCHELL,* 
London,  England. 

DR.  KARL  T.  voN  INAMA-STERNEGG, 
Vienna,  Austria. 

PROF.  JOHN  K.  INGRAM,  LLD. 
Trinity  College,  Dublin. 


PROF.  J.  W.  TENKS, 

Cornell  University. 

DR.  WM.  PRESTON  JOHNSTON. 

President  of  Tulane  University. 

VERY  REV.  JOHN  J.  KEANE,  D.  D., 
Rome,  Italy. 

PROF.  E.  LEVASSEUR. 
Paris,  France. 

PROF.  AUGUST  MEITZEX, 
University  of  Berlin. 

PROF.  BERNARD  MOSES. 

University  of  California. 

DR.  HENRY  WADE  ROGERS, 

President  Northwestern  University. 

PROF.  HENRY  SIDGWICK, 
Cambridge  University. 

PROF.  WILLIAM  SMART,  LL.D., 
University  of  Glasgow. 

SIMON  STERNE,  Esq., 
New  York  City. 

HON.  HANNIS  TAYLOR.'LL.  D., 

Mobile,  Ala. 


(> 


*  Deceased. 


PROF.  LESTER  F.  WARD, 
Washington,  D.  C. 


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This  book  is  due  on  the  date  indicated  below,  or  at  the 
expiration  of  a  definite  period  after  the  date  of  borrowing,  as 
provided  by  the  library  rules  or  by  special  arrangement  with 
the  Librarism  in  charge. 


DATE  BORROWED 

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